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Abstract
Grid computing environments are open distributed systems in which autonomous participants
collaborate with each other using specific mechanisms and protocols. In general, the partici-
pants have different aims and objectives, can join and leave the Grid environment any time,
have different capabilities for offering services, and often do not have sufficient knowledge
about their collaboration partners. As a result, it is quite difficult to rely on the outcome
of the collaboration process. Furthermore, the overall decision whether to rely at all on a
collaboration partner or not may be affected by other non-functional aspects that cannot be
generally determined for every possible situation, but should rather be under the control of
the user when requesting such a decision.
In this thesis, the idea that trust is the major requirement for enabling collaboration
among partners in Grid environments is investigated. The probability for a successful future
interaction among partners is considered as closely related to the mutual trust values the
partners assign to each other. Thus, the level of trust represents the level of intention of Grid
participants to collaborate.
Trust is classified into two categories: identity trust and behavior trust. Identity trust is
concerned with verifying the authenticity of an interaction partner, whereas behavior trust
deals with the trustworthiness of an interaction partner.
In order to calculate the identity trust, a ”small-worlds”-like scheme is proposed.
The overall behavior trust of an interaction partner is built up by considering several factors,
such as accuracy or reliability. These factors of behavior trust are continuously tested and
verified. In this way, a history of past collaborations that is used for future decisions on
further collaborations between collaboration partners is collected. This kind of experience is
also shared as recommendations to other participants. An interesting problem analysed is
the difficulty of discovering the ”real” behavior of an interaction partner from the ”observed”
behavior. If there are behavioral deviations, then it is not clear under what circumstances
the deviating behavior of a partner is going to be tolerated. Issues involved in managing
behavior trust of Grid participants are investigated and an approach based on the idea of
using statistical methods of quality assurance for identifying the ”real” behavior of a partici-
pant during an interaction and for ”keeping” the behavior of the participants ”in-control” is
proposed.
Another problem addressed is the security in Grid environments. Grids are designed to pro-
vide access and control over enormous remote computational resources, storage devices and
scientific instruments. The information exchanged, saved or processed can be quite valuable
and thus, a Grid is an attractive target for attacks to extract this information. Here, the
vii
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confidentiality of the communication between Grid participants, together with issues related
to authorization, integrity, management and non-repudiation are considered. A hybrid mes-
sage level encryption scheme for securing the communication between Grid participants is
proposed. It is based on a combination of two asymmetric cryptographic techniques, a variant
of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC).
The different methods to trust management are implemented on a simulation infras-
tructure. The proposed system architecture can be configured to the domain specific trust
requirements by the use of several separate trust profiles covering the entire lifecycle of trust
establishment and management. Different experiments illustrate further how Grid partici-
pants can build, manage and evolve trust between them in order to have a successful collab-
oration.
Although the approach is basically conceived for Grid environments, it is generic enough
to be used for establishing and managing trust in many Grid-like distributed environments.
Kurzfassung
Grid-Umgebungen sind offene verteilte Systeme, in denen autonome Teilnehmer durch die
Verwendung von bestimmten Mechanismen und Protokollen miteinander kooperieren. Im All-
gemeinen haben die Grid-Teilnehmer unterschiedliche Ziele. Sie treten in die Grid-Umgebung
ein und verlassen sie zu unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten, haben verschiedene Fähigkeiten zur
Anbietung von Diensten und besitzen (fast immer) ungenügendes Wissen über ihre Koop-
erationspartner. Folglich ist es sehr schwer, den Ergebnissen des Kollaborationprozesses zu
vertrauen. Weiterhin wird die Entscheidung, einem Partner zu vertrauen, von anderen nicht-
funktionalen Aspekten beeinflusst, die sich im Allgemeinen nicht für jede mögliche Situation
bestimmen lassen. Solche Aspekte sollten daher dem Benutzer bekannt sein, wenn eine
Entscheidung getroffen werden soll.
In dieser Arbeit wird die Idee propagiert, dass Vertrauen eine bedeutende Anforderung für
die Ermöglichung von Zusammenarbeit zwischen Kooperationspartnern in Grid-Umgebungen
ist. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine erfolgreiche zukünftige Zusammenarbeit unter Partnern zu
haben, steht in engem Zusammenhang mit den gegenseitigen Vertrauenswerten, die die Part-
ner einander zuweisen. Somit stellt das Vertrauensniveau der Partner deren Absicht dar,
miteinander zu kooperieren.
Vertrauen wird in zwei Arten eingeteilt: Vertrauen in die Identität und Vertrauen in das
Verhalten der Kooperationspartner. Das Vertrauen in die Identität bezieht sich auf die Ver-
ifikation der Authentizität eines Partners, wohingegen das Vertrauen in das Verhalten seine
Glaubwürdigkeit darstellt.
Um das Vertrauen in die Identität zu bestimmen, wird ein Schema vorgeschlagen, das ähnlich
dem von Stanley Milgram vorgeschlagenen ”Kleine-Welt-Phänomen” ist. Um das Vertrauen
in das Verhalten eines Partners zu berechnen, werden unterschiedliche Komponenten des
Verhaltens betrachtet, wie etwa Genauigkeit und Zuverlässigkeit. Diese Komponenten wer-
den während einer Kooperation kontinuierlich getestet und verifiziert. Auf diese Weise wird
der Verlauf der vergangenen Zusammenarbeit aufgezeichnet und für die zukünftigen Entschei-
dungen hinsichtlich weiterer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Partnern benutzt. Diese Erfahrungen
werden auch anderen Kooperationspartnern mitgeteilt. Ein interessantes Problem ist die Bes-
timmung des ”wirklichen” Verhaltens eines Partners durch das ”beobachtete” Verhalten. Es
ist nicht klar, unter welchen Umständen und wie lange mögliche Verhaltensabweichungen eines
Partners toleriert werden können. Die in der Arbeit vorgeschlagene Nutzung verschiedener
statistischer Methoden der Qualitätssicherung bietet die Möglichkeit, das ”wirkliche” Verhal-
ten eines Partners zu identifizieren und es ständig unter Kontrolle zu behalten.
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Ein weiteres Problem, das adressiert wird, ist die Sicherheit in Grid-Umgebungen. Das
Grid wurde entworfen, um verschiedenen Teilnehmern Zugang zu entfernten Rechnern, Spe-
ichereinheiten und wissenschaftlichen Instrumenten zu ermöglichen. Die Informationen, die
die Partner austauschen, abspeichern oder verarbeiten, könnten für andere Grid-Teilnehmer
potentiell wertvoll sein. Somit stellt eine Grid-Umgebung ein attraktives Ziel für Angriffe
dar, um diese Informationen zu extrahieren. Diesbezüglich konzentriert sich die Arbeit auf
die Vertraulichkeit der Kommunikation zwischen den Partnern. Weiterhin werden Fragen
der Autorisierung, der Integrität, des Managements und der Nicht-Abstreitbarkeit behan-
delt. Das vorgeschlagene Verschlüsselungsverfahren ist eine Kombination von zwei asym-
metrischen Verschlüsselungstechniken, einer Variante der Public-Key-Kryptographie und
einer Verschlüsselungsmethode, die auf die Benutzung von digitalen Zertifikaten verzichtet.
Die verschiedenen Verfahren zum Management von Vertrauen wurden in einer Grid-
Simulationsumgebung implementiert. Die vorgeschlagene Systemarchitektur ist flexibel
und kann durch separate Vertrauensprofile an domänenspezifische Vertrauensanforderungen
angepasst werden. Durch mehrere Experimente wird illustriert, wie das Vertrauen zwischen
Grid-Partnern aufgebaut, entwickelt und verwaltet werden kann, um eine erfolgreiche Zusam-
menarbeit zu ermöglichen.
Der in der Arbeit vorgestellte Ansatz zum Management von Vertrauen wurde zwar für
eine Grid-Umgebung konzipiert, kann aber auch für die Etablierung und Verwaltung von
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”To trust is human”
Ken Grimes
... even in Grid environments!
Grid computing is a form of distributed computing that involves resources across dynamic
and geographically dispersed organizations. The parent idea for Grid computing is quite old.
In the early 1970s when computers were first linked by networks, the idea of harnessing
unused CPU cycles was born [61]. Anyhow, the term ”Grid” was established only in the
mid-90s to denote a proposed distributed computing infrastructure for advanced science and
engineering [140].
According to Foster et al. [141] and [142], the Grid computing paradigm is aimed at:
• providing flexible, secure, coordinated resource sharing among dynamic collections of
individuals, institutions and resources, and
• enabling communities to share geographically distributed resources as they pursue com-
mon goals, assuming the absence of central location, central control, omniscience, and
existing trust relationships.
In general, Grid systems have the characteristics of uncertain environments with casual
relationships based on the ”good name” of participants at the moment of collaboration. The
importance of a ”good” or ”bad name” is crucial in further decisions about the interactions
between them and is influenced by their individual actions performed.
At the base of every decision for an interaction between participants, trust considerations
should reside. The level of trust represents the level of intention of parties to collaborate.
Trust is usually specified in terms of a relationship between a ”trustor”, the subject that
trusts a target participant, and a ”trustee”, the participant that is trusted. The level of
trust that the participants build on each other is crucial for constructing the beliefs and
determining the level of intention of participants to establish collaboration among them.
These trust values can be accumulated and calculated based on past direct or indirect
interactions.
In order to give to the participants, especially to consumers, the possibility to establish such
a relationship with the other party, it is better to consider the relationships between trust
and Quality of Service (QoS) (Azzedin et al. [82]). QoS properties, according to Rana et
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Figure 1.1: Considered Architecture for Grid Environments.
al. [73] can be considered as trust elements and their specific values at a certain moment of
time should interfere with the decision of the consumer whether a provider is eligible for a
certain activity or not. In a similar way, the possibility to classify consumers that want to
take advantage of the offered services should also be given to the providers.
In general, such a trust management system for Grid environments, during establishment,
management and evolution of trust between participants, should reflect the same procedure
as during establishment, management and evolution of trust among humans. At the end one
comes up with the conclusion of Castelfranchi [99] that ”there is not such a big difference
among feeling threatened by humans that stay next to you or behind a machine somewhere
in the network; we must trust for interacting”.
1.1 Motivation
With the growing size of the Grid, the number of applications that profit from this technology,
varying from simple data sharing, as in Antoniu et al. [77], to expensive simulations [15]
grows as well. In such a new situation, comprehensive solutions for handling uncertainties
in the environment as a tool for helping individuals to expose themselves, regarding their
capabilities, correctness and honesty and at the same time to know better the others in the
environment are required.
It is pretty hard to have an objective opinion on the capabilities and the honesty of others
in the environment. ”Uncertainty” and ”ignorance” are difficult to deal with and affect
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the decision process when it comes to choose the right partner for/during an interaction.
Furthermore, thanks also to the environment, as presented in Fig. 1.1, it is difficult to
determine the real identity of the collaboration partners and their real intentions. In other
words, a Grid environment deserves the determination made by Dane Skow as an ”automated
error amplifier” [239] in all its contexts.
1.1.1 Trust and Security in Grid Environments
The mission of Grid computing is to make possible the sharing of services (representing dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge and expertise) distributed across multiple institutions and multiple
participants. When it comes to service integration across multiple partners, both security
and trust issues become significant.
Security mechanisms tend to provide the needed protection against malicious parties in the
environment. Traditional security mechanisms typically protect resources from malicious
users by restricting access to only authorized users. Currently Grid security uses X509-based
digital certificates [18], security assertions (SAML) [45] or role-based access management
(PERMIS [42] and Shibboleth [47]).
Such security mechanisms (Fig. 1.2), although too rigid for authentication and autho-
rization in terms of access control, lack the ability to determine how trustworthy the results
obtained from a specific provider are likely to be. In Grid environments, participants need to
protect themselves also from others that offer resources or services. As an example, the case
when resources act deceitfully offering false or manipulated and misleading information can
be mentioned. In such an example, the traditional security mechanisms are unable to offer
the needed protection to the threatened participants.
Figure 1.2: Traditional Security Mechanisms on Grids.
Trust management provides the basis to overcome these problems. It is a successful
approach that helps to maintain overall credibility level of the system as well as to encourage
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honest and cooperative behavior in the environment.
Trust is often linked to the identity of the participants. If the identity is uncertain, then one
argues if that participant can still be trusted. However, a framework for identity does not
provide information about trust. Participants need to somehow evaluate information received
from another participant in order to determine the trustworthiness of both the information
as well as the sender itself.
As a result, in Grid computing, trust management between participants should also be based
on social properties of trust. Just like in Marshs’ work [191], as much aspects as possible
from sociology and psychology should be included.
1.1.2 Considered Trust Features for Grid Environments
In real life, when dealing in the presence of uncertainty and ignorance with possible threats,
one has to rely on trust as the only mechanism for successfully dealing with inherent risks.
Being conscious on present threats pushes us to interact on basis of historical evidence as-
signing tasks accordingly to the different levels of trust we were able to build. From Josang
et al. [172] and Foster et al. [142], can be derived that trust systems are seen as most suitable
for providing protection against such threats while supporting the scalability and dynamicity
of the environment.
Trust in general, is seen as multifaceted and may be related to themes such as experience,
optimism, intentions, risk, beliefs, transitivity, competence, reliability, mutual control com-
mitment, etc. While managing trust in Grid environments, these features should be reflected.
Socially inspired trust models are useful for Grid environments, especially for the ease of ef-
ficiency in supporting the management of trust requirements.
Another important step to be taken in a Grid environment deals with the ”decentralization”
and ”generalization” of the notion of trust. Each of the participants should be able to decide
on its own regarding its policies and the preferences set by users (applications). Although in
this case more responsibility and expertise is assigned to an entity, at least each of them has
a chance to manage their own trust relationships.
Two types of participants can be identified in Grid environments: clients and providers of
services and resources for storage or computational purposes. It is in best interest of all par-
ticipants that both clients and providers know that they are dealing with single identities in
the Grid. Individual actions performed under a particular identity influence the ”good name”
of the identity itself and as a result the relationships of this identity with others in the commu-
nity. Each participant can identify itself as a client, as a provider or could also play both roles.
For each of the participants, their identity and their behavior must be considered to
establish trust among them. When trusting a participant, it is important to know which
aspect one is referring to. There are instances where a participant is trusted more than the
others regarding different levels of trust. There must be the possibility to specify in which
aspect of trust participants are interested in and at which level. Trust towards a participant
should be handled in different contexts. These contexts should be used to decide whether a
participant is eligible for a certain activity or not. The overall value of trust of a participant
should interfere with the decision of improving its social position among the others in the
environment.
Thus, trust in Grid environments is also a social value that pushes participants to collaborate
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with each other, assuming that their identities are already verified and that the kind of offered
goods are of sufficient quality.
There is the need to separate different activities in which a participant is involved, and the
need to consider not only the behavior of the participant in offering and requesting services
or resources but the quality of goods as well. Two participants continue to collaborate or
establish a collaboration with each other thanks to direct or indirect good experiences they
formerly had. The bigger the level of accumulated trust of a participant, the better will be
its ”social value” and ”position” in the environment. Thus, for each participant its ”social
position” in the community is important and must be determined upon the calculated level
of trust that this it acquired within the community. The importance of a ”good” or ”bad
name” is crucial in further decisions about the interactions with the participants involved.
However, apart from giving the possibility to a participant to gain a better social position in
the environment and the possibility to be decorated according to the level of trust, such a
system should also include sanctions to participants in case of misconduct or a lower level of
participation and interest in the community.
It is also important to underline that just like in our society it is good to have a percentage of
risk involved which is derived from some useful social aspects such as reciprocity and altruism.
In general, Grid systems can be seen as uncertain environments with casual relationships
based on the ”good name” of entities at the moment of collaboration.
1.1.3 Acting on Trust
The overall decision whether to trust an interaction partner or not may be affected by other
non-functional aspects that cannot be generally determined for every possible situation, but
should rather be under the control of the user when requesting such a decision. In addition,
while the basic functionalities of two applications could be similar, differences in application
behavior could be caused by different domain specific trust requirements. Therefore, a trust
system for a Grid environment should offer flexible and easy to use components that can be
configured to the specific needs of a user/provider on a per application/services requestor basis
(Fig. 1.3).
Figure 1.3: User/Application−Client−Provider.
1.1.4 To Trust or to Control?
In Grid environments, a participant needs to safeguard itself against others’ ”betrayal” of
trust and eventual sub optimal performance and behavior. It may pursue not only to build
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trust but at the same time to use control mechanisms. Trust and control mechanisms should
stay in a supplementary relationship (Fig. 1.4). Control mechanisms do not ”kill” trust but
help to protect participants in the environment from betrayal of trust. A high level of trust
should in no case mean a low reliance on control mechanisms and thus reducing it to zero.
Figure 1.4: To Trust and to Control.
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
This work offers a flexible model for establishing and managing trust in Grids as well as an
analysis of the effects that trust in general and different requirements for trust can have on
the environment and on personal views about the competence and honesty of others.
1.2.1 Trust Model
Consideration of Social Aspects of Trust in Grid Environments. Considering the
human experience while establishing and managing trust among participants in the environ-
ment as one of the ”starting points” of the thesis. A wide variety of needs and requirements
for trust from the users of applications running on Grids, regarding possible collaboration
partners, are considered. Trust is established and managed based on experience (personal or
that of the others), beliefs and prejudice. Each of the participants is able to manage its own
trust values regarding the others in the environment and also offers this experience when it
is requested.
Trust Threats Analysis. Threats to trust in Grids are taken into consideration and an-
alyzed during this work for having a better understanding on possible deceitful behavior of
the participants in the environment.
Hybrid Trust Model. This thesis considers both identity and behavior trust of the inter-
action partners together with different sources to calculate the overall trust values regarding
that specific interaction partner.
User/Application in the Loop. Trust establishment and management are adapted to
user and application requirements. The trust system is configured to the domain specific
trust requirements by the use of several separate trust profiles covering the entire lifecycle of
trust establishment and management.
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Relationship between Trust and Control. Each of the participants continuously controls
the behavior of their counterparts during the entire collaboration. The following principles
are applied:
• high control level on nominal trust and vice versa and
• user/application can express their preferences on the control level depending or inde-
pendent of the trust level.
Detection and Prevention of Anomalous Behavior. A definition of the behavior of
participants in Grid environments, as it could be derived from social sciences, is given. Sta-
tistical methods of quality assurance are used for monitoring the behavior of participants
during long and short term collaborations as a tool for detecting possible deceitful behavior
and trust betrayal.
1.2.2 Analysis of Effects of Trust in Grid Environments
Analysis of System Performance while Involving Trust. It is not possible to achieve
a higher level of reliance on the others’ behavior for nothing. The effects that trust can have
on important features like system overhead, mean processing time, etc are analyzed through
different simulated scenarios.
Effects of Control Levels on Trust. Many situations of normal and anomalous behav-
ior are taken as use cases and analyzed. Different control levels (from strong to moderated
control) exerted from participants and different typologies of interactions between them are
configured.
1.3 Thesis Overview
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2. Here, an overview of Grid environments is presented. Current technologies
applied together with security vulnerabilities are analyzed. The aim of this chapter, except
from being an introduction into Grid systems, is also to show the motivation for considering
trust and in part also security as research topics for this thesis.
Chapter 3. This chapter discusses the most important trust features for Grid environ-
ments together with different threats to trust that were identified during this work. The aim
of this chapter is to define the notion of trust considered for designing the trust model. Part
of this work was published in the Proceedings of the First International Conference on Grid
Services Engineering and Management (GSEM’04), Erfurt, Germany [212].
Chapter 4. In this chapter, a discussion of the literature related to trust modeling in
the Grid and in Grid-like domains, is provided.
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Chapter 5. This chapter outlines the key concepts of the approach proposed to achive trust
in Grid computing environments. A flexible model for managing both identity and behavior
trust of Grid participants is presented. Different sources for gathering trust information are
used and an important space to configure the requirements is left to the human user. The
collaboration among participants is continuously monitored according to the user/application
needs and accumulated experience during the past collaborations. Furthermore, statistical
methods for quality assurance are used for categorizing the behavior of partners according to
the observations during the current collaboration and observations done in the past, trying
to find any possible deviation on their behavior. The chapter concludes with a proposal on
how to enhance the security of the communication among trusted partners during future
collaborations. The ideas presented in this chapter have been published in ”Siegener Peri-
odicum zur Internationalen Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft’03” [135], the Proceedings of
the Fourth International Conference on Grid and Cooperative Computing (GCC’05), Beijing,
China [216] and the Proceedings of the International Conference on Grid Computing, High-
Performance and Distributed Applications (GADA’07), Vilamoura, Algarve, Portugal [213].
Chapter 6. This chapter presents the experimental work done in simulation environments
during this thesis for:
• observing how trust evolves among Grid participants,
• what are the effects of trust in the performance of the system in general,
• what are the effects of trust on the collaboration among Grid participants,
• what are the effects of control on trust itself and on the performance of the system,
• what ”success rate” has the deviating behavior of the counterparts on different control
levels (model configuration) of Grid participants.
Part of the experimental results have been published in the Proceedings of the Third Inter-
national Symposium on Information Assurance and Security (IAS07), Manchester, United
Kingdom (best paper award) [214] and in the International Journal of Information Assurance
and Security (JIAS) [215]
Chapter 7. This chapter closes the thesis giving a summary of the conclusions and the
work done in this thesis. Finally, some areas of future research are outlined.
Appendices. The appendices, except of showing the details regarding the experimental
scenarios, contain a discussion on why simulators were preferred upon real-life platforms for
running the evaluation experiments. Furthermore, a detailed presentation of the used sim-
ulator toolkit together with the implemented changes for adapting the trust model in this
simulation environment is given.
Chapter 2
Can You Trust Your Partners in
the Grid?
”It’s good to trust; it’s better not to”
Italian proverb
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Reasons for Grids
Grid computing is seen as the upcoming technology for solving complex computational prob-
lems. The systems linked in the Grid, forming the virtual computational space, might be
distributed in different geographical areas, run different operating systems and owned by
different organizations, each with its own policies for the management of resources.
In the form we know it today, Grid computing provides a framework for exploiting the
underutilized resources of different organizations (Fig. 2.1) and thus offers the possibility
of substantially increasing the efficiency of resource usage. Through efficiently using the
resources, Grid computing offers also a cost efficient problem solving environment.
2.1.2 Application Areas
In the following, some application areas that could profit from Grid technology will be pre-
sented. These applications are also used later on in this thesis, for deriving special trust
requirements and needs that each of the applications or users of these applications can have
towards their possible collaborating parties.
Data Sharing. The Grid can be considered as a large distributed data server. It is made
up of a pool of servers that basically run the same application, e.g. GridFTP [26]. Each
instance (session) runs independently without interfering with other instances.
The client is responsible for initiating the sessions, aggregating the results and putting to-
gether the file chunks to compose the whole file. This is a Grid application that can take
advantage of the storage capacity of idle servers and available network bandwidth.
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Figure 2.1: Generalization of Application Scenarios.
Media Sciences (Ewerth et al. [134]). Video content analysis is a complex task that
could also profit from the use of specialized Grid applications in this field. One example
could be the process of identifying ”cuts” in videos. Through a temporal segmentation, the
video is divided into disjoint segments called ”shots”. Two shots can be separated by transi-
tional frames, but often there is an abrupt shot change (called a ”cut”) without such frames.
To identify such ”cuts”, the video file is splitt and all these input video files are sent to a
scheduler, which assigns the tasks (splitt video files) to the remote services that will take care
of the analysis and the identification of the ”cuts”. After all the jobs are processed, the frame
dissimilarities have to be merged together, the user is going to be notified that the work has
been finished and the computed cuts list can be downloaded.
Medical Image and Video Analysis (Amendolia et al. [75]). The scenario tackles
the problem of storing and processing large images, which typically requires large compu-
tational infrastructures such as distributed databases and clusters. The solution allows the
use of idle storage and processing capacities in machines of the Grid to store and process
large amounts of medical digital images. An example from medical imaging is finding similar
cases (images) in a set of mammograms for diagnosis support. Images resulting from the
mammography are passed to remote services representing image analysis algorithms which
calculate similarities in image sets. These image analysis algorithms may be basically similar
to those used in the identification of video cuts or in object recognition tasks within frames
of video sequences. However, a more qualitative output is required in the medical scenario
2.2. GRID ENVIRONMENTS 11
compared to the video application.
Scientific Simulations (IBM Red Paper Series [137]). In this scenario, Grid computing
is used to support the execution of complex system simulations in the areas of physics, chem-
istry, and biology. The implementation tackles the problem of intensive calculations, which
demands high performance computing and typically requires large computational infrastruc-
tures such as clusters. Conventional high-performance facilities include computer clusters,
super-computers and a wide range of dedicated computing devices that provide good com-
puting power but at a high cost. Apart from the acquisition costs, such devices usually have
high maintenance costs and tend to become obsolete within a rather short period of time (a
few years at most), having to be replaced by new ones as the research evolves.
Summing up these ideas, research activities that perform compute intensive calculations de-
pend on high performance computing and, as a result, on very expensive infrastructures.
Such infrastructures must be also cost-effective and long-lasting. Therefore, this is the per-
fect scenario for Grid computing technologies.
Consulting Industry (IBM Red Paper Series [155]). This scenario describes a Grid
solution for a consulting company that provides financial management services to its clients
via the Internet. The application evaluates investments according to client constructs and
policies defined by corporate and government rules. A significant amount of its processing
time is calculation-intensive, because the application evaluates all available investment op-
tions of a particular client. Depending on the type of request, the processing can consume a
large amount of CPU resources.
2.2 Grid Environments
Grid computing is a relatively new paradigm that materializes the old concept of using
multiple distributed resources to cooperatively work on a single application (Schopf [232]).
2.2.1 Definitions
From its first appearance as a new paradigm, many definitions about Grid computing were
given. In 1998 [140], Foster and Kesselman wrote:
”A computational Grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides dependable,
consistent, pervasive and inexpensive access to high-end computational capabilities.”
In this definition, some of the Grid properties and functionalities are also given.
Some years later, this definition also includes ”the direct on demand access to computers,
software data and other resources” (Foster et al. [141]).
Again, according to Foster [139], the Grid computing paradigm is aimed at:
• coordinating resources that are not subject to centralized control - The Grid aims at
the integration and coordination of resources and users that live within different control
domains, different administration units, different companies and addresses the issues of
security, policy, payment, membership, and so forth.
• using standard, open, general-purpose protocols and interfaces - The Grid is built from
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multi-purpose protocols and interfaces that address such fundamental issues as authen-
tication, authorization, resource discovery and resource access.
• delivering nontrivial qualities of service - The Grid allows its constituent resources to
be used in a coordinated fashion to deliver various qualities of service, relating for
example to response time, throughput, availability, and security, and/or co-allocation
of multiple resource types to meet complex user demands, so that the utility of the
combined system is significantly greater than that of the sum of its parts.
All these definitions do not specify what a Grid is, but give an explanation of what a Grid
should be able to do. The most convincing definition of what a Grid is comes from [22] where
Grid computing is described as:
”an emerging computing model that provides the ability to perform higher throughput comput-
ing by taking advantage of many networked computers to model a virtual computer architecture
that is able to distribute process execution across a parallel infrastructure.”
In this work, the term Grid is used in the widest sense to describe the ability to pool and share
resources in a global environment in a manner which achieves seamless, transparent, simple
access to a vast collection of many different types of hardware and software resources, through
non-dedicated wide area networks, to deliver customized resources to specific applications.
2.2.2 Grid Participants
To understand the Grid, one needs to understand who uses it and to which purpose it is
used. According to Foster et al. [140], the classes of users that will exploit Grid capabilities
together with their interests are presented on the following table:
Class Purpose Uses Concerns
End Solve Applications Transparency;
users problems Performance
Application Desktop Programming Ease of use;
developers applications models; Tools Performance
Tool Develop tools; Grid Adaptivity;
developers Programming services Exposure of
models performance;
Security
Grid Provide basic Local system Local simplicity;
developers Grid services services Connectivity;
Security
System Manage Grid Management Balancing local
administrators resources tools and
global concerns
Table 2.1: Participants in Grids as of Foster et al. in [140].
The basic services in Grids are implemented by ”Grid developers”, which operate most
of the time on different hardware configurations rather than on software or protocols. All
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programming models are brought by ”tool developers”, which deal with libraries and ser-
vices used later on by ”application developers”. ”Application developers” construct high
level applications and components providing the ”end users” with the right infrastructure to
accomplish their needs in Grids without being concerned with the fact that they are func-
tioning in a Grid environment. The final class of users are ”system administrators” which
are in charge of infrastructure management assuring an effective functional behavior, at any
time in the environment.
In this work, only three classes of Grid users/participants are considered, ”end users”, ”Grid
consumers” and ”Grid providers” (Fig. 1.3 and 1.4). The above table could be summarized
in table 2.2.
Class Purpose Uses Concerns
End Solve Grid-enabled Transparency;
users problems applications Performance;
Security; Trust
Grid Execute Scheduling tools; Performance;
consumers end users’ Management tools; Costs;
requests Grid and local Connectivity
system services Security; Trust
Grid Maximize returns Management tools; Transparency;
providers on offered Grid and local Security; Trust
services system services
Table 2.2: Participants in Grids as used in this work.
2.2.3 Grid Environment Architecture
Grid computing was born to provide users with a seamless computing environment [140]
and is not only a matter of hardware connection, audience of participants or communication
among them. There do exist a lot more underlying principles that form a Grid environment.
• Multiple administrative domains and policies. Grid participants are geographically dis-
tributed across multiple administrative domains and owned by different organizations
each with its own management and usage policies.
• Heterogeneity. A Grid involves a variety of resources heterogeneous in nature.
• Scalability. The Grid has the ability to grow from a few integrated single resources or
organizations to hundreds and thousands of them.
Among communities that take part in a Grid environment, it is distinguished between
dedicated and sporadic participants. Each of them, alone or combined, helps to form two
kinds of Grid environments:
• Dedicated Grids and
• On-demand Grids
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In the following, a description of their characteristics is given.
Dedicated Grids. Concerns the case when large vendors will offer dedicated proprietary
applications Grids. This kind of environment is mainly compound of static Virtual Organiza-
tions (VOs), where the participants have agreed on conditions and rules for sharing resources
and using services (Fig. 2.2). VOs enable different organizations or individuals to share
resources in a controlled fashion to achieve a common goal and as a result, they are emerging
as fundamental entities in modern computing (Foster et al. [142]). The policies for authenti-
cation and authorization vary according to the organizations involved.
Figure 2.2: Dedicated Grids - Environment Architecture.
All participants are confident that applications that run on the remote sites, either on behalf
of consumers or providers, are going to behave properly. Based on the confidence provided
by this Virtual Community, members of a Dedicated Grid should, most probably, not ex-
perience the problem of an unpleasant behavior of the collaboration parties. On the other
hand, Grid members are limited to those interested in the subject. The creation of such
dedicated environments allows the deployment of a system that has been optimized for the
intended purpose. Hence, it opens the possibility of specialized Grid environments. It means,
a particular type of Grid, handled by an organization, whose aim is to provide dedicated and
specialized Grid services, will be created. The audience is thus narrower with Dedicated
Grids than with other types of Grids. This type of environment does not fulfill the Grid
mission at its very best. Seamless access of the users is not a reality and a centralized control
of the behavior of participants and their collaboration is done.
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On-Demand and Interoperable Grids. This environment could also be considered as
the next step of the evolution of Grid computing (Schreck et al. [233]). In this environment,
a wide range of participants, with no real common interests, exist (Fig. 2.3). The Grid
offers to them a seamless opportunity to share and use resources and services present in the
environment.
Figure 2.3: On-Demand and Interoperable Grids - Environment Architecture.
The environment is considered to be compound of dynamic VOs. Participants can organize
themselves, ”on the fly”, into a group in order to provide functionality and behavior that
none of them individually can. Any new VO can be made available and offer its function-
alities to every other participant in the environment. The dynamic organization is the key
behind higher robustness and lower costs for the management of Grid systems. It is possi-
ble to perform a computation, solve a problem, or provide service(s) to a single consumer
or to thousands of them. This Grid environment may consist of millions of interconnected
participants. Each of them stays behind a Grid node which forms an abstraction over re-
sources. Consumers could profit from new services, functions or even new concepts offered
by providers.
The dynamicity of the environment will facilitate the deployment of new services, but at
the same time raises many problems, from performance degradation to the growing of the
uncertainty in the environment as the number of participants grows. In such environments
failures are the rule rather than the exception.
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None of the participants is aware of the nature of its collaboration parties and some unpleas-
ant behavior from certain participants is expected. As a result, policies for dynamic behavior
control should exist. In order to offer satisfactory solutions in such an unreliable environ-
ment, providers must also offer explicit QoS assurances regarding availability, stability, and
capability [71]. The possibility to share or use resources and services should be given only
to the most trusted and competent participants. This will also serve to push participants to
continuously improve their behavior and the QoS of the services they offer.
In the rest of this thesis, it is refered to this kind of environment during the analysis of
the different needs for trust while deploying the trust establishment and management model.
2.2.4 Grid Security Models
Security is a crucial aspect in Grids. There are many security aspects within Grids that play
an important role. Among those are authentication, access control and privacy, encryption
and confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation.
• Authentication: attests the identity of collaboration parties. The authentication mech-
anism may be a custom authentication mechanism or an industry-standard technology.
• Access Control and Privacy: deals with the question ”which participant can perform
what action, when and where”. The problem of access control comes up after the
authentication was done successfully. Privacy deals with single preferences from par-
ticipants to hide and protect data from unauthorized requests.
• Encryption and Confidentiality: constitute an additional mechanism for protecting the
communication between collaboration parties and at the same time prevent the disclo-
sure of sensitive information.
• Integrity: protects the data saved or exchanged between participants from being altered
or destroyed.
• Non-repudiation: prevents participants from denying the origin of their actions.
Every participant in the Grid environment wants assurances that their data is kept un-
changed, that control and privacy of the communication are assured, that his/her requests
are executed accordingly, etc. In order to define a secure environment, the above aspects
have to be taken into consideration together with some other additional constraints that will
be treated in this thesis, like:
• Certification Infrastructure: determining the identity of participants. In such an infras-
tructure some of the ”certification authorities” should be considered more reliable that
the others.
• No Cheap Pseudonyms: preventing the participants to easily change and thus hide their
real identity.
• Collaboration Monitoring: the goal is to monitor the progress of the collaboration
between participants. Even the definition of policies regarding the collaboration does
not guarantee a secure collaboration; therefore monitoring plays a crucial role. This
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is essential to ensure that the interaction is progressing according to the needs and
preferences of the collaborating parties leaving no spaces for surprises regarding the
outcome of this interaction. Monitoring is important to achieve enough knowledge on
the behavior of the collaboration parties in order to find out if any form of deviating
behavior occurs.
• Past Behavior: archiving the monitoring results and thus achieving knowledge on the
behavior of others in the environment.
• Identity and Behavior: consideration of both identity and the behavior of a single
participant in the environment.
• Secure Execution: deals with running trusted (not-trusted) applications on not-trusted
(trusted) Grid environments.
• Trust Notions: many of the aspects mentioned above are subsumed by trust notions.
Trust can be considered as an enhancement of the security for Grid environments. Trust
relationships between users, administrators, applications, services and every other Grid
participant have to be considered.
The underlying security mechanisms should offer support for these trust relationships.
In the following, the security models of some of the most important Grid initiatives are
presented:
• Globus [19]: The Globus Toolkit uses the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) for en-
abling secure authentication and communication over an open (Fig. 2.4). GSI provides
a number of services for Grids, including mutual authentication, single sign-on and
delegation of credentials for computations that involve multiple resources and/or sites.
GSI is based on public key encryption, X.509 certificates and the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) communication protocol. To these standards, some extensions have been added
for single sign-on and delegation.
Authentication: GSI uses certificates for authentication. A participant in the Grid
is identified by a certificate, which contains information vital to identifying and authen-
ticating the participant. A certificate contains:
– The name of the subject. It serves to identify the participant represented through
this certificate.
– The public key belonging to the subject.
– The identity of a Certificate Authority (CA) that has signed the certificate to
certify that the public key and the identity both belong to the subject.
– The digital signature of the named CA.
If two parties have certificates and if both parties trust each other’s certificates, then
the two parties can prove to each other that they are who they say they are. This is
known as mutual authentication.
Certification Infrastructure: A third party is used to certify the link between the
public key and the subject in the certificate. In order to trust the certificate and its
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Figure 2.4: GT4 Grid Security Infrastructure.
contents, the CA itself has to be a trusted one. Furthermore, the participants them-
selves can generate certificates for temporary sessions (proxy certificates) if several Grid
resources are needed to be used and each of them requires mutual authentication.
Encryption and Confidentiality: By default, the GSI does not establish confidential
(encrypted) communication between parties.
Access Control and Privacy: GSI has an access control list. The purpose of this
file is to map a GSI Credential to a local user’s login name. The GSI administrator
on the site can map the holder of any GSI credential to any local user name. It is up
to the GSI administrator to verify that the GSI Identity is owned by and matches the
local username. The access control list is a plain text file, containing a quoted GSI
Credential Name (the subject of an X509 certificate) and an unquoted local user name.
Each subject name in the access control list must be listed only once. However, multiple
identities may map to a shared local name. It is up to the GSI administrator to ensure
that the access control entries do not violate any site security policies.
Integrity: By default, the GSI provides also communication integrity. It is a config-
urable feature and if activated, some overhead is introduced in the system.
Trust: the only trust notion contained in GSI is represented by the ”trusted CAs list”,
where all CAs that a participant trusts are listed.
• Legion [33]: In Legion, existing security standards such as Kerberos and the Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) communication protocol are integrated into the metacomputing
environment. The basic concepts of the Legion Security Model (Fig. 2.5) are minimal:
– every object (where the object may represent a file, a Legion service, a device,
or any other resource) provides certain member functions (authentication, access
control, delegation).
– user-defined objects can play two security-related roles - those of the ”responsible
agent”, RA, and the ”security agent”, SA.
– every invocation of a member function is performed in an environment consisting
of a triple of (unique) object names - those of the operative responsible agent,
security agent, and ”calling agent”.
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– there is a small set of rules for actions that Legion will take, primarily at member
function invocation. The general approach is that Legion will invoke the known
member functions, thus giving objects the responsibility of defining and ensuring
the policy.
Figure 2.5: Legion Security Model.
Authentication: The Kerberos authentication protocol is fundamentally based on
clients obtaining tickets for the use of services. Tickets are unforgeable tokens obtained
from a distribution server through a protocol that involves the actual authentication of
the user through password entry. Just like in Globus, in order to avoid the repeated
entry of passwords, a special Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is obtained by clients. This
TGT is a credential that can then be used for a limited time to obtain further tickets
that are required to access individual services. Clients can obtain specially marked
TGTs that can be forwarded to proxies for use within a limited time period. The
use of these forwarded TGTs is the basis for employing Kerberos as an authentication
mechanism within Legion. The services provided by Kerberos (e.g., obtaining forward-
able user credentials) are available in other systems, such as the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL). In fact, both Kerberos and SSL can be called through a generic interface: the
Generic Secure Service Application Program Interface (GSSAPI). By using GSSAPI,
straightforward extensions to other systems such as SSL are possible.
Access Control and Privacy: In Legion, access is the ability to call a method on an
object. Access control is not centralized in any single part of the Legion system. Each
object is responsible for enforcing its own access control policy. It may collaborate with
other objects in making an access decision and indeed, this allows an administrator to
control policy for multiple objects from a single point.
The general model for access control is that each method call received at an object,
passes through a ”access control” layer before being serviced. Policies for this layer
are specified as events in the configurable Legion protocol stack. According to these
policies it will be decided whether to grant access according to whatever policy it imple-
ments. The default implementation provides a more sophisticated access control layer
that implements access control lists and credential checking. Access control lists can
be specified for each method of an object.
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Collaboration Monitoring: is limited to monitoring the contribution and consump-
tion of participants. Information on parameters such as the amount of CPU used, the
number of messages sent and received, the total volume of data moved in and out of the
object and the number of method invocations performed are registered. Contribution
is monitored similarly.
Past Behavior: On termination, the collected information is forwarded to the instan-
tiation manager. The instantiation manager in turn places the resource data into a host
specific accounting database. Periodically the data is collected, merged into a single
database and reports are generated.
The mechanism offers the possibility to gain information who is using and who is con-
tributing resource and in what quantities.
• Unicore [53]: UNICORE security is based on the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol
and X.509V3 type certificates (Fig. 2.6). Because the participants’ id and group are
mapped onto his/her certificate on each UNICORE site, there is no need to use Grid-
wide user identification.
Authentication: For authentication by the gateway, each participant uses his/her
Figure 2.6: Unicore Security Model.
certificate for identification. The user interface application maintains the certificates
and needs to know the Certification Authority which signs the user and the gateway
certificates.
Certification Infrastructure: UNICORE has a single Certification Authority (CA)
localized at LRZ (Leibniz-Rechenzentrum, Muenchen/Leibniz-Computer Center Mu-
nich) and all other centers run a Registration Authority (RA). Additionally, each par-
ticipant has its own X.509 certificate that it uses to communicate with the Gateway
via the SSL protocol.
Access Control and Privacy: possession of a valid certificate enables all participants
to take advantage of the underlying functionalities. There are also two levels that retain
full control over resources. Only participants that are registered in the login database
may submit their tasks. The second allows the specification of system dependent reg-
ulation and limits for a particular machine.
Trust: is an implied notion regarding only the central CA.
• Condor [8]. Condor security is also based on the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol
and X.509 type certificates (Fig. 2.7).
Authentication: By default, Condor’s authentication simply uses the participants
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Figure 2.7: Condor Security Infrastructure.
identity (resulting from the information contained in the certificate) to determine who
a participant is.
Certification Infrastructure: The role of the CA is played by the pool (VO) admin-
istrator(s).
Encryption and Confidentiality: encryption is used for data sent across the net-
work. Condor can encrypt either the data that it sends for internal communication, or
participants data, such as files and executables.
Access Control and Privacy: Certification Authority (CA) maintains an access con-
trol list as well. This list allows the administrators to control which participants can
join a pool and what the rights will be.
Integrity: Condor offers the possibility to check if data sent across the network have
been tampered or not using additional cryptographic data. This can be used to prevent
so-called ”man in the middle” attacks in which an attacker changes the data being sent
without either side being aware of the modifications.
Trustworthy and reliable security is essential for all the Grid initiatives discussed above as
the basis for setting-up a Grid environment which demands convenient and automatic access
to available resources (Friese et al. [146] and Smith et al. [243]). There exist mechanisms and
tools which provide Grid applications with the ability to access the resources they require
when they require them and which also allow users and their collaborators to monitor and
steer their applications wherever they are on the Grid, while at the same time it is required to
maintain an accepted level of security to prevent any malicious behavior in the environment.
Since the Grid spans different security domains, it should be able to operate in conjunction
with these various local solutions. It cannot require a total replacement of local security
solutions, but rather must allow mapping into the local environment. Enhancing security
through trust consideration could be an efficient solution to this problem.
2.3 Threats on Grids
Security is one of the most challenging aspects of Grid computing (Smith et al. [244], [242]
and [241]). The Grid community has successfully adapted and applied existing security ap-
proaches and mechanisms to protect Grid participants from those that could be potentially
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malicious. These solutions focus primarily on authentication, access control and ease of col-
laboration. Authentication will identify each participant and ensure that no un-authorized
parties are involved. Access control ensures that the participant is allowed to use the resources
and/or services offered by remote participants. Finally, ease of collaboration is introduced
to implement many of the design goals of Grid computing, such as single sign-on, virtual
organizations and interaction among multiple administrative domains.
But how reliable and trustworthy are the Grid systems in reality?
From their very nature, Grids are designed to provide access and control over enormous
remote computational resources, storage devices and scientific instruments. The nature of
the information exchanged, saved or processed sometimes is very valuable and as a result,
the Grid can be an attractive target for distilling such information. Each Grid site is inde-
pendently administered and has its own local security solutions such as Kerberos [210] and
PKI [43]. These solutions are built on top of different operating systems. When all partic-
ipants are brought together to collaborate in this ”extremely” heterogeneous environment,
many security problems arise [242], [241]. In general, Grid systems are vulnerable to all
typical network and computer security threats and attacks. Furthermore, the introduction
of Web Service technology in the Grid (Foster et al. [143]) will bring a new wave of threats,
in particular, those inherited from XML Web Services.
A comprehensive security system, capable of responding to any attack on Grid resources, is
indispensable to guarantee its anticipated adoption by all interested participants indepen-
dently from being individuals or organizations. The conception of this security model for the
Grid requires also an analysis of the threats that do exist in Grid environments. Without
such an analysis, it will be very difficult to implement the right enhancements to the current
security models for Grid environments.
One of the first analysis on Grid security breaches was made by LCG group [32]. Some basic
classification of security threats from the operational point of view in Grids could be:
• Misuse.
• Confidentiality and data integrity.
• Infrastructure disruption.
• Accidental.
• Web Applications and XML Web Services vulnerabilities when considering dependency
on the technology.
Demchenko et al. in [125] and Navqi in [206] described some other models of vulnerabilities
of Grid systems.
We separate the vulnerabilities in Grids into vulnerabilities regarding Grid resources and
vulnerabilities regarding Grid services. Furthermore, one deals with models of uncertainty in
Grid environments and of deceptive behavior of Grid participants.
2.3.1 Vulnerabilities of Grid Resources
Theft of Credentials and Private Keys. The authentication process is mainly based on
the exchange of participants’ credentials. If not properly protected, this personal information
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could be an easy target to attacks with the sole aim to steal or compromise it. Single partici-
pants in the environment can impersonate certain identities and try to act maliciously without
fearing that their real identity can be compromised. Some consequences of intentional imper-
sonation are discussed further in the following sections when deceptive behavior is considered.
Data Integrity Attacks. These threats are directly related to the security offered by
the physical Grid infrastructure. The integrity of the stored data, replica files and other data
that are under the ”execution process” is dependent on the integrity of the Grid hardware.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks. Such
attacks, especially DDoS attacks are aimed at the availability of Grid services and Grid re-
sources. Thus, authorized participants are prevented from successfully joining the Grid and
participating in it.
Communication Attacks. This type of attacks regards the ”leak” of information be-
ing transmitted between participants. The presence of security gaps worsens the security of
the communication. As a result, the data being exchanged are vulnerable to different kind
of attacks (i.e. passive wire tapping).
2.3.2 Grid Service Vulnerabilities
The deployment of Web Service technologies in Grids (Foster et al. [117]) adds new vulnera-
bilities and attack strategies. As Demchenko [124] states, specific for this kind of attack, from
the point of view of applications and network protection, is that the malicious participants
do not interrupt the normal operation of their target participant.
Based on the articles of Negm [208] and [207], Linstrom [185] and Bloomberg et al. [90],
where analysis and classifications of Web Service vulnerabilities are presented, the following
vulnerabilities for Grid services can be derived:
Service Interface Attacks. WSDL is the description mechanism for Grid services con-
taining all methods and parameters used to access the service. This information on how to
access the service could expose the service to possible attacks.
Credentials Tampering. Grid services, just like the Web Services, use XML credentials
for authentication, authorization and session or state management. A poor implementation
of the security in the Grid systems, poor key generation or key management and lack of en-
cryption, are the causes of additional vulnerabilities like XML content theft or manipulation.
XML Content Manipulation. XML documents may be manipulated to contain malicious
parsing or processing instructions (XML Schema extensions, XPath or XQuery instructions,
XSLT instructions, etc). These malicious extensions make remote applications or hosting
environments more vulnerable in the face of additional threats.
Variations of DoS Attacks. Many Grid applications may allow complex or voluminous
XML input which, used intentionally by malicious participants in the environment, may over-
load the XML parsing system resulting in a variation of DoS attacks. Furthermore, XML
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has the ability to include references to external documents or data types. This can be inten-
tionally used by malicious participants to involve remote Grid sites to start (D)DoS attacks
in the environment. Least, but not last, the SOAP messaging infrastructure can be also the
target of typical network/infrastructure based attacks.
2.3.3 Dealing with Deception
Deception encompasses different behaviors consisting not only of ”blatant lies”, but also of
common deceptive behavioral mechanisms including concealment, exaggeration, equivoca-
tion, half-truths and misdirection (Buller et al. [93]). In fact, in everyday life, while carrying
out interpersonal relationships, one can expect to either witness or be the conveyor of a de-
ception (Decaire [123]).
Why do participants in Grid environments deceive? The answer could as simple as ”for the
same reason why humans do”, so for hiding themselves and/or planning a deceivable ac-
tion. Grid environments are conceived and set up by human users to serve the human users
through establishment of ”interpersonal relationships” between Grid participants. Consider-
ing the security infrastructure for Grid environments discussed above, every participant in
the environment has the potential to deceive the others and at the same time is vulnerable
in the face of deception.
In Grid environments one can definitely talk about a ”planned deception” in terms of
Mitchell [201], carried out by a single participant or in collaboration with others.
Here, deception in Grid environments is organized into two groups; identity related deception
and behavior related deception.
Identity Related Deception. In Grid environments, it is relatively simple to hide one’s
true identity, or to make use of someone else’s identity. For such a reason, the main problems
regarding identity deception deal with:
• Creation of a New Identity - The current certification infrastructure makes it easy to ev-
ery participant to obtain and be represented by several identities; all that a participant
has to do is ask for a certificate offering a ”cheap pseudonym” (von Laszewski [76]).
This certification procedure makes participants even more vulnerable. They can find
themselves under the attack of malicious participants, whose identity could be no more
traceable, or collaborate with others in the environment who offer mediocre services.
• Impersonation - Impersonation makes it possible for malicious participants to hide
themselves behind the identity of others when acting in the environment. Current
Grid security uses technologies that make use of public key infrastructures and digital
signatures that can be manipulated. Poor implementation of the security infrastructure,
poor key generation or key management and lack of encryption makes the credential
theft and credential tampering in Grid systems possible.
Identity related problems make it even more difficult for Grid participants to have certainties
on the identity of their collaboration partners and as a result to have confidence on their
behavior and on the output of the entire collaboration process.
Behavior Related Deception. The current Grid infrastructure favors the presence of
2.3. THREATS ON GRIDS 25
malicious participants whose aim can be harming the others for deriving mainly personal
profits. This deceptive behavior can be categorized as:
• Abusive Behavior - During collaboration, partners exchange information on each other
and data to be processed as well. This information, especially the confidential one, can
be intentionally forwarded to remote third parties or be used by single collaboration
partners contrary to the owners intentions.
Another form of abusive behavior is packet dropping. Malicious participants intention-
ally drop the data that should be sent to the interested participant instead.
• Mediocre Behavior - In current Grid environments, there does not exist any tool that
verifies the competence and the honesty of its participants. This allows single partic-
ipants, despite their modest capabilities, to compete with others in the environment.
Mediocre behavior also is the intentional decrease of one’s performance during the col-
laboration.
• Offensive Behavior - Offensive behavior are the attempts made by malicious participants
to attack the others in the environment for preventing them from normal functioning,
gain access to confidential information or making use of them for initializing a second
attack from.
In this work, a solution that deals with the categories of abusive and mediocre behavior is
presented. Proposals on how to deal with different categories of offensive behavior are also
given in the next chapters of the thesis.
2.3.4 Dealing with Uncertainties
Uncertainty plays an important role in Grid environments. It has really tight connections to
the information available about the environment, especially its participants. Information is
the mean for gaining knowledge about the others, minimizing the risk of collaborating with
deceivable partners. The more knowledge exists, the less the uncertainty. Uncertainty is
viewed as a manifestation of some knowledge deficiency, while knowledge is viewed as the
capacity to reduce uncertainty. In Grids, there does exist knowledge-based uncertainty. It
relates to the amount of knowledge about the structure and causalities of the environment,
knowledge about the real intentions of participants and reliability on the outcomes of the
collaboration processes.
The following categories for uncertainties in Grids are identified:
Uncertainties on the Identity. Uncertainties regarding the identity of Grid participants
relates to the simplicity of changing or manipulating their identity information. Current
technology offers the possibility to the participants to identify their collaboration partners,
but no assurances on their real identity. As a result, suspicions on the behavior and the
intentions of single participants exist.
Uncertainty on Current Behavior. This is the result of absence of tools for monitoring
the ongoing collaboration between participants. Output of the monitoring process helps to
create a history of the behavior of all collaboration partners. In current Grid environments
there does not exist any model of participants’ behavior where their behavior is determined
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as deceivable by comparing current behavior with their typical behavior and with the set of
rules and preferences established by Grid users.
Uncertainty on Future Behavior. The absence of a history regarding the past behavior
of the collaboration parties makes it also difficult to reason and create a logic on possible
future behavior.
In Grid environments, uncertainty is an additional problem to deal with. An adequate so-
lution should be offered to the participants in order to reason on the others’ identity and
behavior as well in the presence of uncertainty.
2.4 Summary
Grid computing is evolving toward a reality with scalable, flexible and dynamic participants
that provide a rich set of functionalities. The potential benefits of Grid computing are
enormous and range from data sharing and hosting to health, financial, simulation, video
and image processing services.
Current Grid environments can be defined as:
• Heterogeneous: Grid environments aggregate large numbers of independent and
geographically distributed computational and information resources, including super-
computers, workstation-clusters, network elements, data-storages, sensors and services.
Similarly, applications typically combine multiple independent and distributed software
elements such as components, services, real-time data, experiments and data sources.
• Dynamic: the Grid computation, communication and information environment is con-
tinuously changing during the lifetime of a collaboration between participants. This
includes the availability of the participants as well as their state, services and data.
• Uncertain: Uncertainty in Grid environment is caused by multiple factors, where the
most important are:
– Unpredictable and changing behaviors of participants introduced by the dynam-
icity and heterogeneity of the environment.
– Possible failures, which have an increasing probability of occurrence as number of
participants in the environment increase.
– Incomplete knowledge or perhaps no knowledge at all on participants in the envi-
ronment.
• Vulnerable: As previously analyzed, Grid systems will be vulnerable to all typical
network and computer security threats and attacks. Furthermore, bringing Grid tech-
nology next to Web Services technology brings new threats inherited from XML Web
Services.
Security is the key attribute that needs to be addressed within the Grid. Current Grid tech-
nologies offer authentication solutions based on the application of cryptography, PKI and
X509. Current security solutions have many deficiencies which makes Grid computing yet
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not so convincing for the commercial world.
Many of the security challenges in Grid environments can be addressed by considering man-
agement and enforcement of trust policies within a dynamic Grid environment. Defining
a trust model is the basis for interoperability but the trust model is independent of in-
teroperability characteristics. Trust is a complex subject relating to belief in the honesty,
truthfulness, competence, reliability, etc., of the considered participants.
In a trust management system, participants which assign some degree of trust to other par-
ticipants based on a combination of identity considerations, behavior observations, recom-
mendations from other participants and references to the trust sources are involved. This is
typically done by each participant resulting in its own trust policy. The degree of trust that
the participants assign to each other governs the decisions that they make when collaborating
with each other.
An enhanced solution needs to consider:
• Hierarchical infrastructure for assigning certificates - all participants are able
to issue certificates for themselves and the others, but some participants have to be
considered as more trusted than the others as certification authorities.
• Continuous monitoring of the collaboration - The monitoring process helps Grid
participants to control if their collaboration partners are behaving correctly or not. It
is the mean for gathering knowledge on the others’ behavior and thus decreases the
level of uncertainty in the environment. This process should last through the entire
lifecycle of the collaboration, and the information accumulated can serve for personal
future decisions or be offered to the others in the environment.
• A probabilistic model for expressing beliefs regarding the behavior of Grid
participants - Just like as Dix in [130] argues that in several real-life situations an agent
behavior may be known with a given degree of uncertainty, in Grid environments, the
behavior of its participants may also be known with given degrees of uncertainty. Given
that probability distributions are as sensible means to describe the uncertainty between
several possible behaviors (i.e. successor behaviors of a given current one), the type of
analysis involved must also be a probabilistic one. In such a probabilistic framework, the
Grid participants may have the possibility to express their beliefs (degree of suspicion)
regarding certain behavior properties (or the behavior as a whole) of their collaboration
partners.
• Identity and Behavior - Identity of a participant is part of the Grid authentication
and authorization process but at the same time it expresses the belief that this partic-
ipant is who he/she claims he/she is.
While making collaboration decisions, Grid participants have to consider both identity
and the behavior of the partners they are going interact with. Furthermore, mapping
the identity of a participant with his/her behavior may discourage malicious partici-
pants from trying to impersonate someone else in the environment and take part in a
collaboration process.
• Decentralization of the control and management - In Grid environments, central-
ized monitoring of distributed participants can become impractical when the number of
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participants is large, or the monitoring frequency is high. The large volume of monitor-
ing data means that high bandwidth connections and huge hosting platforms are needed
to download the data. Furthermore, using a central site for hosting behavior monitoring
information, also bears security risks. It can be an attractive target for malicious par-
ticipants who may want to steal or manipulate the saved information. Decentralization
is an important step to be taken in Grid environments. Each of the participants should
be able to manage on its own the collaboration process with others, although in this
case more responsibility and expertise is assigned to a single participant.
• Different sources for collecting information on collaboration partners - It is
important that participants make use not only of their personal experience regarding
past direct collaborations with other participants, but at the same time use the experi-
ence of others in the environment together with social notions like prejudice, optimism,
beliefs and transitivity.
Grid computing has the potential to evolve into something more than a commodity. In a
future in which computing, storage and software are no longer objects that we possess, but
utilities to which we subscribe, the most successful scientific communities are likely to be
those that succeed in assembling and making effective use of appropriate Grid infrastructures
and thus accelerating the development and adoption of new problem solving methods within
their disciplines (Berman et al. [86]).
This makes Grid technology as the next logical step towards utility (on-demand) computing
[14].
Chapter 3
Trust in Collaborative Grid
Environments
”Nach dem Spiel ist vor dem Spiel”
Sepp Herberger
3.1 Introduction
All Grid participants are expected to provide a certain level of confidence in terms of se-
curity and quality of service. This will affect their ”existence” (being present and active
in collaborations with others) in the environment. However, pure consideration of only the
security aspects like authentication and authorization is insufficient to make them less vul-
nerable against different threats and to ensure a successful and ”undisturbed” interaction.
The problems identified in the previous chapter can be somehow minimized by considering
the management and enforcement of the notion of trust in the environment.
In general, trust and security are very tightly coupled (Lamsal [180]). They can even be
considered as complementary to each other. The effect that different aspects of trust like
reputation, honesty and credibility have in establishing trust relationships between partici-
pants in the environment has to be considered together with security.
Trust is an important aspect of Grid environments. It is the underlying concept behind every
decision for collaboration.
There are a number of ways that Grid participants can establish trust among them. First,
a participant interacts with the target participant(s) and learns its/their behavior over a
number of interactions. In this case, the participant reasons about the outcome of the direct
collaborations with others. When starting a collaboration with a new participant, it can use
its beliefs about different characteristics of the interaction partners and also reason about
the beliefs in order to decide how much trust should be put on each of them. Second, the
participant could ask others in the environment about their experiences with the target par-
ticipant(s). If sufficient information is obtained and if this information can be trusted, the
participant can reliably choose its collaboration partners.
When trusting a participant, it is important to know which aspect one refers to. There are
instances where a participant is trusted more than the others regarding the different levels
of trust. There must be the possibility to specify in which aspect of trust participants are
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interested in and at which level. Trust towards a participant should also be handled in dif-
ferent contexts. These contexts should be used to decide whether a participant is eligible or
not for a certain activity. The overall value of trust of a participant should interfere with the
decision of improving its social position among the others. Thus, trust is a social value that
pushes participants to collaborate with each other.
There is the need to separate different activities in which a participant is involved and the
need to consider not only the behavior of the participant in offering and requesting services
or resources but the quality of goods as well.
Two participants continue to collaborate or set a collaboration with each other based on
direct or indirect good experiences they formerly had.
Considering a decentralized and context-oriented notion of trust as well as experiences,
beliefs and intentions adds a lot of flexibility to a Grid environment. Although more respon-
sibility and expertise is assigned to every participant, they are able to manage their own trust
relationships with others.
In the rest of the chapter, the most important trust features for Grid environments will be
discussed. Finally, different identified threats to trust will be presented.
3.1.1 Trust Taxonomies
The notion of trust has been treated in a number of publications ranging from sociology,
psychology to computer science. Though several definitions and classifications of trust already
exist, there is no clear consensus on the definition of this notion. Delimiting this notion is
even more critical in the domain of Grid computing, where trust plays a central role for
establishing collaboration among participants in the environment. Definitions of trust are
more effective when the entire process of trust establishment and evolution is considered.
Each of the participants in the environment possesses an objective, underlying level of trust.
This reflects exactly the degree to which they will fulfill the assigned tasks or reciprocal
obligations during collaborations. However, the subject that trusts a target participant does
not fully know this underlying trust value and must gather all the available information from
all possible sources in order to attribute by itself a level of trust to the collaboration parties.
3.1.2 Definitions
Trust is an important aspect in every domain ranging from everyday life to social and com-
puter sciences. Most of the activities between parties are initiated based on the sole suppo-
sition that a certain level of trust already exists between them.
Trust is usually specified in terms of a relationship between a ”trustor”, the subject that
trusts a target participant and a ”trustee”, the participant that is trusted. Trust forms the
basis for allowing a trustee to use or manipulate resources owned by a trustor or may influ-
ence a trustor’s decision to use a service provided by a trustee.
In Grid environments, collaboration takes places between different participants. A collabora-
tion partner is either a service provider (e.g. a node to host and provide a service, or a service
instance running on the provider node) or a service consumer (e.g. a node that requests a
service from a provider (which includes the request to deploy and perform a service at the
provider), or a service instance running on the consumer node).
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There are two major aspects that influence the selection or acceptance of an interaction
partner:
• The identity of the interaction partner or more specifically the trust that one can put
in the credibility of the identity an interaction partner claims to have.
• The past behavior of the interaction partner as an indicator for its future behavior . This
behavior can be determined considering a multitude of dimensions, such as the accuracy
of delivered results, actual costs compared to expected costs, availability of the service,
response time, or fault and intrusion properties. Furthermore, the trust values might
be different for different applications/services the interaction partner offers or requests.
In the following it will be discussed:
• ”what trust is”,
• ”what trust is not” and
• ”how trust in Grid environments can be defined”.
What Trust Is Supposed to Be. There are several attempts to define trust.
The most interesting definition is given by Merriam Webster dictionary [34], where trust is
considered as:
• assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something
• dependence on something future or contingent (hope)
• reliance on future payment for property (as merchandise) delivered (credit)
• a property interest held by one person for the benefit of another
• a charge or duty imposed in faith or confidence or as a condition of some relationship
• something committed or entrusted to one to be used or cared for in the interest of
another (care, custody)
According to Marsh [191], the majority of work on trust originated from sociology, (social)
psychology and philosophy. The most important definitions in these domains are given by
Morton Deutsch, Niklas Luhmann, Bernard Barber and Diego Gambetta.
Deutsch [126] argues that trust depends on the individuals’ perceived cost and benefits anal-
ysis of the specific scenario. Such a definition involves some kind of uncertainty and at the
same time indicates some optimism. If the perceived benefits were greater than the perceived
harmfulness then the significance of trust in the choice would not be that big. In [127], he
shifts towards confidence for defining trust. Thus, trust is the confidence that one will find
what is desired from another person rather than what is feared. This shift towards confidence
indicates the inclusion of hope in trust.
Luhmann [188] and [189], emphasizes that in order to live in a society, several assumptions
are needed and trust is the mean for reducing the complexity of the society. The particular
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situation and the particular environment have to be taken into account before taking trust
decisions. Trust plays a significant role in the interaction of a single individual with the
society.
Barber [85], links trust with expectations about the future:
• Expectation on the persistence and fulfillment of the natural and moral social orders.
• Expectation on ”technically” competent performance.
• Expectation that interaction partners will ”carry out their fiduciary obligations and
responsibilities, that is, their duties in certain situations to place others’ interests before
their own”.
Gambetta [147], defines trust as follows:
”Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which
an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both
before he can monitor such action (or independently or his capacity ever to be able to monitor
it) and in a context in which it affects his own action.
When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the
probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us
is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.
Correspondingly when we say that someone is untrustworthy, we imply that that probability
is low enough for us to refrain from doing so.”
Furthermore, he describes trust as:
• a particular expectation one has with regard to the likely behavior of others,
• something suspended between faith and confidence,
• a tentative and intrinsically fragile response to the ignorance, a way of coping with ”the
limits of our foresight”,
• a result rather than a precondition of cooperation.
Finally, according to Grandison [154], in information technology, trust can be defined as:
”the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely, and reliably within
a specified context.”
What Trust Is Not Supposed to Be. Kaplan [178], gives his definition of what trust is
not:
• Trust is not transitive - it can not be passed from a person to another and furthermore
preserving the same level.
• Trust is not distributive - different persons can not share the same trust value and the
trust on a single person can not be transformed in a unique value for the group.
• Trust is not associative - it can not be linked or added to another value.
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• Trust is not symmetric - two partners must not necessarily trust each other at the same
level.
• Trust is not self-exclaimed - everyone can exclaim his/her underlying trust level, but
no one else must necessarily trust it; trust must be gained.
The following applies to ”what trust is not” definition as well:
• Trust is not equal to reputation - reputation reflects the ”social position” of an indi-
vidual among all the others in the environment while trust is a property established
between two individuals through direct collaborations.
• Trust is not the opposite of risk - while risk can be considered as the opposite of trust,
having a certain level of trust does not mean ”risk-free”.
• Trust is not a substitute for security mechanisms - as previously stated, trust and
security are complementary to each other.
• Trust is not as the ”prisoner’s dilemma” [44] propagates it - trust is established by
considering different sources for getting trust information from and not a purely socio-
cognitive property.
• Trust is not specified only in terms of ”trusted” and ”not trusted” - two individuals
trust each other on an individual scale.
• Trust is not static - trust changes (evolves or regresses) over time.
• Trust is not absolute - identity and behavior are two aspects that influence the selection
of collaboration partners. Furthermore, behavior of individuals needs to be evaluated
considering different aspects. A trustor trusts a trustee with regard to its capability of
performing specific actions or providing specific services within a certain context.
• Trust (in terms of beliefs and altruism) is not a handicap - it is good to trust, it is good
to have some risk involved. Without trust we cannot stand (Confucius).
• Trust is vulnerable - vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited (Kaplan [178]).
Alternatively, a weakness in a trust establishment and management system could be
exploited in order to violate trust1.
• Trust is not an exclusive property - trust is not assigned; everybody in the environment
can earn it.
• Trust is not enough - a high level of trust should in no case mean ”blind trust” and as
a result a low reliance on control mechanisms.
• Trust is not cost-effective - trust is a complement to security and means control. Control
mechanisms could in a certain sense raise the individual costs of the participants.
1The threats to the trust in Grid environments are treated at the end of this chapter.
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Definition of Trust. In this thesis, a multi-faceted definition for trust is considered:
”Trust is the extent to which every participant in a Grid environment, in a specific moment
of time, with an evidence of relative security regarding the identity and the behavior of their
counterparts, is willing to interact with them, even though unexpected negative outcomes could
result from the entire collaboration process.”
When trusting a participant, it is important to know which aspect one refers to. There
are instances where a participant is trusted more than the others regarding to different levels
of trust. There must be the possibility to specify in which aspect of trust participants in
the environment are interested in and at which level. Trust towards a participant should be
handled in different contexts. These contexts should be used to decide whether a participant
is eligible for a certain activity and the overall value of trust of a participant should interfere
with the decision of improving the social position among the others.
Trust in Grids still preserves its social value. It pushes participants to collaborate with each
other, having certainties that the kind of requested goods and services are offered with a
sufficient quality level (Fig. 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Trustor-Trustee Collaboration.
Considering Gambetta’s description of trust ( [147]), it is further concluded that trust is the
”moral prize” that the trustor assigns to the trustee at the end of the collaboration regarding
its behavior during collaboration and at the same time it is ”the precondition” for future
collaborations.
3.1.3 Classification
Trust in this work is classified principally into identity trust and behavior trust:
Identity Trust (IT ). Every participant in the environment is known through its iden-
tity. Trust on identity reflects the confidence of the trustor on the declared identity of the
trustee.
Behavior Trust (BT ). During the collaboration, it is expected from every participant
in the environment to behave dependably, securely and reliably. Behavior trust reflects the
confidence of the trustor on the expected behavior of the trustee.
Behavior trust depends on different aspects, such as type of connection, type and quality of
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services offered, processing power, quality of resources, etc. In different situations, Grid users
can have different needs with respect to the overall capabilities of single participants in the
environment, e.g.:
• the user may want to use some computing power in the shortest time possible at the
lowest cost,
• the user may want to take advantage of any special service with a certain quality of
service offered by one or more participants,
• the user may want to save critical data at some remote sites expecting the the data will
not be manipulated.
Overall Trust. The trust T that an interaction partner X has for partner Y is influenced
by both identity trust T I and behavior trust TB:
TX(Y ) = T IX(Y ) · TBX (Y ) (3.1)
The relationship between overall trust, identity trust and behavior trust is expressed in Fig.
3.2.
Figure 3.2: Overall Trust.
3.2 Trust Dimensions
While sources of trust are from where trust cues originate, dimensions of trust are the oper-
ational attributes to which they contribute (Bailey et al. [84]).
In the following, dimensions of trust in Grid environments will be discussed.
3.2.1 Attraction
Attraction among Grid participants involves the overall capabilities that they offer in the
environment. Independent of the role a participant is playing at a certain moment of time,
”attractiveness” is specified in terms of ”appearance”, determined primarily by its interface
and functionalities exclaimed. These elements are very important since a Grid participant
that ”looks good”, is also as a reasonable partner for collaborating with.
36 CHAPTER 3. TRUST IN COLLABORATIVE GRID ENVIRONMENTS
3.2.2 Identification
Trust in Grid environments should also be linked to the identity of the active participants. If
the identity of a participant is uncertain, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is difficult
to fully trust that specific participant.
The relationship between trust and identification in Grids has not been explored in depth
yet. Since in Grid environments there is the possibility for the participants to possess a
signed certificate which is validated entitling them to collaborate with others in the environ-
ment, further knowledge of the identity is not required. However, possibilities for further
investigation on the ”real” identity of the trustees must be offered, in order to fulfill explicit
requirements of trustors.
3.2.3 Control of Collaboration Partners
The relationship between trust and control is of a great importance for the notion of trust and
for modeling and implementing control mechanisms regarding the behavior of participants in
Grid environments.
Trust and control assume each other’s existence, but they do not necessarily coexist in every
scenario. According to Möllering [203], trust produces control and control produces trust.
Control is trust-building when trust in trustee’s autonomous willingness and competence
would not be enough. Both trust and control exist in a reflexive relationship to each other,
establishing the means of positive expectations. For a trustor, when coming to the behavior
trust or overall trust of a trustee, control completes and complements trust. Furthermore,
the control:
• determines whether a collaboration was successful or not,
• deals with the possible deviations and unexpected events in order to cope with them.
Castelfranchi and Falcone, in [102], argue that control requires new forms of trust:
• trust in the control itself,
• trust in the trustee as for being monitored and controlled,
• trust in possible authorities, etc.
Depending on the circumstances, control makes trustee more reliable or less reliable. As a
result, control can either decrease or increase trust.
3.2.4 Competence and Reliability
Competence implies that the trustee possesses the knowledge, expertise and ability to fulfill
the needs of the trustor (Chopra and Wallace [107]). A related attribute is credibility (Doney
et al. [132]), the degree to which information provided by the trustee can be believed.
Competence in Grid environments is incorporated by the attributes of:
• correctness - the participant delivers the proper outputs or payments,
• availability and accessibility - the participant is up and running whenever it is needed.
Reliability of a collaboration partner is measured in terms of dependability, predictability or
consistency. It is directly related to past experiences and prior collaborations.
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3.2.5 Satisfaction
The trust that the trustor places on the trustee during (or at the end) of the collaboration
increases the ultimate benefits the trustor gains from collaborating with the trustee. In a
certain sense, not only does the trustor gain the desired outcome from the collaboration, but
the trustor also gains the ”satisfaction” of having evidence that the trustee is capable to fulfill
its needs, behaving accordingly to the trustor’s expectations, showing itself as trustworthy.
Only when a trustor, according to the gathered evidence on past collaborations, establishes
a belief that a trustee is capable of performing its required functions and will act on the
trustor’s best interests, the trustor can fully expect that the trustee will fulfill the trustor’s
needs to perform a specific task.
A trustor’s continuous sense of satisfaction, regarding the collaboration process with a specific
trustee, will have a positive effect on trustor’s perception of effort and performance expectancy
toward the trustee.
3.2.6 Commitment
The higher the level of commitment, the greater the probability a participant will achieve a
better outcome. Expected benefits coming out of the collaboration normally exceed the costs
associated with maintaining this kind of relationship between them (the very aim of a Grid
participant for joining the environment).
Commitment during the collaboration results in an increase of the trust that the trustee has
already established to the trustor.
The accumulated trust is only an evidence of commitment during past collaborations and
does not give any warranties for the commitment of the trustee in future collaborations. It
merely reflects the trustor’s expectations regarding the behavior of the trustee in the future.
3.2.7 Intentions
Intentions are not characteristic of machines in Grid environments; they are not characteristic
of computers at all at their present stage of evolution. Intentions, however, do become
”insidiously implanted” in Grid participants. Developers, administrators and users in Grid
must be careful to properly define their goals and objectives. If the participant’s purpose is
perceived to be somehow hostile, then distrust will result.
3.2.8 Expertise
Expertise is related to the skills, capabilities, or knowledge of a collaboration party. In
general, experts are perceived as being more trustworthy than the others (Brainov et al.
in [91] and Peters et al. in [220]). In Grid environments, the assessment of expertness is
related, to some extent, to breadth of knowledge, depth of knowledge, etc, offered by the
specific participants for the solution of specific problems. An optimal solution to a difficult
problem is most impressive with respect to the capabilities of the party/parties involved in
the collaboration.
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3.2.9 Dynamicity
Dynamism is used to describe how active a Grid participant is. With respect to the trustee,
a trustor’s opinion is affected by its perceptions of a trustee’s responsiveness, i.e. meaning
how quickly it is engaged in a collaboration process and how quickly it works towards the
solution of assigned tasks.
3.3 Trust Sources and Formalisms
Trust is a multidimensional value that can be derived from different sources. First, prior to
any collaboration, trust has an initial value that reflects a trustor’s general predisposition
or willingness to trust. This predisposition reflects to some extent the trustor’s collabora-
tive attitude (Mayer et al. [196]). Second, trust may be based on knowledge and inference
(attribution) of the trustee’s abilities, traits, goals, norms, values and circumstances. This
knowledge may be based on the trustor’s own direct experience with the trustee. Third,
trust may be based on the reputation that the trustee has in the environment. This kind
of trust is formed through the collaboration in the past between the trustee and others in
the environment. A fourth source of trust could be the socio-cognitive trust as discussed
by Castelfranchi and Falcone in [100] and [101]. This type of trust formalizes the concepts
derived from human social interaction and its relationship to trust. Ideas from different
fields like psychology or sociology are synthesized. In this case, it makes use of outcomes
from examination of the behavior of deceptive individuals and the behavior of collaborative
individuals or collaboration of all individuals (group collaboration). The empirical basis for
defining the elements for assessing trust for making trust decisions and how trust among
individuals evolves over time are provided.
3.3.1 A Social Network Model for the Relationships between Participants
in Grids
Experience is an important factor that influences the trust between participants in Grid en-
vironments. It is actually the result of the interaction between participants.
We distinguish between three types of experiences:
Direct Experience. If a trustor assigns some tasks to a trustee, the quality of the outcome
of the execution of these tasks reflects the trustor’s experience with the trustee. This type of
experience is called direct experience. Observations of the trustee’s behavior, through record-
ing the outcome of the collaboration process, are essential for a subjective evaluation of its
trustworthiness.
The term direct trust refers to the trust that is built from direct collaborations (that is, using
observations by the trustor itself). Even in the case when the participants are unknown at
the beginning, a collaboration can be established (depending on the security policies). In
this case, an initial value can be assigned by default, which will later on be changed by the
trustor on the basis of the outcome of the direct experience with the trustee.
Third Parties’ Experience. The quality of the experience itself is important. This can
be considered as subjective, meaning that different participants may not estimate the quality
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of the experience with a specific collaboration partner at the same level. The experience
that third parties in the environment have had with a specific participant is called third
parties’ experience or recommendations. Recommendations from third parties provide the
possibility for trust regarding unknown participants to be propagated. Recommendations are
based purely on the recommender’s personal direct experience. Obtaining recommendations
becomes more important in cases where no direct experience with a specific target partic-
ipant exist. Thus, recommendations allow participants to consider collaboration even with
unknown entities.
Experience with Recommenders. The third parties’ experience is per recommender
and as such it is possible to associate a measure of trust in the opinion of the recommender
itself. In cases where recommendations affected the trustor’s decision to collaborate with the
trustee, the quality of those experiences will also serve to evaluate the quality of each indi-
vidual recommendation to arrive at the formation of an opinion regarding the recommenders.
Let us consider the case when a participant X (the trustor) assign its tasks to a participant
Y based on the recommendations by a participant Z (third party). Here, X relied on Z’s
recommendation. If the collaboration between X and Y was evaluated as successful according
to the point of view of X, than Y is most probably suitable for future collaborations. The
outcome of the collaboration with Y affects X’s opinion about Z’s future recommendations.
In other words, direct experience of X with Y , affects X’s opinion regarding the recommen-
dations of Z. This is the experience with recommenders.
The relationships between Grid participants can be modeled as a social network (Fig. 3.3),
where participants in the environment are represented through a set of vertices and relations
between them are represented through a set of edges.
Figure 3.3: Social Network Model for the Relationships Between Participants in Grids.
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3.3.2 Optimism, Intentions, Beliefs and Risk
Social trust includes characteristics like optimism, belief in collaboration and confidence that
collaboration parties can resolve their differences and ”live” a satisfactory ”social life” to-
gether.
According to Patil et al. [218], optimism is the positive expectation a participant has for
another participant or an organization based on past performance and truthful guarantees.
Trust is about expectations in future collaborations. Participants’ intentions behind collab-
oration play an important role in a successful outcome of the entire collaboration process.
Trust is considered to be an epistemic notion (Christianson and Harbison [108]) consisting
of beliefs (Castelfranchi and Falcone [103]).
Statements about trust regarding individual participants in the environment are statements
of personal beliefs held by others. The reasons for holding them do make such beliefs true in
the real world (Patil et al. [218]).
Trust values regarding past collaboration partners involve one’s beliefs derived from the avail-
able evidences, intentions and readiness for undergoing possible risks. One should not expect
Grid participants to behave monotonously on these basic parameters involved in trust forma-
tion. A generic framework for managing trust among participants should provide means and
methods for the participants themselves to express their beliefs while avoiding unintentional
transitivity of trust (Christianson et al. [108]).
The extent to which a participant can be optimistic is threatened by the risk associated
with the unsuccessful or undesired outcome of the collaboration. Risk and trust helps for
making decisions in uncertain collaborative environments. Participants in the environment
continue to collaborate with unknown participants even though they are aware of risk exis-
tence. It is because of their intentions behind the collaboration and their beliefs in evidences
associated with the collaboration with specific participants as well.
Trust means in no way certainty. Some uncertainty is always present and some probability
of failure must be considered. A participant in the Grid environment must accept this fact
and run such a risk. Thus, when a trustor trusts a trustee there are two risks:
• the risk of total failure - outcome of the collaboration is disastrous.
• the risk of wasting the efforts - not only fails the trustor on achieving its goals but also
wastes other resources (e.g. monetary).
Relying on another party for establishing a collaboration with may be considered as a risky
process. It implies always the presence of some uncertainty, but it also requires some pre-
dictability of the other party and inevitably some degree of trust in it.
3.4 Trust Properties
Trust is necessary to enable Grid participants to collaborate with each other. Every trust
relationship has basic properties to which it adheres.
Trust, which reflects a subjective degree of individual belief about other participants, is
dynamic and non-monotonic (Marsh [191]), meaning that personal experiences may increase
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or decrease one’s degree of trust. Trust beliefs are also influenced, as previously shown, by
reasoning, social stereotypes, communication and spreading of reputation (Bacharach and
Gambetta in [83]). To trust means, one is vulnerable to the outcome of a decision and risks
and uncertainty are inevitably involved with it. With the above definitions of trust it is
possible to identify the properties of trust. Properties of trust include subjectivity, ability
to reduce complexity, non-transitivity, context and ability to be measured. The identified
properties of trust, which are included in the construction of the trust model presented in
this thesis, are introduced in the following:
• Trust is a knowledge gaining process - trust is a process of individual learning to trust
others in the environment.
• Trust is not an ever flourishing property - some problems can be tolerated by the
participants, but when a certain threshold is reached, trust can flip to distrust. For the
trustee, fixing the individual problem will not lead to a regain of the lost trust on the
trustor’s side.
• Trust is always accompanied by risk - during the collaboration, the presence of some
uncertainty on the outcome of the collaboration process with a specific participant is
presumed, but at the same time some degree of trust is also needed in it.
• Trust is dynamic - experience and knowledge about the collaboration party is accu-
mulated with time, and as a result, the degree of trust that the trustee builds at the
trustor is under constant re-evaluation and changes with time.
• Trust is subjective - one property of trust that is important in social networks is its
subjectivism. Two participants often have very different opinions about the trustwor-
thiness of a third participant in the environment. Trust is based on a trustor’s prior
direct experiences and gathered knowledge. Trust is inherently a personal opinion.
Trust on a trustee ranges from complete distrust to complete trust. When knowledge
on the trustee is lacking at all, then this case can be defined as ”ignorance” and the
trustor simply is not able to make a categorization regarding the trust on a trustee.
• Trust is asymmetric - the asymmetry of trust reflects a specific type of personalization.
For two participants involved in a collaboration, trust is not necessarily identical in
both directions. Because participants perceive the experiences differently, it is under-
standable why they may also trust each other differently. According to Hardin [157],
trust is mutual, meaning that each participant has some trust for the other, but there
do often exist differences in how much they trust one another. Asymmetric trust can
arise in any relationship, as supported from Golbeck [149], and representations of trust
relationships in models of social networks must allow for these differences.
• Trust relationship - participants in the environment are interested to deal with sin-
gle identities. Thus, the one-to-one relationship is considered as best suited for Grid
environments.
• Trust is measurable - the trust level is a measure of belief in another participant, in its
honesty, competence, security and dependability.
In the environment, some participants may be trusted more than others. In order to
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have an accurate view on the level of trust regarding a specific participant, this has to
be a continuous value. However, there is still a problem relating to the representation
of ignorance (or lack of knowledge) with respect to trust.
• Trust is compositional - there are a number of ways that a Grid participant can establish
trust with its counterparts. The participant can interact with the target participant(s)
and learn its/their behavior over a number of interactions. In this case, the participant
reasons about the outcome of the direct interactions with others.
When starting an interaction with a new participant, meaning no information on previ-
ous behavior exists at all, its beliefs about different characteristics of these interaction
partners can be used, in order to decide how much trust should be put in each of
them. Furthermore, the participant could ask others in the environment about their
experiences with the target participant(s). With information from many people, there
is simply more reasoning and justification for the belief (Golbeck in [150]). If sufficient
information is obtained and if this information can be trusted, the participant can re-
liably choose its interaction partners.
3.5 Relationship between Trust and Quality of Service
QoS refers to the ability of a trustee to provide network and computation services that
each trustor’s expectations for timeliness and performance quality are met. According to
Quality Management and Quality Assurance Standard [57], QoS is defined as ”the totality of
characteristics of an entity that form its ability to satisfy stated and implied needs.”
There are many different usages of the word quality. The most important are:
• ”conformance to requirements” - leads to the idea that ”quality costs less” and
• ”degree of excellence” - which implies that ”quality costs more”.
There are several dimensions of QoS described in the literature like Chatterjee et al. [105],
Vendatasubramanian et al. [254], Rana et al. [73] and Maximilien et al. [194] which include
parameters like accuracy, precision and performance. For a QoS dimension to be supported,
it means that participants request or specify a level of service for one or more attributes of
these dimensions and the underlying control mechanisms should be capable of keeping those
services at the requested levels. The requirements for quality are an expression of the needs or
their translation into a set of quantitatively or qualitatively stated requirements that enable
the realization and examination of the collaboration processes.
The overall assessment of the QoS is performed by Grid participants themselves, since they
are the ones able to evaluate the efficiency of the services offered and the grade of fulfillment
of their requirements.
The collected information gives to the participant the means for assessing the various quality
characteristics of its collaboration parties. It is used later on during the categorization of the
behavior of its partners for continuing collaboration only with those that fulfill its require-
ments.
QoS assures not only the behavior of single Grid participants through the monitoring of
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QoS parameters, but defines also how the whole environment manages given tasks. QoS
deals with a range of expected behaviors of individual participants which only as a whole
define the completion of the service a user (or an application) demands. In this context,
it is important to map user’s expectations and preferences into the system parameters and
capabilities.
Trust in Grid systems can be defined as having confidence that a interaction party will offer
the desired QoS, behaving as expected. Trust management is the process of deciding what
participants are to be trusted to complete what actions and if the interested participant can
be allowed to use the services offered or not. A trust system for Grid environments should
offer flexible and easy to use components that can be configured to the specific needs of a
user, considering different roles (consumer or provider) that a platform could play in different
moments of time.
Abstracting the common attributes from the variety of demands that the human user,
aiming at an optimal level of QoS, on a per case basis, places to the participants in the envi-
ronment, the components of the behavior trust could be derived from the parameters of QoS
like: reliability (correct functioning of a service over a period of time), availability (readi-
ness for use), accessibility (capability of responding to a request), cost (charges for services
offered), security (security level offered), performance (high throughput and lower latency),
etc.
Each of these parameters can be directly measured or broken up into measurable elements,
in order to offer the possibility to create a history with data from past interactions among
collaborating parties in Grid environments.
Fig. 3.4 gives a view of the behavior trust elements considering different roles (consumer
or provider) that the participants play at certain moments:
Figure 3.4: A General View on Behavior Trust Elements in a Grid Environment.
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The QoS requirements can be divided into:
• Quantitative requirements - here, parameters like collaboration reliability, accessibility
and availability of services offered, performance, responsiveness, cost, etc., are included.
These parameters can be described in terms of measurable values such as bandwidth,
failure percentage and absolute times, given also the nominal values and tolerances
determined at the beginning of the collaboration.
• Qualitative requirements - here, parameters like dependability, efficiency, flexibility, ro-
bustness, interoperability, security, etc., can be mentioned. These requirements are not
expressed in absolute values but they are comparable and always subject to participants’
perception and evaluation.
Managing trust between parties in a collaboration means somehow also quality management.
The establishment of a quality management system helps to identify if the collaboration par-
ties were committed and the output of the collaboration process was not under the requested
standards.
3.6 Trust Metrics
Trust metrics define the measure of amount of trust that the trustor attaches to the trustee.
Quantitative metrics, qualitative metrics, or a combination of these two should be considered
to measure trust levels.
3.6.1 Trust Values
Any trust relation is associated with a value that represents the expectations or the strength
of beliefs. In the literature, there is no real consensus regarding the representation of trust.
According to Ding et al. [129], the level of trust the participants establish to each other can
be either boolean or numeric. Aberer et al. in [67], use a sort of ”binary” trust. Participants
are either trustworthy or not. Another alternative for representing trust values is to make
a categorization of trust regarding a participant. Azzeding et al. in [79], use this approach.
Trust is categorized as (very low trust level, low trust level, medium trust level, high trust
level, very high trust level, extremely high trust level). A similar schema for the trust cate-
gorization is given by Golbeck in [151]. Trust values are specified on a scale of 1 to 9 where
(1: Distrusts absolutely, 2: Distrusts highly, 3: Distrusts moderately, 4: Distrusts slightly,
5: Trusts neutrally, 6: Trusts slightly, 7: Trusts moderately, 8: Trusts highly, 9: Trusts
absolutely).
However, the usage of these semantics does not give an objective view on the real trust of
a participant (trust is subjective; different participant may use different categorization for
the same experiences). Furthermore, this approach gives a loss of sensitivity and accuracy,
since comparisons become coarse grained with no way to distinguish between participants’
behavior.
In order to have a more accurate trust assessment, the numeric values are seen as most suit-
able, although even in this case, there does not exist any proper agreement (Ding et al. [128]).
In eBay [10], participants receive feedbacks with one of the three values (+1, 0, -1) for their
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reliability during each collaboration. Marsh, in his thesis [191], represents trust as a contin-
uous variable using as scale for trust values [-1, +1]. He states that trust can have threshold
values that vary between individuals and situations. A participant will have a positive thresh-
old value, above which another participant is trusted and a negative threshold value, below
which they will not trust a specific participant. Waguih [255], considers a numeric trust
system consisting of nine grades ranging from absolute distrust to absolute trust within [-1,
1]. It proposes that a participant is categorized acording to: -1 (Absolute Distrust), -0.75
(High Distrust), -0.5 (Moderate Distrust), -0.25 (Slight Distrust), 0 (Ignorance), 0.25 (Slight
Trust), 0.5 (Moderate Trust), 0.75 (High Trust), 1 (Absolute Trust).
Sloman [240], expresses the range of trust levels as integers in [0, 100] where high trust is
represented in [90, 100], low trust in [5, 20] and a default initial trust in [0, 50]. Negative
values represent distrust.
In this work, probabilities are used as parameters of subjective belief (denoted as confi-
dence levels) to denote the trust values. The probability for a successful future interaction
among partners is considered as closely related to the mutual trust values the partners assign
to each other. These values vary in [0, 1] ⊂ <, where 0 means that the other partner is
not trusted at all or there are uncertainties due to the lack of information (the condition of
”ignorance”), and 1 means that it can be fully trusted and gives certainties on the success of
the interaction that is going to take place.
In this way:
• trust measurement (identity and behavior trust) is reduced to a normalization of the
measured value to range [0, 1].
• these confidence parameters are an evidence of past experiences and in a certain sense
reflect the risk associated and the expectations for the future.
• according to the user specific needs and requirements it is easier to automate the decision
whether the trust established with a certain participant would be enough to establish
a collaboration with.
3.6.2 Metrics on Clients’ Side
In the following, some of the QoS/Behavior Trust elements, as seen from the clients’ side will
be presented (client is represented through X and the provider through Y ).
This list is subject to extension as soon as new elements are considered as necessary to assess
the behavior (trust) of a provider during the collaboration.
• Availability - represents the state when a provider is present and ready to fulfill the
client’s request. It could be measured as:
TAvailabilityX (Y ) =
NAvailabilitytotal success(Y )
NAvailabilitytotal verif. (Y )
(3.2)
where NAvailabilitytotal success(Y ) represents the number of successful verifications of the avail-
ability of the provider (service) and NAvailabilitytotal verif. (Y ) represents the number of total
verifications of the availability of the provider.
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• Accessibility - represents the state when an available provider is capable of serving the
clients’ requests. It could be measured as:
TAccessibilityX (Y ) =
NAccessibilitytotal success(Y )
NAccessibilitytotal verif. (Y )
(3.3)
where NAccessibilitytotal success(Y ) represents the number of successful verifications of the acces-
sibility of the provider (service) and NAccessibilitytotal verif. (Y ) represents the number of total
verifications of the accessibility.
A non-available service is implied to be not accessible as well.
• Accuracy - reflects the provider’s competence, reliability, commitment and intentions.
It can be measured as:




where NAccuracytotal success(Y ) represents the number of total correct responses (resulting after
verification) received from a provider (service) and NAccuracytotal verif.(Y ) represents the num-
ber of total verifications of the accuracy of the responses from that provider (service).
• Response time - represents the time taken for a provider to complete a client’s request
and return a response. It can be measured as the time between sending a request to a
provider (service) and receiving a response from it.
• Latency - intended to measure the speed with which a provider can process a given
request. Possible measures can be conducted using the time when the request reached
the service and time when the service finished processing the request.
• Throughput - represents the number of completed service requests over a time period
(Ran [224]). Throughput is related to latency and in a certain sense influences the
response time; the higher the throughput, the shorter the response time. It is also true
that as the number of concurrent clients increases, the provider’s throughput is multi-
plexed amongst a larger number of connections and hence the response time increases.
• Packet dropping - if an available and accessible provider received a task to complete,
but for a certain reason did not return any kind of results, then it is supposed that the
task assigned by the client was dropped. It could be measured as a fraction of the total
number of responses the client should have received from a specific provider:
TP DroppX (Y ) =
NP Dropptotal success(Y )
NP Dropptotal verif.(Y )
(3.5)
where NP Dropptotal success(Y ) represents the number of total responses the client received
from a provider and NP Dropptotal verif.(Y ) represents the number of responses that the client
expected in total from that specific provider.
• Packet dropping duration - represents the ”duration” of drop events from a provider.
It can be measured as the number of consecutive packets dropped in each event.
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• Bandwidth - represents the amount of data a specific provider instantaneously receives
and transmits. It can be measured as the average number of bytes (or packets) able to
be received and transmitted in a second.
3.6.3 Metrics on Providers’ Side
In the following, some of the QoS/Behavior Trust elements, as seen from the providers’ side,
will be presented (provider is represented through X and the client through Y ). This list, just
like in the case when client was the trustor, is subject to extension as soon as new elements
are considered as necessary to asses the behavior (trust) of a client during the collaboration.
• Client availability - just like in the case when the client was the trustor, availability
represents the state when a client is present and ready to receive the provider’s response.
Formula (3.2) could be used for measuring client availability.
• Client accessibility - again just like in the case when the client was the trustor, acces-
sibility represents the state when an available client is capable of accepting the result
coming from the provider. Formula (3.3) could be used measuring client accessibility.
Once again, a not available client could be considered as not accessible as well.
• Number of concurrent requests - represents the number of simultaneous requests that
a client can make to a provider. Considering a service-oriented Grid environment as in
Srinivasan et al. [246] or in the thesis of Friese [145], the client could assign more than
one task simultaneously to a provider e.g. simply by invoking different instances of
the same service offered by that provider. In case the number of concurrent requests is
somehow limited by any pre-contract2 (Web Services Agreement Language [54]) between
the client and the provider, respecting this clause is ”a must” for the client and part of
its behavior during the collaboration. It can be measured as:
TConc ReqX (Y ) =
NConc Reqtotal success(Y )
NConc Reqtotal verif.(Y )
(3.6)
where NConc Reqtotal success(Y ) represents the number of successful verifications (client respected
the agreement) and NConc Reqtotal verif.(Y ) represents the total number of verifications of the
number of concurrent requests made from the client.
• Size of sent packets - once again, in case the size of the packets the client is allowed
to send to the provider is somehow limited by any pre-contract [54] between the client
and the provider, respecting this clause is again ”a must” for the client and part of its
behavior during the collaboration. It can be measured as:
TPacket SizeX (Y ) =
NPacket Sizetotal success(Y )
NPacket Sizetotal verif. (Y )
(3.7)
2Actually, each of the considered metrics, either from client or provider side, could be subject to a pre-
liminary agreement between the client and the provider. Each of the metrics specified in the agreement is ”a
must” for the party, otherwise it has not behaved accordingly. Trust values are always influenced from the
resulting behavior (positively or negatively).
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where NPacket Sizetotal success(Y ) represents the number of successful verifications (client respected
the agreement) and NPacket Sizetotal verif. (Y ) represents the total number of verifications of the
size of packets sent from the client.
• On-time payment - represents the number of payments made at the right time by the
client. The time of payment can be specified in an agreement between the client and
the provider. It can be measured as:
TOn TimeX (Y ) =
NOn Timetotal success(Y )
NOn Timetotal verif.(Y )
(3.8)
where NOn Timetotal success(Y ) represents the number of successful verifications (client respected
the agreement) and NOn Timetotal verif.(Y ) represents the total number of verifications of the
payment times.
• Due payment - regards the due amount of the reward the client owes the provider for
the services offered. It can be measured as:
TOn TimeX (Y ) =
NOn Timetotal success(Y )
NOn Timetotal verif.(Y )
(3.9)
where NOn Timetotal success(Y ) represents the number of successful verifications (client respected
the agreement) and NOn Timetotal verif.(Y ) represents the total number of verifications of the
payment times.
• Response loss - if an available and accessible client, for a certain reason was not able
to receive the response sent by the provider, then it is supposed that the response got
lost. It can be measured as a fraction of the total number of responses the provider
sent to the client:
TP LossX (Y ) =
NP Losstotal received(Y )
NP Losstotal sent(Y )
(3.10)
where NP Losstotal received(Y ) represents the number of total responses the client received
from a provider and NP Losstotal sent(Y ) represents the number of responses that the client
expected in total from that specific provider.
• Response loss duration - distribution of the ”duration” of loss events, measured as the
number of consecutive packets lost in each event.
3.7 Trust Threat Analysis
Trust is vulnerable and anything or anyone that can exploit any vulnerability constitutes a
threat (Kaplan [178]).
It is related to the fact that participants have a degree of freedom to disappoint the expec-
tations. It is also related to the limits of anyone’s capacities ever to achieve a full knowledge
of others, their motives, their responses to endogenous as well as exogenous changes (Gam-
betta [147]).
Threats define events, the occurrence of which could have an undesirable impact (Ozier [211]).
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Threat analysis includes the identification of possible threats that may adversely impact the
target participant. Without threat management and assessment, the participants may fail to
objectively establish trust among them.
The potential for harm caused by the presence of threats could be also answered from the
four questions posed by Ozie while analyzing and assessing risk (Ozier [211]):
• What could happen? (What is the threat?)
• How bad could it be? (What could the impact or consequence be?)
• How often might it happen? (What is the frequency?)
• How certain are the answers to the first three questions? (What is the degree of confi-
dence?)
Central to the notion of trust is the condition of ignorance or uncertainty as defined in the
forth question. If no uncertainty could exist in the environment, then the trust information
the participants gathered on each other could be more reliable. Reliability on trust infor-
mation is the confidentiality that one should have regarding the offered experience and the
current behavior of others in the environment.
The two primary types of adversaries in Grid environments, able to put reliability of trust
at risk are fraudulent and malicious participants. They are primarily distinguished by their
goals in the environment. Fraudulent participants wish to have a considerable profit for their
”mediocre” contribution or achieve a better ”social” position in the environment to the detri-
ment of the other participants. The goal of malicious participants on the other hand, is to
cause harm to either specific targeted participants in the environment or to the environment
as a whole.
To accomplish their goal, both types of participants are willing to exploit any vulnerability
(Negm in [208] and [207], Lindstrom [185] and Bloomberg et al. [90]) and any type of coalition
with other participants (Jennings et al. [122]).
A threat model is normally used to describe a given threat and the harm it could do to
the participants in the presence of vulnerabilities. The construction of the threat model is
important for the construction of the overall trust management system. In the evolution
of computational Grids, security threats were overlooked in the desire to implement a high
performance distributed computational system (Naqvi [205]). This applies to the threats on
trust as well. The conception of a comprehensive trust management system for the Grid en-
vironments requires a realistic threat model. Otherwise, without such a threat model, there
is the risk of wasting time and effort implementing the trust management system.
In the following, trust threat profiles help to identify the specific threats that put the relia-
bility of trust information at risk in Grid environments.
3.7.1 Abusive ”Gossiping”
Participants have the possibility to exchange their personal direct experiences. This should
not be seen as an obligation for the participants, but merely as a possibility to exchange
information on others and thus helps to reduce the level of the uncertainty in the environ-
ment. Each of the participants should independently decide whether to consider this kind of
information and at what degree.
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In this case, the possible threat to the trust information offered to participants is abusive or
even malicious ”gossiping” by fraudulent or malicious participants with the sole aim to:
• discredit participants in the environment - for certain targeted participants or for ev-
erybody else, low trust values are offered to interested parties, or
• support certain target participants for an undeserved profit - higher trust values, mean-
ing a greater competence are offered regarding certain target participants in the envi-
ronment.
3.7.2 Deceiving Trust
A participant can gather information and learn the behavior of its partners over a number
of direct interactions. In this case, the participant reasons about the outcome of the future
interactions with these participants. This trust information can be abused by fraudulent or
malicious participants. The following threats to this type of information are identified:
• From ”High” to ”Low” - A higher level of trust gives some assurances on the compe-
tence and the reliability of the target participant. The existence of this general principle
in Grid environments bears some disadvantages. Fraudulent and malicious participants
can use it in order to deceive their interaction parties. At the beginning, they could
fulfill the expectations of their interaction parties and offer services of high quality,
reasons for which they were chosen among the others in the environment, but as soon
as their they have reached a ”high social position” in the environment, they start acting
differently, lowering the quality of their offered services.
• Trust Manipulation - In current Grid environments, for each of the participants it is
very easy to change or manipulate their identity information. Current technology offers
the possibility to the participants to identify their interaction partners, but no assur-
ances on their real identity. As a result, suspicions on the behavior and the intentions
of single participants exist. This problem becomes serious especially in cases when ma-
licious participants impersonate the identity of highly trusted participants and try to
collaborate with others in the environment.
• Stealing Trust Information - In general, Grid systems will be vulnerable to all typical
network and computer security threats and attacks.
The nature of the trust information saved (direct experiences) can be considered as
valuable and as a result an attractive target for malicious participants for distilling
valuable information from (e.g. a list of most trusted participants in the environment
could be extracted in order to attack them or hinder their normal activity).
3.8 Summary
Trusting a participant means believing that when offered the chance, it is not likely to behave
in a way that is damaging to the others.
So far, Grid technology has been primarily used by researchers. These users have tried to
benefit at maximum from being able to share resources in the Grid and have no intention
of harming the resource owners or fellow users. This is all about to change. The number of
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Grid users is growing fast. The growing size and profile of the Grid require comprehensive
security solutions as they are critical to the success of this technology. A comprehensive
security system, capable of responding to any attack on Grid systems, is indispensable to
guarantee its anticipated adoption by the users and the resource providers as well.
Considering the uncertainty of Grid environments where all the participants are free to dis-
appoint the others, free enough to avoid a risky collaboration and free enough to consider a
specific collaboration party as an attractive option, trust gains a great relevance, especially
with respect to the level of reliability that the participants should assign to each other.
In practice, it is not possible to know in advance whether a certain participant can be trusted
or not. This deduction should be done considering both identity and the behavior of the
collaboration parties. Identity trust is concerned with verifying the authenticity of the col-
laboration partner, whereas behavior trust deals with the trustworthiness of that party.
The overall behavior trust of an interaction partner can be built up on several factors. Con-
sidering the relationship between quality of service (QoS) and trust, different QoS properties
like availability and accessibility of the service, accuracy of the response provided by the ser-
vice, response time, cost of the offered services, security etc., can be considered and modeled
as behavior trust elements that a consumer uses to rate a provider. In a similar way, the total
number of (concurrent) requests coming from a consumer or the size of the packets received
from it can be considered as behavior trust elements from the point of view of a provider.
These factors of behavior trust should be continuously tested and verified. In this way, it is
possible to collect a history of past collaborations that can be used for future decisions on
further collaborations between partners. This kind of experience can also be shared as recom-
mendations between participants. Considering the social value of trust, some socio-cognitive
trust decisions should also be included regarding the future behavior of the collaboration
party(parties).
The level of trust represents the evidence a participant was able to gather about its collabora-
tion parties in the past, the beliefs of this participant regarding the behavior of these partners
in future collaborations and as a result the level of intention of participants to collaborate
with each other.
A trust management system for Grid environments should be flexible enough to reflect all
discussed trust properties and contain flexible and easy to use components that can be con-
figured to the specific needs of the users on per case basis.
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Chapter 4
Related Work
”We must respect the past and mistrust the present,
if we wish to provide for the safety of the future.”
Joseph Joubert
4.1 Introduction
Trust is used in different domains. McKnight and Chervany [197] offer a typology of trust
and a classification of the existing research on trust in domains like sociology, psychology,
management, economics, and political sciences. Trust is thereby classified conceptually into
six categories:
• disposition - the trustor is inclined to trust,
• situation - the trustor trusts only in particular scenarios,
• structure - the trustor trusts impersonally the structure the trustee is part of,
• belief - the trustor believes the trustee is trustworthy,
• intention - the trustor is willing to depend on the trustee,
• behavior - the trustor voluntarily depends on the trustee.
A mathematical model of computational trust should be capable of expressing all such as-
pects, as well as further notions of primary relevance in computing, e.g. that trust information
is time dependent and varies very rapidly. Also, it should be sufficiently general to allow com-
plex structures representing combinations of different types of trust.
The related work regarding trust modeling is grouped into four main categories:
• General models of trust.
• Identity-based trust models.
• Behavior-based trust models.
• Other approaches to trust management.
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4.2 General Models of Trust
General models of trust are frequently motivated by work in security and policy representa-
tion. Trust and security are related, dependent concepts with different purposes.
Policies are aimed toward the expression of when, what and how trust in a participant is
determined, without considering the problem of trust establishment and many important
elements of trust management. Furthermore, some of them assume that trust is established
through an external trusted system. Here, languages like XACML (eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language) from OASIS [62], or SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) [45]
should be mentioned.
Moreover, the work of Carbone et al. in [96], contributes to the division of trust in different
types, yielding a policy language that aids the control over trust decisions.
An approach, similar to role-based access control [28], where access decisions are based on
the roles that individual users have as a part of the organization where they take part, is
the one described by Kagal et al. [176]. A trust management framework that uses a sys-
tem of rights and delegations, as well as digital certificates to facilitate trust management
is proposed. Trust management involves developing security policies, assigning credentials
to participants, verifying that the credentials fulfill the policies, delegating trust to third
parties and reasoning about participants’ access rights. This approach allows the delegation
chain in which users are able to delegate their rights to other users that they trust. Once
users are given certain rights, they are responsible for the actions of the users to whom they
subsequently delegate those rights and privileges.
Josang et al. [165], [167], [166], [168], [170], [169], [173] and [171], proposed a subjective
logic for beliefs. His approach can be used to model and rationalize beliefs relating to levels
of trust in a system. Through the proposed subjective logic, an opinion value along three
axes: belief, disbelief and uncertainty is computed. He describes a scheme for combining
opinion values and a protocol for initiating a trust relationship and evaluating trust values.
Some other contributions in the trust domain are presented as a result of related research
in game theory. Buskens [94], offeres a variant of the ”Trust Game”. It is analogous to the
prisoner’s dilemma, but set in a market scenario. The game theoretic approach is used for
measuring a type of trust from the graph of a social network.
An approach that uses also game theory is that of Brainov and Sandholm [91]. The authors
show that underestimating trust hurts all participants involved and a mutual level of trust
maximizes the utility. Once again, the game defined by this work is a market-based scenario,
where buyers and sellers are the main actors. In this work, the fact that trust could be
considered as an alternative for dealing with uncertainty is underlined.
Platform for Content Selection (PICS) [238] provides rules that together form a kind of
filter between the web documents and their viewers based on policies. It was developed by
the World Wide Web Consortium [56] to protect primarily children from pornography on the
Internet. PICS offers some rating that determine the appropriateness of a target internet
page. All PICS-compliant applications should be able to read the labels and together with
the user-defined filtering rules decide whether a specific document can be accepted or rejected.
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Another approach that can be classified in the category of general trust models is the ”Free
Haven” system [16]. It describes a design for a publishing system aiming to a distributed,
anonymous, persistent data storage which is robust against malicious attempts by others in
the environment.
4.3 Identity-Based Trust Models
The majority of the so-called ”trust models” based on the identity of the involved participants
deal primarily with authentication. The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [69] authenticates
the owner’s identity using digital certificates. A digital certificate is issued by a certification
authority and verifies that a public key is owned by a particular participant [209]. It does
not handle the policies regarding what involved participants are allowed to undertake.
Two other known certificate systems are PGP [209] and X.509 [138]. They make use of digi-
tal certificates based on public key cryptography. That is, these two models can be used to
guarantee the identity of the originator or the recipient of an object. The PGP trust model
assumes no centralized or hierarchical relationship between certification authorities [154]. In
PGP systems, the user generates a pair of keys, a public and a private one, associated with his
unique ID (name, e-mail address). PGP’s digital certificates are used primarily for privacy
and authentication relating to e-mail type of applications between human users. On the other
hand, X.509 is a strictly hierarchical trust model used for authenticating web transactions
(i.e., authenticating the user or the web server) by offering a digital certificate as a proof of
identity. In X.509 framework, everyone will obtain certificates from an official certification
authority (CA). Certificates contain more information than PGP. They contain the names
of the signature schemes used to create them and the time interval in which they are valid.
The certification authority does not guarantee the trustworthiness of the owners of the keys.
They simply authenticate the owner’s identity. This is necessary in order to establish access
or provision rights for their bearers. The policy governing what the owners of the keys are
permitted to access is not handled by the certificate infrastructure, but is left up to the
trustor which may trust others, may validate their certificates or even trust third parties to
validate certificates.
It is important to underline that none of these models can be used as a single trust model
for all domains. PKI implementations contain no systematic and reliable methods for ob-
taining evidence about participants involved e.g. in an Internet transaction (Josang [174]).
PGP lacks official mechanisms for the creation, acquisition and distribution of certificates
and X.509 may lead to unnatural business alliances between competing companies as a result
of rigid hierarchical structure, violating the natural establishment and propagation of trust.
Additionally, some applications, such as the reference information distribution systems need
certificates to have a lifespan longer than is currently allowed by each of the schemes sepa-
rately.
Other approaches provide encryption methods for ensuring a trusted communication among
partners. The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [158] uses application encryption for Web browsers.
It is a protocol oriented towards protection of the data exchanged between Web browsers and
Web servers, ensuring the provenance of the data, their secrecy and integrity. The approach
used by IP Security (IPSec) [89] ensures the secrecy and the integrity of the exchanged data
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through the implementation of network layer encryption and authentication providing an
end-to-end identity-based trust solution. Another example in this category is the Kerberos
protocol [179], which uses a third party to facilitate the exchange of credentials between
users and computers. Kerberos is not oriented towards the determination of access rights,
but simply enables two parties to securely exchange easily verified credentials.
A distinct problem that comes out during credential exchange is that of possible loss of pri-
vacy, since the partners are obliged to reveal their identity. Winslett et al. in [267] and [266],
have focused on the trade-off between privacy and trust establishment. In their work, trust
is established only thanks to the revelation of a certain number and type of credentials. An-
other approach, based on these principles is TrustBuilder [260]. Trust is established only if
a sufficient number of credentials are revealed. Furthermore, some types of credentials affect
trust more than others. Zheng et al. [271] offer a scenario where agents play in a variation
of the prisoner’s dilemma. Trust is measured as the amount of cooperation between two
participants and the types of credentials include resumes, text-chats, and pictures of players.
The type of credential, in their work, affects the amount of trust or distrust received.
PolicyMaker [88] is especially convenient in systems that include anonymity as a security
requirement. It is a unified approach for specifying and interpreting security policies, cre-
dentials and relationships that allow direct authorization of security-critical actions. It is
a tool in the development of services whose main goal is privacy and authenticity. Policy-
Maker expresses security credentials and policies without requiring the application to manage
a mapping between personal identity and authority. It also offers possibilities of expression
of conditions under which an individual or an authority is trusted and the conditions under
which trust may be deferred. It specifies what a public key is authorized to do (evaluates
whether a proposed action is consistent with local policy). Policies are trust assertions made
by the local system and are unconditionally trusted by the system. Credentials are signed
trust assertions offered by other entities whose signatures must be verified before using the
credentials.
KeyNote [87], is also used for specifying local security policies and security credentials that
can be sent over an un-trusted network. KeyNote accepts as input a set of local policy asser-
tions, a collection of credential assertions and a collection of attributes (action environment)
that describes a proposed trusted action associated with a set of public-keys. Applying as-
sertion predicates to the environment, it decides consistency of actions with a local policy.
The result of the KeyNote evaluation process is an application-defined string, the simplest
response being ”authorized”.
Another approach from IBM, the Trust Establishment Policy Language [29] and [162], sim-
ilar to PolicyMaker, states that the underlying trust implications involved in an e-business
transaction can be solved using certificates. It is a role-based access control model that uses
certificates, a Java-based Trust Establishment module and a Trust Policy Language (TPL).
Certificates can be issued by various participants, vouching for a specific participant in a
particular role (buyer, seller or both). The ”Trust Establishment module” validates client
certificate and maps a role to the owner of the certificate. TPL is used to specify local policy
which defines what a role is permitted to do. This framework can be used to define policies
for all applications whose users are allowed to undertake only those actions assigned to them
according to their roles.
Rule-controlled Environment For Evaluation of Rules and Everything Else (REFEREE) [109]
provides both a general policy-evaluation mechanism (for Web clients and servers) and a lan-
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guage for specifying trust policies. It places all trust decisions under explicit policy control.
In the REFEREE model, every action, including evaluation of compliance with policy, hap-
pens under the control of some specified policy. That is, REFEREE is a system for writing
policies about policies, as well as policies about cryptographic keys, PICS label bureaus, cer-
tification authorities, trust delegation, etc. It is based on PolicyMaker and considers a PICS
label as the stereotypical web credential and uses the same theoretical framework as Poli-
cyMaker to interpret trust policies and administer trust protocols, which are represented as
software modules. Like PolicyMaker and KeyNote, REFEREE is a recommendation-based,
query engine so it needs to be integrated into a host application. It evaluates requests and
returns a value (true, false or unknown) and a statement-list, which is the justification for
the answer.
Germano [148], distributes trust relationships and reputations to each participant. They can
decide whom to trust based in the specifics of this architecture, where users certify other
users’ public keys without the need of a Certification Authority. Communication between
two users takes place only if a link can be established between them.
All these approaches can be considered as ”hard security approaches” to trust (trust is either
present or absent). Trust is here defined as the output of the identity and authorization
verification process, thus, after credentials and their claimed association are verified.
4.4 Behavior-Based Trust Models
4.4.1 Direct Experiences
The first formal computational model of trust has been presented by Stephen Marsh in his
Ph.D. thesis [191]. He investigates the notions of trust in various contexts and develops a
formal description of its use with distributed intelligent agents. ”An imperfect understanding,
a plethora of definitions and informal use in the literature and in everyday life” with regard
to trust is addressed. In his model, Marsh proposes a set of variables and a way to combine
them to arrive at a single continuous value of trust in the range [−1, 1], where:
• −1 implies complete distrust on the target agent,
• 0 implies lack of knowledge regarding the target agent and
• 1 implies full trust on the target agent.
Marsh identified three types of trust (basic, over all contexts; general, between two people
and all their contexts occurring together and situational, between two people in a specific
context). He also identified time as being relevant to the variables used to comprise trust.
Furthermore, he includes aspects of trust such as:
• Competence - the level of experience that agents have with each other,
• Group membership - an agent’s level of trust towards agents from the same group,
• Agent disposition - an agent’s inclination towards cooperation and
• Reciprocation - the modification of behavior based on a recent history of cooperation.
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Although the work is considered as valuable for the definitions presented, it displays difficul-
ties with the separation of the concepts of trust and distrust. Marsh also does not consider
the possibility for the agents to share their accumulated trust information.
Following his work, some researchers have attempted to model the properties of trust and
reputation in a computational setting. Resnick et al. [226] describes reputation as ”important
for fostering trust among strangers”, creating a clearer picture for reputation. Their work
outlines those features of reputation that make it valuable for Internet applications.
Castelfranchi and Falcone [136], express the idea that a higher level of reputation is use-
less without knowledge of the context in which that reputation was earned. The authors
deal with a dynamic aspect of trust: ”does the observed behavior represents also the real
intentions of that agent regarding future collaborations?”. This model is a clear example of
a cognitive trust model. The basis of their model is the strong relation between trust and
delegation. Delegation finds place only if a specific set of beliefs and goals (the mental state
that Castelfranchi and Falcone identify with trust) are met. The basic beliefs that an agent
needs are:
• Competence belief - the belief of the trustor that the trustee is capable of performing
the task.
• Dependence belief - the belief that it is better to rely on that specific trustee for per-
forming the task.
• Disposition belief - the belief that the trustee will actually perform the task. It can be
further divided into:
– Willingness belief - the trustee intends to perform the task and
– Persistence belief - the trustee is stable in its intentions while performing the task.
Relevant is also the degree of importance of the goal that is going to be achieved through
the delegation of the task to the trustee. The resulting degree of trust is obtained by
multiplying the degree of those beliefs and goals useful to the trust relation. If this value
exceeds a given threshold and it is also the best solution of all the available solutions,
then the decision to delegate is taken.
Another approach is the one presented by Jonker et al. [164]. They focus on another aspect of
trust dynamics, more precisely on how positive and negative experiences can change negative
and positive trust, respectively. The outcome of this work suggests that trust does change
according to the type of experiences and that distrust may be harder to overcome.
4.4.2 Third Parties’ Experiences and Hybrid Trust Models
Trust in E-Commerce. Trust plays a crucial role in computer mediated transactions and
processes. Online service provision commonly takes place between parties who in general
are strangers to each other. Furthermore, the environment where the service consumers and
providers act, often offers insufficient information about their counterparts. This forces the
provider to accept the risk of dealing with a non-correct consumer, but especially it forces the
consumer to accept the risk of prior dealing with a dishonest provider of goods (i.e. to pay
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for services and goods before receiving them; consumer finds himself in a vulnerable position,
etc.). The consumer generally has no opportunity to see and try products he is going to buy
(contrary to the provider that knows exactly what he is going to get once the money has been
paid). This information asymmetry is considered to be mitigated through the use of trust
and reputation in such marketplaces. Even if the consumer (provider can also be included)
does not know what he gets during the transaction, he can still be confident that it will be
what he expects as long as he trusts the provider.
Reputations are effectively used in electronic marketplaces like eBay [10] as a measure of the
reliability of involved participants. With eBay, buyers and sellers can express their negative
(−1), neutral (0) or positive (1) votes for each other after each transaction. Votes so collected
are used by the system to provide cumulative ratings of users, that are made known to all
participants. Reputation is considered as a global property and these models use a single
value, that is not dependent on the context it was earned. The only source of information
used to build the value of reputation is the information coming from the others that has
previously interacted with the target participant. Unfortunately there does not exist any
kind of mechanism for dealing with false information provided.
Reputation systems like CNET [6], EPINIONS [11] and ALLEXPERTS [2] compute reputa-
tions based on the feedbacks of experts and reviewers. OpenPrivacy [37] introduces reputation
services that can be used to create and calculate results from accumulated reputations.
Other models, like the one proposed by Halberstadt et al. [156], use social factors such as
reciprocity that according to them constitutes the social motto ”be nice to others who are
nice to you”.
Mui et al. [204] have proposed a computational model where the concepts of trust and
reputation are separated in electronic marketplaces. According to them, reputation is the
”perception that an agent creates through past actions about its intentions and norms” and
trust is ”a subjective expectation an agent has about another’s future behavior based on the
history of their encounters”. They express reputation as a probability of success ranging in
[0, 1]. In this model, no effects of deception are considered. Furthermore, no reference to the
minimum value of success that will push the agent to accept a counterpart exists.
Although some approaches, like the one discussed above, are offered for online marketplaces,
the providers can still hide the quality of the goods they are going to offer. The high level of
information asymmetry creates a perfect situation for frauds, misuse and also a market for
lemons (Akerof [70]).
A general discussion of trust on the Internet is given by Friedman et al. [144], where char-
acteristics of trust in online interactions are outlined. One of the key points presented there
is that simply performing a task is definitely not the same as providing good service of high
quality. This is a problem of automated reputation systems for electronic marketplaces that
fail to capture this difference.
Trust in Multi-Agent Systems. Trust is a fundamental concern in multi-agent systems.
It is considered to lie at the core of all interactions between collaborating agents that operate
in uncertain and constantly changing environments. Given the particular features of these
environments, trust components and the ensuing systems are increasingly being conceptual-
ized, designed and implemented.
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Considering relationships between agents, Jennings et al. [223] expect that agents exhibit a
specific behavior in an interaction based on reputation from various sources. They focus on
combining the sources of reputation and refer to direct experience as confidence. In some
later work, [78] they claim that the context and the roles of interacting agents can somehow
determine the rules of trust. In particular, the general relationships of trade, dependency,
competition and collaboration can be mentioned. A main disadvantage is the fact that trust
is implied to exist whenever it is believed that an agent will not gain at the disadvantage of
another agent.
Another model presented by Jennings et al. in [159] and [160], combines multiple sources of
trust such as reputation, context-based rules and credentials. In cases where no reputation
or other sources of trust regarding a particular agent exist, endorsements of trust from other
agents are used. In this model, the strong belief that the agents will report their trust infor-
mation truthfully exists.
In [64] and [65] Abdul-Rahman et al. focus on providing a system where each agent is
merely enabled to make trust decisions rather than automating the entire process. The main
contribution of this work is the effort to decentralize the trust decision process.
The trust model they present later on in [66] uses four degrees of belief to express the trust-





For each of the partners and the contexts, the agent maintains a tuple with the number of
past experiences in each category. Considering direct interactions, trust on a partner in a
given context is equal to the degree that corresponds to the maximum value in the tuple.
They make use of different trust categories:
• which aspect is trusted,
• a scale of trust values on recommendations and
• direct trust values (related to one context).
The biggest problem of this approach is that it is not possible to differentiate between lying
agents and those who in a certain sense ”think different”. The model gives more relevance
to the information coming from those agents with a similar point of view (agents that have a
similar perspective in a given context). The model is intended to evaluate only the trust on
the information given by recommenders. Direct experiences are used to compare the point
of view of these recommenders with the direct perception of the agent and then are able to
adjust the information coming from them accordingly.
The trust model proposed by Schillo et al. [231] considers a hard type of trust (the re-
sult of an interaction between two agents is a boolean impression meaning either good or
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bad). Furthermore, the degree of satisfaction for interacting agents is not considered. They
propose a Prisoner’s dilemma set of games with a partner selection phase. Each agent re-
ceives the results of the game it has played plus the information about the games played by
a subset of all its neighbor players. The result of an interaction is the impression on the
honesty of the partner and its behavior according to the normal prisoner’s dilemma actions
(cooperation or defection). The model assumes that the recommenders never lie, but they
can hide information in order to make other agents appear less trustworthy. No information
is given about how to combine direct experiences with recommendations. The trust value is
a subjective property assigned particularly by each individual and it does not depend on the
context.
The model Zacharia [268] deals with direct information and recommenders’ information.
The reputation value is a subjective property assigned particularly by each individual. Di-
rect experiences are limited to the use of the most recent experience with the agent that is
under evaluation. More importance is given to the recommendations. A similar structure
to Schillo et al. [231] is used. Ratings are represented from a directed graph, where nodes
represent agents and edges the information on the most recent reputation rating given by
one agent to another. The agents who have been rated directly by the generator of the graph
have a reputation value equal to the rating value. In this model, the reputation value does
not depend on the context and no special mechanisms are provided to deal with inappropri-
ate recommendations. Furthermore, the reputation value assigned to an agent regarding its
recommendations, compounds also its reliability.
Another approach that combines direct experiences with the reputation information from
others is ReGreT [228] and [229]. The model adopts a sociological approach for computing
reputation in societies of agents trading well defined products inside an e-commerce environ-
ment. The main contribution is the vision of reputation through:
• Individual dimension - the effect of personal past experiences with a given agent.
• Social dimension - refers to reputation inherited by individuals from the groups they
belong, that is the reputation of the group that an individual belongs to also influences
the reputation of the individual.
• Ontological dimension means that the reputation of an agent is compositional. The
overall reputation is obtained as a result of the combination of the agent’s reputation
in each context.
A great importance is given to the freshness of the information. Computations give a fixed
high relevance to recent rates over older ones according to a time dependent function. In
REGRET, a minimum number of interactions are required for evaluating the reputation of a
certain agent. REGRET does not handle the problem of cheating among agents. Rates are
obtained cooperatively and the competition in the environment is not considered at all.
The work of Yu et al. [263], [264] and [265] describes a decentralized solution to reputation
management. Agents are allowed to actively determine trust using reputation information
they receive from other agents. This is a further effort towards the construction of a de-
centralized trust management system. The information each of the agents stores, reflects a
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general value of the quality of the interaction with the partners. Each of the agents defines an
upper and lower threshold for what they consider as trustworthy, unclear and untrustworthy
agents. Then, using the saved information together with Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence,
an agent can calculate the probability that a specific partner most probably is going to offer
a service assigned to one of these groups. If the difference between the probability that the
service belongs to the first and latest group is greater than a threshold for trustworthiness,
the target agent is considered as a trusted one. Once again, only the most recent experiences
with a specific partner are considered. When third parties’ experience is considered, a similar
graph to that of Schillo et al. [231] is used. If any of the acquaintances has any information
on the target agent, they will send it to the interested agent, otherwise they send referrals
to the other agents that can be queried to obtain either the needed information or further
referrals. If the referrals that finally give the desired information are not far away to a depth
limit in the chain, then the information will be taken into account.
The model does not offer any possibility for the simultaneous use of direct and third parties’
experiences. If any information exists thanks to direct experiences that constitutes the only
source of information that is considered to determine the trust of the target agent. Third
parties’ experience is considered only in the absence of direct experiences with the target
agent.
The model presented by Sen and Sajja [235] is primarily concerned with the robustness
of reputations that an agent receives. The agent selects those partners that have the highest
reputation in a group of agents. The main contribution of the model is the capability of each
agent to dynamically adjust the size of the group it is going to select a partner from, despite
the existence of a set of cheaters within the population of agents. Cheaters are assumed
to cheat consistently. To decide if a partner is good or not, the model uses the number of
positive and negative answers received from recommenders. Knowing the number of recom-
menders and how many of them are cheaters, the model provides a mechanism to calculate
how many agents should be queried to be sure that the likelihood of selecting a good partner
lies upon a certain value. Direct experiences are used only as recommendations and not used
in combination with third parties’ experience in order to obtain a final reputation value.
In the work of Carter [97], the reputation of an agent is based on the degree of fulfillment
of roles assigned to it by the society. If the society judges that they have met their roles,
they are rewarded with a positive reputation, otherwise they are punished with a negative
reputation. The authors identify five roles:
• Social information provider role - the degree of connectivity of an agent with its com-
munity (users of the society should regularly contribute new knowledge about their
friends to the society). Every recommendation made by a user has a weight associated
to it which indicates the strength of the recommendation.
• Interactivity role - the degree of usage of the system from a particular user, in compar-
ison with others (users are expected to regularly use the system, otherwise without this
participation it is assumed that the system becomes useless).
• Content provider role - the degree of affinity of the offered information to the real
interests of the users (users should provide the society with knowledge objects that
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reflect their own areas of expertise; users that create information agents related to their
areas of expertise will produce higher quality content related to their interest than those
who do not).
• Administrative feedback role - (users are expected to provide feedback information on
the quality of the goods offered by the system).
• Longevity role - the degree of having a high average reputation (users should be en-
couraged to maintain a high reputation to promote the longevity of the system).
The user’s overall reputation is calculated as a weighted aggregation of the degree of fulfill-
ment of each of the above roles and the weights are entirely dependent on the specific society.
Maximilien et al. [193], [194] and [195] offer a multi-agent framework (WSAF, Web Services
Agent Framework) coupled with a QoS ontology. Agents provide methods that let consumers
set their QoS preferences and rank services. They establish a QoS ontology, however, there
are no details about metrics where the consumers have to base on and do not consider how
truthful providers in their QoS advertisements could be. It is not shown how agents scale
with the increasing number of services in the environment and how agencies scale with the
changing number of QoS properties. Furthermore, they evaluate only service providers from
the consumer’s point of view and do not offer any possibility for the providers to evaluate
their consumers.
Trust in P2P Systems. Peer-to-Peer networks are networks in which all peers cooper-
ate with each other to perform a critical function in a decentralized manner [200]. Usually,
there is no centralized control authority in P2P systems and all peers are both consumers
and providers of resources and share information and services directly without intermediary
peers. Since peers are heterogeneous in providing services and do not have the same compe-
tence and reliability, considering trust is a necessity for such environments.
Damiani et al. [120] proposes the XRep protocol. It makes automatic voting using feedbacks
of the users regarding the best host for a given resource possible.
The same idea is used by the authors in the P2PRep system [115], [119]. It is a set of pro-
tocols and algorithms for sharing reputation information with peers. It is a self-regulating
system that uses a distributed polling algorithm by which resource requesters can assess the
reliability of a resource offered by a participant before initiating the download from that
specific participant.
PeerTrust [261] and [262] is another approach that aims to develop a trust mechanism for
P2P networks. Peers can quantify and compare the trustworthiness of other peers and per-
form trusted interactions based on their past direct experiences without trusted third parties.
The model defines a general trust metric that combines the total number of transaction a
peer performs and the credibility of the feedback sources in addition to the feedback a peer
receives through its transactions with other peers. A limitation of the model is that it has
no mechanism for preventing dishonest peers from cheating via collusion, where a group of
peers secretly agree or cooperate especially for illegal or deceitful purposes. In addition, this
approach has no mechanism for filtering out and isolating dishonest peers from the reputation
network. A peer gathers feedbacks from other peers regardless of their honesty. This practice
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allows dishonest peers to damage and influence the feedback-based reputation network.
The EigenTrust [177], using PageRank algorithm [92], computes a global reputation value
for each peer. It is intended to decrease the number of downloads of non-authentic files in
a P2P file-sharing network. Reputation is simply the quality of a peer’s uploads, where as
quality, parameters like the successful upload of a file are implied. To every peer, a unique
global trust value, based on the peer’s history of uploads is assigned. By having peers use
these global trust values to choose their partners from whom they download, the network
effectively identifies malicious peers and isolates them from the network.
The most important design considerations, relevant to the reputation system are:
• The system should be self-policing .
• The system should maintain anonymity .
• The system should not assign any profit to newcomers.
• The system should have minimal overhead .
• The system should be robust in the face of malicious collectives of agents.
In the EigenTrust system, peers are assumed to be organized under a distributed hashtable
(DHT). The reputation values for any given peer are managed by a unique set of ”score
managers” which are allocated using multiple hashes into the DHT space. The benefit of
this approach is that there is no need for a central authority to map hashed node values
into actual nodes. Before communicating with a node, the requesting node should access the
score managers for the destination node. Similarly, once the file transfer has completed, those
same score managers should be updated with the transfer status. However, the authors focus
mainly on the mathematics aspects of trust calculation and do not provide any approach on
how this information is going to be distributed within the system.
Wang et al. [257] and [256] use ”Bayesian Networks” for enabling peers to develop trust
and reputation, especially with respect to the competence and capability of peers to of-
fer high-quality files and valuable recommendations in a P2P file sharing application. The
model also computes a global reputation value for each peer. Every peer develops a naive
Bayesian network for every other peer it has interacted with and modifies its corresponding
Bayesian networks after each interaction. When a peer has no experience with another one, it
can ask other peers to make recommendations for it. Such recommendations are partitioned
in two groups, recommendations from trustworthy peers and recommendation from unknown
peers and are combined by taking a weighted sum.
In [67], Aberer et al. distinguish trust among:
• provider peers,
• recommender peers offering recommendations on provider peers and
• recommender peers offering recommendations on other recommenders.
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They consider the authenticity of a recommendation before it can be used. In their model,
a negative feedback is stored as an evidential recommendation called a ”complaint”. The
evidential recommendation mechanism works well against the attack from peers issuing fake
recommendations without real interactions, however, it cannot detect and stop peers from
lying in recommendations based on interactions that have really happened. Furthermore,
since this model is entirely based on negative feedbacks, the peers do not have any possibility
to develop a positive reputation.
Poblano [106] is a JXTA-based effort to establish a reputation based decentralized trust
model. Specifically, Poblano is used as the trust model for distributing signed certificates
among peers in JXTA. The trust spectrum neither requires nor prohibits the presence of a
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). A peer is connected to at least one peer group, which is
a dynamic set of peers that have agreed upon a common set of policies and services. Peer
group’s membership is motivated by keyword interest.
This approach is used to perform reputation guided searching or to securely distribute signed
certificates among peers and as such, it is based on recommendations. For calculating the
cooperation threshold between two peers, a user-centric approach was chosen. The user in-
teraction is required to tune the software and to make choices. Access control based on direct
observations is not the main concern of this work.
The major drawback of Poblano is that the peers do not consider the latest information
available to them for discovering compromised peers.
Trust Management in the Semantic Web. The Semantic Web is also a large, un-
supervised system to which everyone may offer his contribution. Trust decisions in such
environments can be a transitive process, where trusting one piece of information or infor-
mation source requires trusting another associated source. Much research has focused on
authentication of resources (work on digital signatures and public keys), however, just be-
cause a person can confirm the source of documents, does not also mean that the content of
the offered documents has to be trusted. Confidence in the source or author of a contribution
is important, but trust and reputation in this case could help diminish the uncertainties.
One of the early approaches of Stweart [248] and later on of Stewart et al. in [249], deals
with the trust transfer between hyperlinks on the Web. They examine how much trust, in
the context of a consumer trusting a business for purchasing a product, is transferred from
a trusted Web resource to an unevaluated one. The transfer is evaluated through the com-
bination of different types of links, types of resources and types of trust in the known sources.
Advogato [58], provides a trust metric, called ”Advogato maximum flow”, for discovering
which users are trusted by members of an on-line community and which are not. The au-
thors compute the maximum network flow over a web of trust to find trust between any pair
of entities. An advantage of this approach is that it is very robust to noise and even attacks
altering the given web of trust. However, trust is computed by a centralized community
server and there always exist some highly trusted users. Furthermore, the model does not
provide support for weighted trust relationships.
Golbeck et al. [152] and [153], describe how trust/reputation can be applied to a person
for a specific subject area. A trustor trusts a trustee in relation to a certain area by such a
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degree or that the trustee has a certain reputation in a specific area. The trust values are
measured on a scale from one to ten where one means absolute distrust and ten means abso-
lute trust. In their model, participants assign trust values to others. Trust is then calculated
by a transitivity function, which considers the trust along the hops down the network path.
Using the same principles, in [192], it is dealt with the problem of controversial (trusted and
distrusted) participants. The key contribution of their work is the evidence that the globally
computed trust value in a web of trust, for a controversial user may not be as accurate as
a locally computed value due to the global disagreement on trust for that user. This work
addresses the use of trust within those systems where the set of commonly rated items be-
tween users is sparse (i.e. Epinion community [11]). That situation leads to a breakdown in
correlation-based recommender system algorithms and their work explores how incorporat-
ing even simple binary trust relationships can increase the coverage and thus the number of
recommendations that can be made.
In general, trust management models for semantic web do not consider context and as a
result do not differentiate between ”context specific trust”. Ding et al. [128] try to present a
method for computing trust, considering also the domain of knowledge. They make use of the
trust of participants in the ability of the others to recommend based also in their similarity.
As a result, they offer a data model that computes trust as:
• trust in the domain knowledge of participants,
• trust in their ability to recommend others,
• more participants trusting the others similarly and
• more participants being trusted similarly from the others.
However, the model bears a high level of abstraction regarding the notion of trust.
4.5 Trust in Grid Computing Environments
In Grid environments, trust management was first discussed by Azzedin et al. [79], [81]
and [80], who make an important contribution defining the notion of trust through identity
trust and behavior trust and also separating the Grid domain into a client domain and a
resource domain. They have studied the importance of trust in Grid environments and have
shown how the computing performance in Grid can be improved by using the concept of trust
and avoiding the large computational overhead incurred by the security infrastructure.
The work on trust management in Grid environments deals with only one of these dimensions
of trust.
4.5.1 Identity-Based Trust Models
The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [18] from the Globus Alliance uses the X.509 certifi-
cates as its authentication mechanism for security. Authentication is one of the mechanisms
helpful in implementing certification trust. In this PKI, highly trusted participants known as
certificate authorities (CA), issue X.509 certificates where essentially a unique identity name
and the public key of an entity are bound through the digital signature of that CA. One of
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the challenges encountered in key management include the need of users of having different
credentials, according to the roles they play and projects they take part, thus, different CAs
need to be trusted. While PKI could handle this situation by signing the same public key
into several different certificates, in practice the user may end up with numerous key pairs to
manage. To link these different identities, the notion of federated identities has been devel-
oped, as shown by Linn et al. [186].
GSI provides necessary mechanisms needed for authentication, but does not handle all the
security management issues and especially trust management issues. Although it uses the
PKI infrastructure to establish the identity of other collaborators, this identity does not pro-
vide any information about the likely behavior of the participants.
Another proposal for handling authorization in Grids is considered in the Globus Toolkit
Gridmap file [20]. This file holds a list of the authenticated distinguished names of the Grid
users and the equivalent local user account names that they are to be mapped into. Access
control to a resource is then left up to the local operating system and application access
control mechanisms. This approach neither allows the local resource administrator to set a
policy for who is allowed to do what, nor does it minimize his/her workload.
The Community Authorization Service (CAS) [219] was the next approach by the Globus
team to improve upon the manageability of user authorization. CAS allows resource owners
to grant access to a portion of his/her resource to a VO and then let the community determine
who can use this allocation. The resource owner thus partially delegates the allocation of
authorization rights to the community. This is achieved by having a CAS server, which acts
as a trusted intermediary between users and resources. Users first contact the CAS asking
for permission to use a Grid resource. The CAS consults its policy (which specifies who has
permission to do what on which resources) and if granted, returns a digitally self-signed ca-
pability to the user optionally containing policy details about what the user is allowed to do.
The user then contacts the resource and presents this capability. The resource checks that
the capability is signed by a known and trusted CAS and if so maps the CAS’s distinguished
name into a local user account name via the Gridmap file.
Chang et al. [104] use certified code as an upholder of trust. The authors deal with a
simple notion of trust, considering only the correct running of some code, on behalf of the
clients, on the remote providers. The intrinsic properties of native code that is going to be
run are examined. It serves to determine if the code tries to perform any illegal operation
either intentionally or non-intentionally. Once the testing of the code is done, it is assumed
to be trustworthy. The authors claim that the certified code can be run even in trustless
environments without considering any additional trust mechanism.
Hwang et al. [161] discuss the problem of propagation of trust in Grid computing using
PKI based trust models. They make use of bridge CA certification model, which intercon-
nects various PKI islands by a central authority of cross certification. Each PKI domain sets
up a cross-certificate with the central bridge CA. Then a trust path is formed from a sequence
of intermediate CAs. Once trusting a bridge CA, one must trust all other certificates in the
environment. The model is suitable only for investigating identity trust in Grid environments
although no protection against certificate theft or impersonation are provided.
Ma et al. [190], propose a new type of mobile process in Grids, Grid traveler . It is able
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to move across VOs in order to coordinate the use of resources and access control. For this
purpose, the authors propose a security infrastructure, G-Pass, for managing credentials of
the travelers. This infrastructure implements a kind of trust model that supports simple
credential verification and transfer. An important feature of this infrastructure is the inabil-
ity of the holders of such ”passports” to manipulate the contained information. Each page
is defined as a contract, on which at least two identities are required to provide a digital
signature and to claim their responsibilities.
In [252], Tie-Yan et al. try to aid the process of authentication. They propose a model
consisting of two tiers. In the upper tier, trust among different virtual organizations belong-
ing to different Grid domains is managed and in the lower tier is managed the trust among
participants that belong to the same Grid domain but to different virtual organizations. No
information regarding the notion of trust assigned to identities of participants and VOs is
given. Furthermore, no means for protection against malicious activities are offered.
These trust mechanisms do not consider behavior trust and thus, the definition for trust,
as presented in the previous chapter, is partially covered. No means for monitoring trust
relationships are offered. In addition, these trust models and trust management applications
do not recognize the need for participants to learn from past experiences and the experiences
of others in the environment in order to dynamically update their trust levels [154].
4.5.2 Behavior-Based Trust Models
Azzedin et al. [79], [81] and [80] present a formal definition of behavior trust. Several aspects
of trust values are considered as part of their model:
• The trust values decay with time - as time passes, if no more collaborations have found
place among participants, trust decays.
• Trust relationships are based on a weighted combination of the direct relationship be-
tween domains as well as on the global reputation of the domains.
• The trust model should stimulate organizations to sanction entities who are not behav-
ing consistently in the Grid environment and who break trust relations.
Behavior trust in this model is limited to a general abusive or abnormal notion of behavior
of the participants during the interaction and no real metrics for trust are offered.
Alunkal et al. [74] propose to build an infrastructure called ”Grid Eigentrust” that addresses
reputation-based service selection in Grid environments. They use a hierarchical model in
which participants are initially connected to institutions which then form a VO. The trust
algorithm that defines these trust tiers is the major contribution of the work. They conclude
with the realization of a ”Reputation Service”, however, without providing mechanisms that
automatically can update trust values. Furthermore, they do not address the authoriza-
tion/authentication of Grid users to the services.
In [184], Lin et al. use the belief, disbelief and uncertainty to weight the trustworthiness
of the collaborating parties. The authors deal with a general notion of behavior trust that
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is established before interaction takes place among participants. They develop a trust man-
agement architecture for addressing security issues in Grid environments based on subjective
logic. They use the belief, disbelief and uncertainty to weight the trustworthiness of the
collaborating parties.
Identity trust, although considered in the model, is implied to belong only to the authentica-
tion process, without offering any possibility to measure it. The authors deal with a general
notion of behavior trust. Trust information from direct and recommenders’ sources are used.
Zhao et al. [270] propose the notion of trust-based scheduling for peer-to-peer Grids. Us-
ing either a quiz or replication strategy they try to identify non-correct responses from the
partners. Thus the behavior of the participants in the environment is identified with the
accuracy of the results coming from the ”provider peers” while it is assumed that every
peer in the system has a persistent identity. When using replication, a similar model to
Seti@Home [46] is considered. The validity of the computed results is checked by letting
different participants work on the same data unit. At the end, if more than the half of the
incoming results is the same, the correct response is established. This technique results in a
significant increase of the total computational costs to solve a particular problem, since the
overall workload is multiplied by the replication factor used to reassign subtasks. If there is
a service charge collected by a service provider for every processed work unit, this also leads
to a considerable increase of the overall cost. Even the usage of particular test challenge for
which the consumer knows the correct result could sometime turn out as not reliable, since
a malicious provider may be able to guess the correct answers to the set of challenges, as the
computational resources of the consumer for test preparation may be very limited.
A Grid environments as a multi-agent system is considered by Dyson et al. [133]. In this
environment the following type of participants take place:
• user agents, which use the resources that are available to them.
• resource agents, which offer resource access have the goal of ensuring that the resources
under their management are utilized to their maximum capacity.
• negotiating agents, which could be either user agents or resource agents. They match
potential resources with the requests that are submitted from the user agent.
A particularity of this work is the evaluation of the user agents as ”pessimistic” or ”opti-
mistic” ones according to their disposition on assigning initial trust values for the resource
agents. Over time, trust values related to past experiences will become inaccurate and out-
dated. However, this model deals with a general notion of behavior trust and no trust metrics
are offered. This model bears also a great level of abstraction regarding the notion of trust
in general and how trust is managed and updated from participants.
Finally, Patel et al. [217], develop a probabilistic approach for managing behavior trust also
in agent-like Grid systems. They do concentrate more on the accuracy of the trust values
coming from third parties (third parties’ experience). A participant is considered as trust-
worthy only if it has a high probability of fulfilling its obligations during the interaction.
In a later work, Teacy et al. in the TRAVOS model [250] and [251] try to cope with inaccurate
reputation sources. They use a similar reputation representation to that of Beta Reputation
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System [163]. A distinctive feature of their model is that recommendations coming from in-
accurate sources are not given the same importance as those received from accurate sources.
In order to mitigate the effects of deceptive advices, TRAVOS scales opinions by a factor
derived from comparing past opinions with the outcome of interactions. In their work, they
suppose that the agents do not change their behavior and this can be seen as a big handicap
for this model.
4.6 Other Approaches to Trust Management - TCPA Initia-
tive
While social-oriented trust models pertain to the reasoning and information gathering ability
of participants, there is a second approach to building trust concerning the implementa-
tion of new technologies instrumented for security (Trusted Computed Initiative [111], [110],
[112], [113], [114]). Through this technology, it is expected that participants interact with
each other only if they can be considered as ”trusted”, where according to the definition at
Wikipedia [52], in technical sense, ”trusted” does not necessarily mean the same as ”trust-
worthy” from a participant’s perspective. Rather, it means that a certain participant can
be trusted more fully to follow its intended aim without any deviations from the expected
behavior.
This approach takes a distributed-system-wide approach to the provisions of integrity pro-
tection for resources. The following notions are at the core of the technology:
• Trusted Platform Module (TPM) - a hardware module for conformed operation and
secure storage. It is designed to perform computations which cannot be subverted by the
platform owner, including the system administrator. These computations involve also
some public key cryptographic operations (decryption and digital signature generation
using a private key in the TPM), system status measurement and secure storage. This
module is going to be installed at every participant’s site
• Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) - at the participant’s site, during the
boot time, the TPM measures the system’s data integrity status. The measurement
starts from the integrity of BIOS, then that of the operating system and finally to
applications. With CRTM, is intended to establish a desired environment by loading
only well behaved systems.
• Root of Trust for Storage - the measured integrity of an executable is represented by a
cryptographic checksum of the executable. This is then securely stored in a TPM. The
TPM component called Platform Configuration Register (PCR) holds this data in an
accumulative formulation. The stored environment status is maintained until system
reboot.
• Remote Platform Attestation - cryptographic challenge-response mechanisms are going
to be used. A participant can then evaluate whether its remote partners have the
desired behavior. Remote platform attestation is the most significant and the most
innovation element of this technology.
The challenge, for the Grid is to find the means of integration with this technology which has
to support the significant components of Grid infrastructure in the most seamless manner as
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possible. It is necessary to support the whole lifecycle, from provisioning and commission-
ing of Grid nodes, software deployment, authorization of participants and so on. Support
for fine-grained mandatory access control will also require integration with the authorization
approaches previously discussed.
This approach although still under development has already encountered a strong contra-
diction [1]. Furthermore, the implementation made from Microsoft on Windows Vista [55],
showed itself as vulnerable by Rutkowska [227].
4.7 Discussion
Trust management remains a significant area of research in different domains of computer
science. The various approaches can be divided into two main categories:
• approaches focused on trust aspects of a security infrastructure in particular with re-
gards to the authentication and authorization of users
• frameworks for trust management focused on the analysis and quantification of trust
and trust services.
The former are relatively well understood because relate to PKI infrastructures. However,
these models define specific situations for their trust, e.g. X.509 specifies trust only in context
of creating reliable certificates, PGP for key introduction etc. They make use of the term
”trusted”, but did not explicitly define what being ”trusted” means and do not relate to the
discussed trust requirements. The same problems exist also for the models that use policies
for managing access and information rights for ”trusted” participants.
The second category has also been subject of a great number of studies, however, apart from
agreeing on the importance of trust, little agreement on what trust really is, how trust can
be characterized and how can it be measured has been achieved. The following aspects are
agreed into the various studies on trust:
• relationship to different sources of information that influence its value,
• orientation toward different contexts that include the activities being performed, the
parties engaged in the interaction as well as other contextual elements of the transac-
tions,
• relationship to different characteristics of the parties involved in a collaboration or the
activities being performed such as their competence, honesty, correctness, etc and
• its quantification, meaning that trust is measurable. Unfortunately, no consensus has
been reached yet on the desired metrics for its quantification.
Many of the proposed approaches differ significantly in their definitions and computational
methods for trust. Thus, it is not surprising to find that many of the above models, although
claiming to handle various aspects of trust, have failed to define what trust is. Trust is mainly
represented as a subjective belief in another participant’s honesty, where honesty is primarily
associated to the accuracy of the results coming from the collaboration partners.
Another common flaw with the majority of the proposed approaches is that they are used to
identify a static form of trust. Trust is mostly evaluated only at the start of a collaboration
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considering only direct experiences and information from third parties. Using only these in-
formation sources, however, imposes several addition concerns that deal with the poor direct
experiences or with the subjectivism of third parties’ opinion.
The majority represent trust as the probability of a binary event, that is, the probability that
a partner will cooperate or defect. However, by modeling a partner’s possible actions simply
as cooperation or defection, they ignore the effects that quality of service provided by that
partner may have on the assessment of its trust.
The trust formation phase is characterized by the leap from ignorance to the belief in an-
other’s (un-)trustworthiness, taken with caution and within a certain time-span. This phase,
however, is absent from all of the models surveyed. Furthermore, none of the models has
properly considered the ”dilemma” of new participants entering an already well established
environment. Such participants may never be given the opportunity to have their trust-
worthiness assessed. Sometimes, distrust is considered as the alternative to ignorance. In
general, the models that support distrust can be considered as pessimistic as none of them
specifically give untrustworthy participants the chance to prove the contrary through some
additional experience.
The presented trust models for Grid environments bear also a lot of limitations. Most of
them make use only on part of the trust sources, more precisely only on direct and third par-
ties’ experience. To the participants, the possibility to choose among different trust sources
when gathering trust information on the future collaboration partners is not offered. All the
models take into consideration only one type from the considered approaches; either iden-
tity or behavior trust. A collective characteristic is the lack of mutual verification of parties
involved in an interaction. Although in the trust models that manage identity trust of the
participants, parties involved in an interaction make a mutual verification of their identities
at the beginning of the collaboration, there is still need for a continuous mutual verification
during the collaboration. This verification affects the behaviors of the parties involved.
None of the approaches in the field of Grid computing analyzes and classifies the behavior
of the participants to conform to the real social meaning. There is still no specification on
what the behavior of Grid participants really is and few metrics regarding the measurement
of behavior trust are offered. Only a general notion for the behavior of the participants is
specified, leaving out different contexts that determine the behavior of Grid participants.
Trust management should be dynamic, having a notion of learning and adaptation. It should
be able to adapt to the changing conditions of the environment in which the trust decision
was made. Human users should also be able to incorporate their own preferences in the
decision-making process. Intentions and the behavior of the participants in the environments
are subject to changes and evolution and thus, there is a need to monitor trust relationships
to determine whether the criteria on which they are based still apply. This could also involve
the process of keeping track of the activities of the partners involved during the collaboration
and of determining the necessary actions needed when any of the participants misuses the
trust of their partners.
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4.8 Summary
In this chapter, the related work done for modeling and managing trust in some areas of
computer science was presented. First, an overview of the models for identity trust was
given. In none of the presented approaches there was a relationship to behavior trust and
thus as stand-alone, these models are not suitable to assess the trust of the participants in the
Grid environments. Second, the current behavior-based trust models were presented. They
were divided into:
• models that consider only direct experiences and
• models that consider either third parties’ experiences only or hybrid models where the
direct and third parties’ experiences are considered as well.
Third, a discussion on the collective features and limitations of the presented approaches was
done.
In the next chapter, the trust model for Grid environments will be presented.
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Chapter 5
Towards A New Approach to Trust
in Grid Environments
”You may be deceived if you trust too much,
but you will live in torment if you don’t trust enough.”
Frank Crane
”Distrust itself is very expensive”
based on a quote of Ralph Waldo Emerson
5.1 Introduction
There are a number of ways that a Grid participant can establish trust with its counterparts.
Firstly, it can interact with the target participant(s) and learn their behavior over a number of
interactions. In this case, the participant reasons about the outcome of the direct interactions
with others. When starting an interaction with a new participant, i.e. no information on
previous behavior exists at all, it can use its beliefs about different characteristics of these
interaction partners and reason about these beliefs in order to decide how much trust should
be put in each of them. Secondly, the participant could ask others in the environment about
their experiences with the target participant(s). If sufficient information is obtained and if
this information can be trusted, the participant can reliably choose its interaction partners.
In the previous chapter it was shown that the presented approaches to trust, especially
in Grid domain bear limitations. The main limitations identified are:
• only part of the trust sources are used,
• either identity or behavior trust are considered,
• no definition of identity trust exists,
• there exists an abstract and general notion of behavior and behavior trust; participants
are either ”collaborative” or ”defective”,
• lack of continuous mutual verification of the partners involved in an interaction,
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• still uncertainties regarding the ”real” behavior of participants (reflection of their in-
tentions; malicious and mediocre behavior is favored).
As a result, there is a need for a flexible trust model whose properties reflect the requirements
of Grid applications and the preferences and needs of their users in a heterogeneous, dynamic,
uncertain and vulnerable Grid environment.
The work presented in this chapter is designed to fulfill this goal for Grid environments, but
at the same time to be generic enough to be considered in many other similar domains.
The notion of trust used follows the statement of the chapter 3:
”Trust is the extent to which every participant in a Grid environment, in a specific mo-
ment of time, with an evidence of relative security regarding the identity and the behavior of
their counterparts, is willing to interact with them, even though unexpected negative outcomes
could result from the entire collaboration process.”
A high degree of trust in a participant would mean that it is likely to be chosen as an
interaction partner. Conversely, a low degree of trust would suggest that the participant
is no more selectable, especially in the case when other, more trusted interaction partners
are available. In this way, the trust model aims to guide a participant’s decision making
process regarding how, when and who to interact with. However, in order to do so, the
trust management model initially requires participants to gather some knowledge about their
counterparts’ characteristics or ”behavior”. This can be achieved in many different ways:
through inferences drawn from the outcomes of multiple direct interactions with these part-
ners or through indirect information provided by others in the environment that have had
similar experiences. The direct interactions make it possible to consider methods by which
participants can learn or evolve better strategies to deal with honest and dishonest partic-
ipants such that payoffs are maximized in the long run. It makes up the trust information
that is going to be shared with others in the environment. For every participant, in order
to consider third parties’ experience, the ability to develop methods to reliably acquire and
reason about the information gathered from them is offered.
The overall decision whether to trust an interaction partner or not may be affected by other
non-functional aspects that cannot be generally determined for every possible situation, but
are rather considered to be under the control of the user(s) when requesting such a decision.
In addition, while the basic functionalities of two Grid applications could be similar, differ-
ences in application behavior could be caused by different domain specific trust requirements.
Therefore, in this trust management system, flexible and easy to use components that can
be configured to the specific needs of a user on a per case basis are offered.
In the following, a trust model that can be classified at the individual level as learning based,
reputation based and to a certain point socio-cognitive based is proposed.
The trust model includes identity and behavior trust of the interaction partners and con-
siders different sources to calculate the portion of trust (overall or partial trust value) for an
interaction partner. Participants, independently of the role they are playing for the moment,
have the possibility to monitor each others’ behavior during the entire collaboration.
Finally, a system architecture for collecting and managing multidimensional trust values is
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proposed. It consists of two main components, a trust engine and a verification engine. The
trust engine manages trust values and offers partner discovery and rating functionality to
higher level applications. The verification engine handles the verification of the behavior
of the parties during the collaboration and generates the necessary feedback for the trust
engine regarding the partner. The proposed system architecture can be configured to the
domain specific trust requirements by the use of several separate trust profiles covering the
entire lifecycle of trust establishment and management. Thus, this model is considered to
be generic enough to support social-oriented trust management within Grid computing and
other similar scenarios.
5.2 Key Concepts
In the following subsections, a summary of the key concepts of the trust model, some of which
have already been treated in the previous chapters and also been published by Papalilo et al.
in [212], [216] and [213], is presented.
5.2.1 Decentralization
In an interview, Patti Maes [221], declared:
”We always think of intelligence as a centralized thing. We view even our own consciousness
as centralized. It’s called the homunculus metaphor - that there’s a little person inside our
brain running things. But it’s more likely that intelligence is decentralized and distributed.”
Instead of delegating the problem of determining trust to some centralized node, a distributed
approach which involves decentralization and collaboration is proposed. ”Decentralization”
of the notion of trust is an important step to be taken in a Grid environment. Each of the
participants should be able to decide on its own regarding to its policies and actions. Further-
more, the structure of relationships between participants in the environment must be allowed
to evolve naturally. Although in this case more responsibility and expertise is assigned to an
entity, at least each of them has a chance to manage its own trust relationships.
Decentralization is also considered to improve the management of trust (Blaze et al. [88]).
5.2.2 Participants
Participants considered in this work include:
Grid End User(s)1. Grid end users are those application users who wish to access or
use Grid resources and services in Grid-enabled infrastructures for solving their problems
belonging to different domains, from media sciences ( Ewerth et al. [134]), medical video and
image analysis (Amendolia et al. [75]), problem-solving environments that help set up param-
eter study experiments (Abramson et al. [68]), mathematical packages augmented with calls
to network-enabled solvers (Casanova et al. [98] and Czyzyk et al. [118]), consulting industry
(IBM [155]) and so on.
For the end users, building or modifying Grid applications remains a difficult and time-
consuming task and thus, excluded. They typically place their requirements on the Grid-
1Referred now on as ”user(s)”.
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enabled tools, in terms of reliability, predictability, confidentiality, usability, costs, perfor-
mance, security and trust.
The construction of applications that can meet these requirements in Grid environments rep-
resents a major challenge (Foster et al. [140]).
Grid Consumer(s)2. Grid consumers take care of users’ requests. They make use of
Grid and local system services, discovery mechanisms, scheduling and management tools.
Consumers interact with providers on behalf of users for executing their requests. They are
in charge of managing the entire collaboration process and hand the outcome to the users.
A user could contact a consumer either directly or through a Grid portal like Globus-COG [7],
or GPDK [24].
Consumers’ requirements normally reflect the users’ requirements.
Grid Provider(s)3. Grid providers constitute the environments that host access to the
services or storage resources. Providers aim to maximize the returns on offered services.
They make use of management tools, Grid and local system services.
Providers’ requirements normally reflect their owners’ requirements, i.e. profit, transparency,
security and trust.
Certification Authorities (CAs). A CA could be a third party dedicated to the dis-
tribution of certificates (i.e. Grid Certification Authorities [21]), or every other participant
in the environment. CAs are used to certify the link between the public key and the subject
in the GSI-like certificate [18] giving a possibility to identify Grid participants.
5.2.3 Trust Metrics
Trust measurements regarding identity and behavior are reduced to the normalization of the
measured values in the range [0, 1].
Probabilities are used as parameters of subjective belief (denoted as confidence levels) to
determine the trust values. The probability for a successful future interaction among partners
is considered as closely related to the mutual trust values the partners assign to each other
during the collaboration.
These values vary in the range of [0, 1] ⊂ <, where:
• 0 means that the other partner is not trusted at all (the condition of ”distrust”, resulting
from the partner’s deviating/other than expected behavior during past collaborations),
or there are uncertainties due to the lack of information (the condition of ”ignorance”).
Assigning a trust value that equals 0 to a collaboration partner when no information on
its behavior exist, expresses not only the ”ignorance” but also the prejudiced ”distrust”
regarding the behavior of a unknown partner during the collaboration.
• 1 means that it can be fully trusted and gives certainties on the success of the interaction
that is going to take place.
These confidence parameters are an evidence of past experiences and reflect also the risk
associated and the expectations for the future.
2Referred now on as ”consumer(s)”.
3Referred now on as ”provider(s)”.
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5.2.4 A Model for Small Worlds in Grids
It is believed that almost any pair of participants in collaborative environments (real world
included) can be connected to one another by a short chain of intermediate acquaintances.
This phenomenon could be seen as valuable for bringing some order to the Grid environments
as considered in this thesis.
In the following, the ”small world” phenomenon and a view on how to introduce this phe-
nomenon in Grid environments are presented.
The ”Small-World” Phenomenon. The phenomenon has its roots in experiments per-
formed by the social psychologist Stanley Milgram in the late 1960s [199]. The aim of his
experiments was to trace out short paths through the social network of the United States.
He asked participants of the experiment to forward a letter to a ”target person” living near
Boston, with the restriction that each participant could advance the letter only by forwarding
it to a single acquaintance that the current holder knew on a first-name basis. The letters
were distributed over a random selection of people over a certain territory. The strategy
followed by most of the people was to pass their letter to someone they presumed was more
likely to know the person to whom the letter was ultimately addressed.
Milgram kept track of the letters and the demographic characteristics of their handlers
through receiving intermediary reports on the letters’ reception. A reasonable number of
letters eventually reached their destination, with a median chain length of about six4. Mil-
gram concluded that six was therefore the average number of acquaintances separating any
two people in the entire world.
Further work conducted by Watts and Strogatz [259], introduced the ”small-world network”
concept which is based on ”six degrees of separation”. They have shown that introducing
just a few distant connections in a regular graph is enough to drastically cut the step-length
and yet still retain high levels of clustering. In other words, such ”semi-random” networks
are very likely to show the ”small-world” effect, with apparently unrelated clusters joined to
others via few steps. Watts and Strogatz made use of three real-life networks: film actors, the
electric Grid of the western US and the nervous system of a nematode worm. Their model
lies between random and regular networks.
Another concept, used for describing ”collaborative distances”, is that of the ”Erdös num-
ber”5 [13]. Paul Erdös has Erdös number 0. Every person that has a joint publication with
him has the Erdös number 1, others that have a joint publication with them have Erdös
number 2 and so on. Thus the Erdös number of every person is just the distance from that
person to Paul Erdös in the collaboration graph (in which two authors are joined by an edge
if they have a joint publication).
Amongst all mathematicians who have a finite Erdös number, the numbers range up to 15,
the median is 5, the average Erdös number is 4.65 (according to the Erdös Number Project);
and almost everyone with a finite Erdös number has a number less than 8 [12].
Notions similar to the Erdös number are used for defining the Oracle of Bacon which links all
co-actors of Kevin Bacon [39], the Kasparov number which links all co-players of the chess
4This situation has been labeled and referred to as ”six degrees of separation”.
5Honoring the mathematician Paul Erdös, one of the most prolific writers of mathematical papers; had 485
co-authors.
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player Garry Kasparov [31], the Black Sabbath Game which links musicians in rock bands [3],
the Oracle of Baseball which links baseball players [40] and so on.
Modeling the ”Small-Worlds” Phenomenon in Grids. Milgram’s experiment [199]
led to two main discoveries:
• first, he proved the existence of short paths in social and collaborative environments,
• the second deals with the fact that people in society, with knowledge of only their own
personal acquaintances, were collectively able to forward the letter to a distant target
so quickly.
Similar conclusions came out from the work of Watts and Strogatz [259].
However, in this thesis, use of a much simpler model of ”small-worlds” for Grid environ-
ments is made. Two types of ”collaboration graphs” are considered:
• certification graph (Fig. 5.1) - links the participants on basis of the authorities that
issued their certificates
Figure 5.1: Certification Graph.
• collaboration graph (Fig. 5.2) - links the participants on the basis of previous direct
collaborations (either for exchanging recommendations or execute tasks and gather
responses).
Similarly to the Erdös number the following can be created:
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Figure 5.2: Collaboration Graph.
• the ”Oracle of Certification” - every participant builds a ”certification graph” centered
at its own CA. ”Oracle of Certification” defines the degree of separation of a target
partner from this participant as the path length of the shortest certificate chain from
the participant’s CA to its partner. Any partner who has no path to the participant’s
CA is said to have an infinite relationship with the centre of this ”certification graph”
and thus∞ is assigned. A relationship is considered to be of first order (i.e. 1 assigned)
between trusted and dedicated CAs such as the one in [21].
• the ”Oracle of Collaboration” - every participant builds a ”collaboration graph” staying
at the centre of the graph. ”Oracle of Collaboration” defines the degree of separation of
a target partner from this participant as the path length of the shortest collaboration
chain from the participant to its partner.
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship of every participant to the others in the environment.
”Oracle of Certification” and ”Oracle of Collaboration” are going to be used by a trustor in
the trust management model during the calculation of Identity Trust and Behavior Trust of
its trustees.
5.2.5 Trust to Identity and Identity Trust
Each of the participants in the environment, before starting to interact with its partners
needs to have some certainties about their identity, i.e. that they are who they claim to be.
This subsection discusses the identification scheme used by this trust management model for
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between Grid participants.
the participants in the environment together with problems related to identity and authen-
tication of participants in Grids and proposals on how to eliminate or minimize them.
Identity. Every participant6 in the environment is identified through a certificate. The au-
thentication infrastructure implied here is similar to the authentication infrastructure adopted
by Globus [18].
The four primary pieces of information included in a certification are:
• A subject name, which identifies the person or object that the certificate represents.
• The public key belonging to the subject.
• The identity of a Certificate Authority (CA) that has signed the certificate to certify
that the public key and the identity both belong to the subject.
• The digital signature of the named CA.
Besides the dedicated third parties, every other participant in the environment is also en-
titled to release certificates either for itself or others that apply for it. An overview of the
certification scenarios is presented in figure 5.2.
The identity of the participant in this model is considered to be much more than a sim-
ple certificate. Every participant can be viewed as a collection of physical attributes as well
as a set of knowledge, behavior, possessions and history (Fig. 5.4). All these parameters can
be described as identification factors7.
The identification factors can be further organized under:
6With the term ”participant”, it is refered to consumers and providers. End-users deal principally with
consumers which interact with providers on users’ behalf. At the end of the thesis, a possible enhancement of
the trust model is presented, where among others, the trust between users and consumers is considered.
7The term was taken from the book Network Security Illustrated [245].
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Figure 5.4: Identifying a participant in the environment (illustration from book ”Network
Security Illustrated” [245]).
• What a participant is - refers to personal attributes of every single participant.
Examples of these traits include hardware and software peculiarities of the participant
(i.e. operating system, hardware in use, network physical address, IP address, etc).
Part of these attributes or a combination of them is extremely difficult to duplicate
and very specific to a single participant. These attributes have to be included in the
identification process.
• What a participant does - refers to unique patterns of behavior that this participant
manifests during the collaboration with others. As such, quantitative QoS require-
ments8 can be mentioned. However, these characteristics are far less consistent than
personal physical attributes. Accurate methods of investigation are needed in this case
in order to differ among normal behavior and different types of anomalies (malicious
behavior included).
• What a participant knows - refers to specific knowledge that the participants have
gathered (locally stored) during past collaborations with others. In Grid environments,
knowledge of participants could be expressed in terms of personal history details (i.e.
participants it collaborated with, their behavior during the collaboration, collaboration
start and end time, etc).
• What a participant has - refers to specific information in possession of that par-
ticipant. Such information is the private key assigned to the target participant from
its CA. However, since this kind of ”possession” could be vulnerable (can be stolen
or counterfeit), additional elements need to be considered in order to increase trust to
identity and when required, the reliability to the confidentiality of the communication.
An example could be the generation of session key(s) that the parties use for encrypting
the communication among them during the collaboration.
8discussed previously in chapter 3, under quantitative QoS requirements, parameters like availability, ac-
cessibility, accuracy, processing time, etc., are implied.
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A fraudulent participant can fake any of the four identification factors, but faking more than
one factor simultaneously is a significantly harder and expensive task.
The proposed solutions help making the identification process more secure, but could never
replace the security layer. It is the first and most important layer that protects a participant
from all kinds of threats and attacks in the environment. To that extent, the security layer
itself can be considered as the ”fifth factor” [245].
Discussion on Problems Related to Identity and Authentication of Participants
in Grids. Having such an infrastructure for distributing digital identities comes out to be
very convenient for the participants in the environment. The problems arise once someone has
fraudulent (malicious)9 intentions. In such a case the following problems could be observed:
• First, such a participant could apply and obtain different certificates from the same
dedicated CA, from other dedicated CAs, from other participants in the environment
or from itself. Thus a participant has the possibility to obtain more than one identity in
the environment. As a result, it will be very difficult to discover and punish a fraudulent
participant.
• Second, following the same reasoning, a participant could easily change its identity
(apply for a new one and enter the environment with this one) in case others have
discovered their intentions. Even in this case, a participant could never be punished for
all wrongdoing.
• Third, every participant is (and should be) responsible only for the security of its own
sensitive information (certificates, private keys, passwords, etc.). However, since the
security measures differ from one participant to the other, it is to be expected that
vulnerabilities exist in many of them. This allows fraudulent participants to easily
impersonate (Lenstra et al. [181]) others in the environment through identity theft or
duplication of sensitive personal information (identity counterfeit).
All these problems exist because of:
• ease of obtaining certificates,
• ease of duplication,
• difficulties on detecting such ”counterfeit” information (Van Oorschot et al. in [175]),
• independence of new credentials. If existing credential information is used by an im-
personator to obtain new credentials, the latter are in one sense ”owned” by the im-
personator, and usually no information flows back to the original credential owner
immediately,
9The two primary types of adversaries in Grid environments, able to put others in the environment at risk
are fraudulent and malicious participants. They are primarily distinguished by their goals in the environment.
Fraudulent participants wish to have a considerable profit for their mediocre contribution, achieve a better
”social” position in the environment to the detriment of the other participants or ”live on others” (e.g. a
consumer who is not going to pay at all or only in part for the services it got). The goal of malicious
participants on the other hand, is to cause harm to either specific targeted participants in the environment or
to the environment as a whole.
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• ease of accessing personal information and even full credentials.
A solution to the problem could be the use of hardware equipments for storing private keys.
However, this solution is not an optimal and ”handy” solution for the majority of the par-
ticipants in the environment. Even in this case there exists no guarantee that the hardware
keys are not going to get lost.
Alternative solutions that can be applied are:
• Fees for Certification. Typically, a participant is authenticated through a certifica-
tion authority (CA) which could be:
– a trusted and dedicated participant (e.g. Grid Certificate Authorities discussed
in [21]),
– another participant in the environment,
– the participant itself which could issue self-signed certificates.
Obtaining a certificate, at least from the dedicated CAs, should imply also some addi-
tional fees for the participants who apply for it.
• Hierarchical Certification Scheme. Among certification authorities, some hierar-
chy should exist. Considering the certification graph in Fig. 5.1, dedicated CAs [21]
should stay at top of it and have a relationship of first order (a supposed direct relation-
ship between them exists; they have the same importance). Within such a certification
scheme, all participants are connected through certification chains to each other. Par-
ticipants that do not have such a connection (have self-signed certificates), have an
infinite relationship with other participants.
• Identity Trust. In such an infrastructure for distributing certificates, applying the
notion of trust among participants regarding their partners’ identity, is the next step.
Trust on identity reflects the confidence of every participant on the declared identity of
the others in the environment .
To give a participant X the possibility to determine the identity trust of another partic-
ipant Y in the environment, a ”certification graph” is centered at X’s CA. The ”oracle
of certification” defines the degree of separation Dcertification of partner Y from partner
X as the path length of the shortest certificate chain from X’s CA to Y . Any partner
who has no path to X’s CA is said to have an infinite relationship with the centre of
this graph and thus, ∞ is assigned.
If partner X needs to gather information regarding the identity trust of another partner
Y , after establishing the ”oracle of certification” of partner Y with its CA, equation
(5.1) can be used:




The oracle of certification is determined according to the algorithm in Fig. 5.5.
• Identification Factors. Including the identification factors (i.e. attributes of a par-
ticipant) in the identification and authorization process can be considered as a further
step against some of the threats such as usage of stolen or counterfeit certificates.
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1. initialize Dcertification = 0;
2. contact target participant and get its certification authority (CA);
3. compare received CA with own CA or any of first order CAs, Dcertification = Dcertification + 1;
4. if received CA equals personal CA, then stop searching any further and calculate T IX(Y ) accord-
ing to formula 5.1, otherwise contact the CA of the target participant directly and ask for its
CA;
5. repeat step 3 until received CA is the same with own CA or any of first order CAs.
Figure 5.5: Determining the ”Oracle of Certification”.
5.2.6 Behavior Shaping and Behavior Trust
Until now, the behavior of collaborating participants in Grid environment is an abstract no-
tion. It is limited to a general abusive or abnormal notion of behavior of the participants
during the collaboration (like by Azzedin et al. in [79], [81] and [80]) or to the estimation of
only singular elements like accuracy (i.e. by Zhao et al. [270]).
In this thesis, behavior is referred to as consisting of any of the quantitative QoS require-
ments10, a combination, or the entirety of them. Abstracting the common attributes from
the variety of demands that the user, aiming at an optimal level of QoS, on a per case ba-
sis, places to the participants in the environment, the components of the behavior could be
derived from the parameters of QoS such as: reliability (correct functioning of a service over
a period of time), availability (readiness for use), accessibility (capability of responding to
a request), cost (charges for services offered), security (security level offered), performance
(high throughput and lower latency), etc.
Each of these parameters11 can be directly measured or break up in measurable elements, in
order to offer the possibility to create a history of data from past interactions among collab-
orating parties in Grid environments.
Behavior trust, the most important social element in Grid systems, deals with the trust-
worthiness of interaction partners, defining the confidence that a participant involved in an
interaction will offer the desired QoS, and behave as expected.
Each of the participants gathers these results by continuously monitoring and controlling
their interaction partners.
Trust management is considered to be the process leading to the decision which partners in a
collaboration are to be trusted to complete particular actions.
5.2.7 Trust Relationships
Trust relationships are modeled as directed graphs where trust is a unidirectional directed
edge from the trustor to the trustee.
A distinct feature of the trust relationships is their dynamicity. According to the observed
behavior during the collaboration, in case of undesired or unexpected behavior of the other
party, participants can decide on the future of the current collaboration (or future collabo-
10Presented at the chapter 3.
11Referred to from now on as behavior trust elements.
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rations) with that partner.
The following trust relationships are considered:
• consumer - provider (provider - consumer): participants trust that their counter-
parts will behave properly during the collaboration. This belief is constructed thanks to
the observations of past collaborations and/or experiences of others. At the same time
it expresses the expectations of the parties; their partners will show at least the same
behavior as in previous direct or indirect collaborations. Consumers expect providers
to supply services on the desired level of quality and providers expect their consumers
to behave accordingly.
It is a bilateral relationship, meaning that both parties have to trust each other (not
necessarily at the same level) for the interaction to take place.
• consumer (provider) - recommenders: this kind of trust relationship differs from
the trust relationship established between consumers and providers. In this model, the
experience the participants establish with their counterparts during single collabora-
tions is considered to be ”personal” to the participant itself. It can be freely offered as
recommendation to the others in the environment that ask for it, without establishing
any trust relationship in this direction. The trust relationship exists only from the side
of the party that needs these recommendations. Every participant can ask the others
if recommendations are needed, but not necessarily consider at all or at the same level
every recommendation it gets. The reasons are:
– since the experience the participants make in the environment is personal, its
categorization as ”good” or ”bad” does not necessarily have the same meaning for
the others, and
– malicious participants could intentionally offer low trust values for well behav-
ing participants and high trust values for others with mediocre behavior or no
contribution at all.
In this model, recommendations depend:
• on the user/application specification of the trust requirements (if any recommendation
is going to be considered, or what trust value to assign them) and
• on a history of the past recommendations and the resulting behavior of the participants
recommended by them.
Furthermore, a separation between behavior trust and recommendation trust exists. The
”ability/inability” of a participant to offer valuable recommendations should in no way in-
terfere with decisions regarding its ”capability” to properly behave during the collaboration
(consumer-provider; provider-consumer) with another participant.
5.2.8 Direct Experience and Direct Trust
Every time a trustor collaborates with a trustee, a direct experience is established between
them. The output of the collaboration determines the type of experience the trustor had
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with the trustee and thus the trust on the behavior of the trustee. This is known as direct
trust .
It is calculated based on the entirety of the behavior elements under observation. Considering
the participant X as trustor and participant Y as trustee, direct trust is expressed according
to the formula 5.2:




where B(Y )i represents the behavior trust elements under observation. Each of the behavior
trust elements is calculated as the ratio of the ”positive” observed experiences with the total





The entirety of behavior trust elements is referred to as Absolute Behavior Trust (ABhvT)
and any combination of them is referred as Relative Behavior Trust (RBhvT).
The accumulated experience can also be offered to the others in the environment in the
form of recommendations.
Furthermore, if recommendations are accepted by third parties, the observed behavior of the
trustee during the collaboration is going to influence the trust that the trustor establishes
with regard to its recommenders. Thus, the trust a trustor assigns to a participant K it got
recommendations from, is the average behavior trust all trustees (Ni), recommended by this








5.2.9 Third Parties’ Experience and Indirect Trust (Recommendations)
Recommendations could gain importance especially in those cases when the trustor never
had any direct experience with the trustee(s), a certain amount of time has passed since the
last collaboration, or when a more ”objective” opinion on the trustee is required. However,
some uncertainties exist about the ”honesty” of the recommenders or even in indicated cir-
cumstances under which the experience was made.
Here, a more social-oriented approach is proposed.
Referring to Fig. 5.3, for every participant in the Grid environment, the others can be cat-
egorized as ”known” and ”unknown” participants based on the previous direct experiences
they had. The same principle can be applied to the recommenders, a participant got rec-
ommendations from. There are recommendations from ”known” sources (participants for
which direct experiences exist) and recommendations from ”unknown” sources, participants
in the environment, with whom, considering the collaboration graph in Fig. 5.2 a path can be
found using the known partners of known partners and so on. Considering the relationship
between Grid participants (Fig. 5.3), the oracle of the collaboration (Fig. 5.2) expresses the
relationship of the trustor to:
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• itself - personal experience is considered as a ”recommendation to itself”. The partici-
pant stays at the root of the graph; the oracle of collaboration is 0 (Dcollaboration = 0).
Trust of a trustor X to the trustee Y is given by TBX,Dcollab.=0(Y ) and expressed by
equation 5.2.
• known sources - participants in the environment who have previously offered their
experience to the trustor. The oracle of collaboration is 1 (Dcollaboration = 1).
Each partner in the network can now calculate the weighted recommendations coming






(K) · TBk,Dcollab.=0(Y ))
|Nk|
(5.5)
• unknown sources - participants in the environment who had never offered their rec-
ommendations to the trustor previously (the fact that they could have offered their
recommendations to trustor’s known partners, known partners of the known partners
and so on is not excluded). The oracle of collaboration is considered to be simply
greater than 1 (Dcollab. > 1).
There are two strategies for calculating the total weighted recommendations coming
from the set of unknown sources, either considering the experience values of each par-
ticipant pi along the shortest path P = {p1, . . . , pD} between partner X and partner Y
or taking only the experience of the participant in the path preceding partner Y into
account. This value is weighted based on the oracle of collaboration of this participant












where Pu = {pu,1, . . . , pu,Du+1} is the shortest path from X to Y with pu,D = u.
Equation (5.6) requires several subjective decisions in the determination of every part-
ner’s trust along the path, which are based on experience and on several uncertainties
regarding the evaluation of these experiences. Therefore, equation (5.7) represents a
more prejudiced evaluation of the recommendations based on the idea that a more ob-









5.3 First Trust Problem
The first trust problem introduces itself in situations when Grid participants, completely
”unknown” to the others, enter the environment. No personal experience exists with any
of the participants, therefore all of the trust sources referenced in (5.5) are equal to 0. The
usual strategies for selecting a partner do not apply in this situation.
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In this work, two different basic strategies for ”initializing” trust are distinguished:
• One is a rather open approach to assign an initial trust value slightly above the minimal
trust threshold to every partner, effectively giving the partner a chance to prove itself
trustworthy without prior verification. This method is called ”warm start phase”.
• In contrast, there might be scenarios in which a partner is tested by performing valida-
tion checks and deriving initial behavior trust from these interactions. Obviously, this
trust establishment phase through a ”cold start” comes at a comparably high price.
The initial trust value assigned to new participants during this initialization procedure
equals 0.
The problem of establishing first trust may be seen both from a consumer as well as a provider
point of view. For this reason, trust management for Grid environments is designed flexible
enough to allow specification of the strategy to be used in either role and on an application
basis.
5.4 Verification Strategies
For the participants, observing the behavior of their counterparts is fundamental for:
• determining the success of the ongoing collaboration between them, verifying that a
particular partner stands up to the assumed or previously offered behavior and
• aiding the decision making process when it comes to choose partners in future collabo-
rations.
The extent to which verification is performed may vary depending on application scenarios or
various user requirements. Also, the need for verification of the partners’ behavior may arise
in both roles (i.e. consumer or provider) independently of the Grid scenario. Participants
will continuously monitor the interaction process among each other and in case of discovered
deviations in the behavior of their partners, scheduling or access policies will be reorganized
accordingly.
The different behavior trust elements (e.g. availability, accessibility, accuracy, response time,
etc), for which trustees were chosen, are the criteria for developing verification strategies
for the trustor. However, the verification of these elements could turn up as very costly
or even impossible for the trustor. It could be pretty easy to verify the availability, the
accessibility, response time, etc., of the collaboration partner(s), even by the trustor itself,
but from the very nature of the tasks running in Grid environments, it is very difficult for a
single participant to verify elements like e.g. accuracy of the response a consumer participant
receives from a provider. The strategy to use for the verification of such behavior trust
elements may vary depending on certain constraints such as the additional acceptable cost
for performing the verification operations.
Regarding verification of the accuracy of the responses, the following verification strategies
can be applied:
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• Challenge with known tasks - A service consumer may prepare a particular test
challenge for which it knows the correct result. In this case, the consumer can di-
rectly verify if a service provider was able to calculate the correct response for this
challenge. However, a malicious provider may be able to guess the correct answers to
the set of challenges and thereby manipulate the behavior trust assigned to it, since the
computational resources of the consumer for test preparation may be very limited.
• Best of n replies - A more feasible verification technique is similar to the one that
is used by SETI@HOME [46]. The validity of the computed results is checked by
letting different entities work on the same data unit. At the end, a majority vote
establishes the correct response. This technique results in a significant increase of the
total computational costs to solve a particular problem, since the overall workload is
multiplied by the replication factor used to reassign subtasks. If there is a service
charge collected by a service provider for every processed work unit, this also leads to
a considerable increase of the overall cost.
• Applying the ”frequency of the verification” - Here, a similar approach to
SETI@HOME [46] is used for verifying the accuracy of the responses coming from
collaboration partners. Instead of sending replicas of original tasks to many partners
and applying a ”best of n replies” verification strategy, only a replica of the original
task is send to partners whose accuracy of the response is already proven. The com-
ing results are compared and a decision is taken. Additionally, for the participants,
the possibility to develop a personalized verification strategy regarding each of their
collaboration partners is foreseen. For this purpose, the notion of ”frequency of the
verification” is introduced.
In this approach, the verification of the accuracy of the responses coming from a certain
partner is coupled with the last measured trust value of the associated behavior trust
element (accuracy) of this participant. This relationship is expressed by (5.8):
f = −((1− Vmin) · TBlast) + 1 (5.8)
where Vmin12 is the minimal verification rate set by the consumer and TBlast represents
the trust value for the accuracy of a provider at a certain moment of time.
From the consumer side this means that for a non-trusted provider every single response
is verified and for a fully trusted provider only a minimum of the responses coming from
that specific provider has to be verified.
Through this approach:
• trustors do not need to make replicas of every task they send to trustees, thus overhead
in the system is significantly reduced and
• such a moderate number of tasks (replicas) to be verified makes it possible for the
trustor to execute replicas even by itself without the need of a trusted third party.
The result of the verifications will directly be used to alter behavior trust regarding accuracy
and indirectly the absolute behavior trust of the target participant.
12This value, as presented in next subsection, with be expressed on the user/application trust requirements,
according to the needs for trust from the environments and the involved participants.
92CHAPTER 5. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH TO TRUST IN GRID ENVIRONMENTS
5.5 User/Application Specific Trust Requirements
A further consideration is the involvement of the human users through allowing them, ac-
cording to the type of the Grid application, to express their personalized trust preferences
towards the participants that are going to be considered as collaboration partners. These
preferences include the initialization values that the user is willing to assign to each of the
new partners, the selection of sources for getting trust information from (recommendations),
verification strategies for all the trust elements, etc.
5.5.1 Application Requirements
In order to better illustrate how different application requirements may arise depending on
the field of application, two scenarios, already introduced in the second chapter, will be
analyzed:
• Grid Services for Video Cut Detection. The first application scenario identifies
”cuts” in videos (Ewerth et al. [134]). To identify such cuts, the video file is split and all
parts are sent to a manager, which assigns the jobs (split video files) to remote services
that will take care of the analysis and the identification of the cuts. After all the
jobs have been processed, the resulting cut lists are merged together, some boundary
processing takes place in the manager, and the user is notified that the work has been
finished.
Video analysis is a collaborative task with moderate security requirements and even
moderate trust requirements regarding the behavior of the involved parties. In this
case, an open attitude accepting recommendations from strangers and requiring only
occasional verification of the data returned from individual data processing services
may be sufficient to satisfy the users of the application.
• Grid Services for Medical Imaging. The second example is to find similar cases
(images) in a set of mammograms (Amendolia et al. [75]) for diagnosis support. Images
resulting from mammography are passed to remote services representing image analysis
algorithms which calculate similarities in image sets.
These image analysis algorithms may be basically similar to those used in the identi-
fication of video cuts or in object recognition tasks within frames of video sequences.
However, different standards are required in the medical scenario compared to the video
application:
– The radiologist may be interested in simply performing standard image processing
techniques on generated data sets without placing any special trust requirements
on the interaction partners. A subset of images stored on a remote image server is
retrieved and viewed. Analysis of image data on the local workstation is performed.
Only occasional verification of the data returned from individual data processing
services may be required.
– The analysis can be extended to the application of several different statistical
analysis methods on data from multiple different studies to view the effects of
a treatment method across a patient group. In this case, trusting the accuracy
of the responses coming from the interaction partners is important. As a result,
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high trust requirements are imposed regarding the behavior of the involved parties.
The radiologist may consider only own experience or recommendations from highly
trusted sources for the selection of partners. A high frequency of verification of
the data returned from the individual data processing services is required.
While the basic application is similar in both scenarios (i.e. applying a number of image
processing algorithms to a set of images and merging the individual results), the domain
specific trust requirements lead to different application behavior.
5.5.2 ”Human on the Trust”
Users, according to the application scenario, can express their personal requirements and
configure the following elements of the trust model presented in this thesis:
Oracle of Certification. The user establishes the oracle of certification (separation dis-
tance from the CA of consumer he/she is collaborating with) of the participants that are
going to be found as suitable for fulfilling his/her needs. The user is expected to either ac-
cept participants with the oracle of certification 1 (participants certified through the same
CA as the consumer or through any of the first order CAs), or accept anyone, independently
of the oracle of certification. The identity trust of the accepted participants is going to be
calculated according to formula (5.1).
Behavior Trust Initialization. The decision whether to ”warm start” (give to new par-
ticipants the chance to prove that they behave accordingly to the expectations) or ”cold
start” (all new participants in the environment are considered as not trustworthy and thus
the minimal trust threshold is assigned to them) can be taken only by the user, according to
the application that is going to be executed.
Behavior Trust Elements of Interest. The behavior trust elements where the user is
more interested in are considered. These elements could vary from single or combination of
some of them (Relative Behavior Trust - RBhvT) to the entirety of them (Absolute Behavior
Trust - ABhvT).
According to the specified elements, only the most trusted participants are going to be cho-
sen for the upcoming collaboration (trust values regarding these elements need to be greater
or equal to the value specified by the user or if not differently specified, to the maximum,
thus 1). Furthermore, when monitoring the collaboration, only the specified behavior trust
elements are going to be verified for discovering possible deviations during the collaboration.
The rest of the behavior trust elements (those not specified) are going to be considered as
”not important” for the user. Their current trust value will not have any impact on the de-
cision whether a participant is eligible for collaborating with and they will not be monitored
during the collaboration.
Trust Profile Vector. Users need the flexibility to weight the different sources for the
behavior trust differently in different situations, contributing directly to calculate the result-
ing normalized trust to put into an interaction partner. For this purpose, a vector of all trust
sources a trustor X may use for rating a trustee Y is defined (5.9):
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~TSX(Y ) :=
(





Now, the trustor X can calculate the resulting normalized trust to put into trustee Y using
a profile vector ~P ∈ [0, 1]4:
~P =
(





where the relative weights express direct experience (Dcollab. = 0), indirect experience of
”known” sources (Dcollab. = 1), experiences of ”unknown” sources (Dcollab. > 1) without
prejudice and the last weight for experiences of ”unknown” sources making prejudices on how
they have gathered their experience with interaction partner Y . The weights can have values
in [0, 1].
Having defined the relative weights for the different sources, trustor X can calculate the
resulting normalized trust to put into a trustee Y :
TBX (Y ) =
~TSX · ~PX∥∥∥~PX∥∥∥ (5.11)
The resulting trust value is only used for the decision to interact with a certain participant.
It does not affect the experience value, because this value only depends on the outcome of
the subsequent collaboration.
Verification Strategies and Sub-Strategies13. The user may choose to:
• ”Trust-no-One” - In this case, the user may choose to verify the accuracy of every single
response. This technique results in a significant increase of the total computational
costs to solve a particular problem, since the overall workload is multiplied by the
replication factor used to reassign every subtask. If there is a service charge collected by
trustworthy participants for every processed work unit, this also leads to a considerable
increase of the overall cost.
• ”Optimistic-Trust” - In order to minimize added costs, the user may choose to verify
the accuracy of only a part of the responses. In this case the user specifies the minimal
verification frequency Vmin with values [0, 1]. The idea behind is that for a non-trusted
participant every single response may preferably be verified and for a fully trusted
participant only a minimum of the responses have to be verified.
The verification strategies the user may choose to apply are:
• Offline verification - behavior trust elements like the accuracy of the responses coming
from a certain participant are verified only at the end of the collaboration, before
the user receives the results. The user needs to specify only the minimal verification
frequency to apply to the verification process.
• Online verification - behavior trust elements like accuracy of the responses coming
from a certain participant are continuously monitored during an ongoing collaboration.
13The verification strategies will be explained in detail in the next subsection.
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The user needs to specify the minimal verification frequency, and also the clearance
number ”i”. It is used to establish the number of responses to be sequentially verified
(100% verification), before applying the frequency of verification.
Stopping Rule ”ncBhvT element”. In a certain sense, this represents the tolerance that the
user has against deviations in the behavior (behavior trust element of interest) of the inter-
action parties. Regarding the example behavior trust element, the accuracy of the responses,
the stopping rule represents the number of non− accurate responses that the user is willing
to accept from a target participant. Once this number is exceeded, the interaction with the
specific partner is interrupted and the scheduling policy is reorganized.
5.6 Keeping the Behavior of the Collaboration Parties ”In
Control”.
Until now, the key concepts of how the participants establish and manage trust among
them are presented. Considering different sources for gathering trust information from (self
experience, indirect experience, user/application trust requirements), each participant sorts
out the collaboration partners and starts interacting only with the ”most trusted” of them.
During the collaboration, behavior trust elements are constantly verified either 100% or at
a certain verification frequency (5.8). According to the verification results, trust values are
updated influencing directly the decision making process if the collaboration with a certain
participant will continue or will be interrupted. Naturally, if the expected behavior was met,
the collaboration will most probably continue. The problems start once any deviation from
the expected behavior of a collaboration partner is verified.
The behavior deviations can be categorized under:
• deviation within the current collaboration and
• deviation in time.
The first has a more immediate effect on the current collaboration and the validity of the
data being processed. If a 100% verification strategy is applied, it is easy to tell that until
that specific moment, no other deviation was ascertained. On the contrary, if a verification
frequency was applied, how could it be possible to tell that no more deviations exist except
those verified? In the trust context: ”does any difference exist between the trust calculated
for that specific participant, according to the observed behavior, with the real trust that should
have been assigned to it according to its real behavior?”
The second deviation affects more than the current collaboration. It deals with the trustwor-
thiness of a participant in general and its intentions. As an example, let consider a provider
which offers a high processing speed for the tasks assigned, applying also high charges for the
offered services. At the beginning it behaves according to the expectations of its partners. As
time passes, trying to have the maximum profit, it starts serving at the same time a greater
number of consumers that it can afford without negatively affecting the processing speed,
applying the same charges. How could it be possible to verify these ”long term” deviations
in the behavior of a participant? In the trust context: How to verify the deviations on the
trustworthiness of a participant?”
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Another question that comes out either in the case when deviations are observed within
a single collaboration or in the case when deviations are observed in time, is: ”How long
should a collaboration continue with a participant despite its anomalous/malicious behavior?”
For answering the above posed questions, new functionalities need to be added to the trust
model. For this reason, statistical methods of quality assurance are going to be considered.
Collaboration(s) among participants is seen as a ”production process” where the behavior trust
elements under observation establish the ”quality” of the collaboration process.
In the following, an overview of the statistical methods of quality assurance together with
their application for keeping the behavior of the collaboration parties in Grid environments
”in control” will be presented.
5.6.1 Statistical Methods of Quality Assurance
Statistical methods for monitoring and improving the quality of manufactured goods have
been around since the early 1920s when W. A. Shewhart introduced the graphical control
chart method for detecting possible problems in manufacturing processes (Mittag and Rinne
[202]).
The term ”quality” is broadly used by service industries and it embraces all the characteristics
of an entity (goods or services) that determine the capacity to satisfy the expressed and
implicit requirements of who uses it.
Current applications of statistical methods of quality assurance have widened to include many
service industries as well as traditional manufacturing applications.
General aspects of the quality are:
• The quality of output process. Goods and services are produced with various degrees
of quality.
• The conformity to already set process regulations and standards.
Every output possesses a number of measurable elements perceivable by the user, which
contributes jointly to the formation in the quality of the product. These elements can be
indicated as quality characteristics or quality parameters. Quality parameters can be of
different types. Generally when the characteristics of quality are measures, expressed on a
continuous scale (weight, resistance, length and duration) one speaks of variables. When
instead discrete data are considered, for instance data that can be numbered (number of
non-working light bulbs, etc.) one speaks of attributes. Quality parameters are evaluated in
comparison to the specifications or the established values for any of the quality parameters
of the product/service. The desired value of the quality parameters is defined as the nominal
value or the target value.
The following statistical concepts for quality assurance are considered:
Sampling and Sampling Distribution. The primary goal of statistical quality assur-
ance is to draw inference about the fulfillment of a quality standard in a population based on
information about individual units. From the statistical point of view, the quality standard
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of an individual unit is related to the specific realization of its quality parameter, and the
quality standard of the population (the entire output) is related to a function parameter, or
a functional parameter of the distribution of the quality parameter. The population consists
of a finite or infinite collection of elements where the sample(s) to be verified are taken from.
A random sampling procedure is the procedure of selecting a finite number of units from a
population through a random mechanism.
Common Sample Statistics. The elements x1, . . . , xn of a random sample are the real-
izations of the corresponding random variables X1, . . . , Xn. The latter constitute the sample
vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , xn).
The vector notation x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is the realization of the sample vector X. The



































Average Outgoing Quality (AOQ). AOQ is also an important characteristic of the sam-
pling plan. Considering the above posed questions, it gains even a greater importance in this
model, because it determines the portion of defective units through the inspection procedure.
Thus, according to the verification results, determining the AOQ of the verification plan
makes possible to identify the differences between the observed and the ”real” behavior of a
participant during the collaboration.
Average Total Inspection (ATI). ATI for a sampling plan is the average number of
units inspected per lot in a series of lots. It depends upon the lot size, the sampling plan and
on the incoming fraction defective.
Average Fraction Inspected (AFI). AFI tells what proportion of the total responses
coming from a participant is verified on average.
Process Control. The underlying concept of statistical process control is based on the
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comparison of the present process’ output with the previous outputs. In this way, a snapshot
of how the process performs in general, is taken. These data are used to calculate the control
limits for the expected measurements of the output of the process. Data from the running
process is collected and compared to the control limits. The majority of measurements are
supposed to lie within the control limits. Data that fall outside the control limits are exam-
ined and perhaps, some will later be discarded. If so, the limits would be recomputed and
the process is repeated.
There are many ways how to implement process control. An alternative is offered through
control charts. Control charts (Fig. 5.6) are used to track process statistics such as a sub-
group mean, individual observation, weighted statistic, or number of defects, versus sample
number or time and to detect the presence of deviations. Control charts consist of:
• Centre line at the average of the statistic by default.
• Upper control limit, 3Sn above the center line by default.
• Lower control limit, 3Sn below the center line by default.
Figure 5.6: Example of a Control Chart.
A process is considered to be in control when after a verification, points fall within the
bounds of the control limits, and the points do not display any nonrandom patterns. When
a process is in control, it is possible to use control charts to estimate process parameters
needed to determine capability.
These key concepts, together with some other additional sampling methods (presented in
the following) will be considered for defining the verification strategies. The strategies for
the verification of the behavior of collaboration partners are ”offline verification” and ”online
verification”. Each of them is able to make a difference, according to the user/application
trust requirements, between the observed and the ”real” behavior of a collaboration partner.
Differences on the performance of each verification strategy will be considered in the next
chapter.
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5.6.2 Offline Verification
Under ”offline verification”, the verification of special behavior trust elements (i.e. accuracy
of the results coming from a collaboration partner, etc) at the end of the collaboration process
has to be understood.
Verification of Attributes. In the following, it will be assumed that the behavior trust
element under observation can be assigned exactly one of the two possible definitions:
• ”non-deviating/conforming” and
• ”deviating/nonconforming”.
The considered parameters are:
• N - total number of units of the behavior trust element under observation, received
from a specific collaboration partner.
• n - total number of verified units of the behavior trust element under observation from
the total N(0 < n ≤ N). It is randomly established using the formula (5.8).
• D - ”real” deviations in the behavior trust element under observation. It is known only
to the collaboration partner (establishes its ”real” behavior during the collaboration)
• d - verified deviations in the behavior trust element under observation.
• nc - stopping rule; established by the user, determines his/her acceptance/rejection
tolerance of possible deviations of the behavior trust element under observation (0 ≤
nc < n).





Single-Sampling Plans. A single sampling plan is the one in which a random sample of
units of the behavior trust element under observation is taken from the entirety resulting
from a collaboration process, is inspected/verified and at the end a decision is taken on the
acceptance/rejection of the entire process.
During the offline verification, the verification of the responses coming from a single provider,
follows the algorithm in Fig. 5.7.
The sample n is taken out randomly from N and without replacement. The performance
of the sampling plan is assed through:
• Average Outgoing Quality. AOQ for offline verification is calculated according to
the formula (5.17).
AOQ(P ) = P (5.17)
If deviations are found and they overcome the user expectations, none of the units
(completed tasks) coming from that specific partner is going to be considered.
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1. initialize number of defective responses found df = 0 and number of responses verified uf = 0;
2. uf = uf + 1;
3. verify the uf -th response;
4. if deviation is found, df = df +1 and update respective trust value according to (5.3), otherwise
go to step 5;
5. check if df ≤ nc;
6. if yes, repeat from step 2 until uf = n, otherwise interrupt verification and do not consider
responses from that participant.
Figure 5.7: Single-Sampling Plan.
• Average Total Inspection. ATI for the offline verification strategy is calculated
according to the formula (5.18):
ATI(P ) = n (5.18)
• Average Fraction Inspected. AFI for the offline verification strategy is simply






Under ”online verification”, the verification of special behavior trust elements (i.e. accuracy
of the results coming from a collaboration partner, etc) during the collaboration process has
to be understood.
The considered parameters are:
• i - the clearance number. It establishes the number of sequential units that need to
be verified (100% verification period) and is expressed by the user in his/her trust
requirements.
• k - the sampling interval. It is the size of the block to pick one unit for verification and





where f results from (5.8).
• P - is the fraction of defective entities discovered during the verification process with
respect to the total number of entities verified.
Continuous Sampling Plans (CSP). The aim of the CSP is to control the intensity of the
verification process depending on the verification results in such a way so that the maximum
of the average outgoing quality does not exceed a specified limit.
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1. initialize the variables for the number of entities (responses, results etc.) verified through 100%
inspection vi = 0, number of the entities to be verified through the frequency of verification in
(5.20) vk = 0 and number of defective entities found df = 0;
2. vi = vi + 1, verify the vi-th unit;
3. if defective, then df = df + 1, and update the corresponding trust value according to (5.3);
4. if df ≤ nc, repeat from step 2 until vi = i, otherwise interrupt collaboration and do not consider
what is received from that participant;
5. vk = vk + k, verify the vk-th unit;
6. if defective, then df = df + 1, and update the corresponding trust value according to (5.3);
7. if df ≤ nc, repeat from step 5 until no more units are left, otherwise interrupt collaboration
and do not consider what is received from that participant.
Figure 5.8: Continuous Sampling Plan.
Execution of a CSP plan follows the algorithm in Fig. 5.8.
Measuring the Performance of Continuous Sampling Plans. The performance of
the CSP could be assessed through the same parameters as in the measurement of perfor-
mance of the single-sampling plan.
The parameters needed to quantify the effectiveness of a CSP are the average fraction in-
spected (AFI) and average outgoing quality (AOQ). All other relevant measures of CSPs can
be computed from these two values.
In terms of the plan parameters:
• Average Outgoing Quality. AOQ for the online verification strategy can be mea-
sured according to the formula (5.21)
AOQ(P |i; k) = (k − 1)P (1− P )
i
1 + (k − 1)(1− P )i
(5.21)
where for P = 0 or P = 1: AOQ(0|i; k) = AOQ(1|i; k) = 0.
• Average Total Inspection. ATI for the online verification strategy is calculated
according to the formula (5.22):
ATI(P |i; k) = 1
P (1− P )i
(5.22)
• Average Fraction Inspected. AFI for the online verification strategy is calculated
according to the formula (5.23):
AFI(P |i; k) = 1
1 + (k − 1)(1− P )i
(5.23)
where for P = 0: AFI(0|i; k) = 1k = f and P = 1: AFI(1|i; k) = 1.
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1. Gather the data for the period of interest.
2. Calculate the center line.
3. Calculate the control limits (the upper and lower control limits).
4. Verify if observed data lie lie within the the control limits.
5. Classify the behavior of the participant.
Figure 5.9: Control Charts for Behavior Trust Elements.
5.6.4 Behavior Monitoring
Most of the related work considers that participants in Grid environments behave either
”good” or ”bad”. In most of the cases ”good” behavior reflects the expectations of the
collaboration party to simply receive a response from its partners or sometimes consider-
ing only the accuracy of the results. If a collaboration party is going to behave other than
these ”normal” expectations, the behavior of the other party is going to be labeled as ”bad”.
Participants with ”good” behavior are considered as trusted ones and as a result eligible
for future interactions. Others have only minor or not any possibility at all to be taken in
consideration for further interactions.
To support a flexible behavior management and classification system, additional mechanisms
are necessary, e.g. splitting behavior in detailed elements, making continuous observation on
them and offering the possibility for the behavior classification. This will answer also the
questions related to the trustworthiness of a participant in time and its consideration in case
a deviating behavior is verified.
Observing the Behavior of Grid Participants. In general, a process is considered as
statistically stable over time (with respect to the behavior trust element under observation)
if the distribution of this element does not change over time. Stability makes the prediction
of the range of variability to expect in the behavior trust element in the future possible.
Each of the Grid participants, as seen above, keeps this element, for each of their interaction
partners, under continuous ”observation”. The primary interest relies on the discovery of the
fraction of the non-conforming elements, coming from a participant, to non-standard sample
size over a period of interest (e.g. as long as the collaboration takes place). Samples of mea-
surements are periodically taken at one or more stages during or at the end of a collaboration,
according to the sampling procedures of each verification strategy applied.
The steps to follow for constructing the control charts for behavior trust elements are as
in Fig. 5.9.
Calculation of the Central Line and Control Limits. Proportion charts (known as
p-charts) are used to calculate the central line and control limits:
• First, according to (5.13) n (mean value of all sample sizes) and p (mean value of all
sample sizes proportions nonconforming) are calculated.
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• Central Line:
CL = p (5.24)
• Upper Control Limit:





• Lower Control Limit:





”In-Control” and ”Out-of-Control” Behavior. When observed behavior trust element
is ”in control”, the fluctuations are expected to lie around the common mean (center line).
When it is ”out of control”, the mean usually changes and flips outside the control limits.
As ”out of control”, only fluctuations outside the upper control limit (UCL) are considered.
Fluctuations above the lower control limit (LCL) could mean only a manifested behavior that
surpasses the expectations.
Behavior Classification. In this work, it is distinguished between ”normal” and ”devi-
ating” behavior. If the observed trust element lies on CL or between UCL and LCL, the
behavior of the participant can be defined as normal and the participant is eligible for future
interactions.
Furthermore, another fine separation regarding the types of deviations that a Grid participant
manifests is considered. Despite its deviating behavior, a participant can still be considered
for future interactions. In a social environment where interaction among participants is es-
tablished based on interpersonal relations there do exist differences in the single expectations
that each of the participants has for the behavior of its interaction partners. As a result:
• if the observed behavior lies between UCL and CL, a participant can still be considered
for future interactions but for the accomplishment of moderated expectations.
• if the observed behavior lies outside the UCL then the participant is banned and no more
considered for future interactions.
5.7 System Architecture
The notions discussed are summarized in the following model where the overall decision
whether to trust a collaboration partner or not is under the control of the user when requesting
such a decision. The underlying trust system is in charge of monitoring the collaboration
process according to the strategies suggested by the user.
The presentation and the discussion will concentrate on the service consumer use of the
trust management system components (every provider is also equipped with a similar trust
management system bearing the same functionalities).
5.7.1 Specification of User’s Trust Requirements
Every user specifies his/her trust requirements according to the schema presented in Fig.
5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Specification of User Trust Requirements.
These trust requirements are going to be distributed on the participants’ site (con-
sumer/provider) as in Fig. 5.11.
Figure 5.11: Distribution of User Trust Requirements.
5.7.2 Trust Engine
The trust engine, Fig. 5.12, is a conceptual element that manages trust values regarding the
collaboration partners and offers partner discovery and rating functionality to higher level
applications, such as workflow engines or job scheduling systems.
The trust engine is knowledgeable about the requirements of the user, the standards that
are used and the threshold of trust that is required. It manages all trust related interactions
with partners and strangers based on the information that it sources (locally stored trust
values), or that is presented to it (recommendations gathered from ”known” and ”unknown”
sources).
The trust engine assigns values to the new partners that are going to be considered or updates
the trust value according to the results of the verification process. Any adverse change of the
trust value leads to the re-organization of the scheduling/accessibility policies.
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Figure 5.12: Trust Engine.
Thus, the trust engine gains a sense of the trustworthiness of a collaboration partner. Its
elements are:
Service Discovery. In a Grid environment, there are several participants (several metadata
services). Discovering the appropriate collaboration partner (service) is necessary. The trust
engine uses its service discovery component to discover individual partner (services) (Fig.
5.13):
Figure 5.13: Discovery Component.
The ”request” determines the needed features (functionalities) that a participant should
have.
For partner/service discovery, different solutions, already implemented can be used:
• Monitoring and discovery service (MDS) from Globus [17].
• Peer to peer node/service discovery [243].
• Brokering systems like Nimrod-G [95].
Recommendations Collection. Every participant could ask the others regarding their
experience with a target participant. Recommendations are going to be requested (and
weighted) according to the users’ requirements (5.9, 5.10, 5.11). The recommendation sce-
narios are going to include either one or any combination of:
• direct experience;
• recommendations from known sources (weighted according to 5.5);
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• recommendations from unknown sources and received through a ”referral chain”
(weighted according to 5.6) and
• recommendations from unknown sources with prejudice (weighted according to 5.7)
The recommendations collection follows the algorithm in Fig. 5.14.
1. according to the user’s requirements, discover a list of possible partners to receive recommen-
dations from (RecommenderMap discoverRecommenders (string targetParticipant)).
2. ask those ”recommendation partners” about their trust value(s) regarding the ABhvT or RBhvT
of a target participant (requestRecommendation (string targetParticipant; string elementOfIn-
terest)).
3. calculate the indirect trust value for the target collaboration partner according to 5.5, 5.6, 5.7
and save to ”Trust Pool” accordingly.
Figure 5.14: Recommendations Collection Algorithm..
Trust Pool. It is a storage component (Fig. 5.15) where the trust values regarding all the
collaboration partners are saved for personal use during future direct collaborations or to be
offered to the others in the form of recommendations.
Trust values for identity are calculated according to formula (5.1). Trust values regarding
the direct experiences are updated according to 5.3 using values that come out from the
verification process. Trust values regarding the indirect experiences are calculated according
to 5.5, 5.6, 5.7.
Figure 5.15: Trust Pool.
Collaboration Trust Pool. It is also a storage component where only the trust values of
the partners during the current collaboration are saved. The values are updated according
to 5.3 using values that come out from the verification process.
Partner Evaluator. Partner evaluator uses the information contained in the Trust Profile
Pool and in the Trust Pool for determining which of the possible collaboration partners dis-
covered suit at best to the user/application’s trust requirements. The output is a list of the
most suitable participants in the environment to collaborate with.
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If during the collaboration the trust value(s) regarding a specific collaboration partner changes
(deviation was verified) and the new trust value does not fulfill the user trust requirements,
the partner evaluator changes the list of trusted collaboration partners accordingly and in this
case also the scheduling policy is changed and the deviating partner is no more considered
for the rest of the collaboration process.
Behavior Evaluator. The behavior evaluator module makes the classification of the be-
havior of a partner during the last collaboration according to the algorithm in Fig. 5.9, using
the values stored in Trust Pool and Collaboration Trust Pool. If any of the observations lies
outside the established limits, then the specific collaboration partner is blacklisted (added to
a ”black list”) and no more considered for future collaborations independently of the ade-
quacy of the trust requirements.
Recommender Evaluator. Every recommender, at the end of the collaboration with other
participants, is going to be weighted according to (5.4). The recommender evaluator uses the
trust values of the collaboration partners during the last collaboration (Collaboration Trust
Pool) for determining the trust values that can be assigned to the recommenders, and weights
the recommendations handled to the Partner Evaluator.
Recommender Trust Pool. It is also a storage component used for storing locally the
trust values regarding the recommenders.
5.7.3 Verification Engine
The verification engine (Fig. 5.16) is also a conceptual element that handles the verification
of behavior trust elements and generates the necessary feedback for the trust engine regarding
the specific collaboration partner(s).
Figure 5.16: Verification Engine.
Its elements are:
Verification Module. Stores the verification strategies that the user wants to apply to
the current collaboration (Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11).
This information is going to be used by the verification handler.
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Verification Handler. The verification handler, considering the list of selected partners
for the current collaboration, together with the users’ verification strategy stored at the ver-
ification module produces an XML file as in Fig. 5.17.
Figure 5.17: XML File Produced by the Verification Handler.
The information contained in this file is going to be used during the verification process.
For every participants specified, the desired behavior trust elements will be verified.
The verification handler establishes also if a given task for a target participant needs to
be replicated for verifying the accuracy of the responses of the target participant. This de-
cision is taken according to the verification frequency applied by the user. Once the results
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from the target participant and from the ”trusted partner” where the replica was executed
come back, a comparison is performed.
According to the verification results (example in Fig. 5.18), the respective trust values of
the behavior trust elements are going to be updated at the trust pool and also stored in the
collaboration trust pool.
Figure 5.18: Example Results of the Verification Process.
5.7.4 Putting it all together
The above presented components collaborate with each other as shown in the systems archi-
tecture in Fig. 5.19.
The user starts with specifying his or her trust requirements along with the input data
to a trust enabled Grid application (step 1), which in turn uses the workflow engine of the
local service-oriented Grid platform (step 2). To enable the selection of trusted services, the
decision is made based on a rated list of potential partner services that is obtained from
the trust engine (step 3). The trust engine uses its service discovery component to discover
individual services (step 4) and to collect recommendations from other trust engines (step
5). These values are stored in the local trust pool to be used in subsequent interactions.
The user specified trust profile is also stored in a trust pool for later reference and used by
other components in the trust engine. The information gathered by the trust engine is now
processed according to the user’s trust profile specification and passed on to the workflow
engine which then can use the partner services according to the rating generated by the trust
engine.
Invocation of external services is then delegated to an invocation handler (step 6). The in-
vocation handler consults the verification engine (step 7) to determine whether a call has to
be replicated or redirected. The verification engine considers the trust profile managed by
the trust engine (step 7), allowing, for example, cost-trust-ratio relations to be taken into
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Figure 5.19: Architecture of a Grid System Supporting the Trust Model Presented in this
Thesis.
account. The resulting invocation is carried out at the selected partner services and results
- both synchronous and asynchronous (notification) results - are then collected by the in-
vocation handler (step 8) and verified through the verification engine, using a strategy and
verification module consistent with the user supplied trust profile (step 9). Verification values
are stored in the trust pool (TP) and the collaboration trust pool (CTP).
The verification values are passed to the behavior evaluator module and to the recommenders
evaluator module which make the classification of the behavior according to the algorithm
in Fig. 5.9, using the values stored in TP and CTP and the weighting of the trust for the
recommenders respectively (step 10).
The overall result of this process is then passed to the workflow engine that collects results
for the application to present them to the end user.
The configuration of the trust engine by use of trust requirement profiles influences three
phases during execution of an application workflow. These main phases are addressed by the
three arrows in Fig. 5.20.
The initialization profile determines the influence and scope of factors for initializing the
trust values to be used in an interaction. It allows to manually assigning trust values to
certain partners, as well as specifying how trust recommendations of partners are handled
and weighted. This profile specifies the behavior of the local platform in a situation that
requires the establishment of first trust.
The source selection profile determines the selection of behavior trust dimensions (e.g.
availability, accuracy) as well as trust sources (e.g. personal experience, recommendations
from directly known partners) to determine a partner ranking according to the application
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Figure 5.20: Trust profile elements influencing the stored trust values and application deci-
sions.
needs. This allows a user to take accuracy trust recommendations from known partners into
account with a higher weight than, for example, availability values (which might be caused
by the different network locations) coming from the same partner.
The verification profile specifies which verification strategies are to be applied to the results
of partner service invocations and the feedback parameters into the trust engine. In this
profile, the user specifies how breaches of assumed service level agreements should influence
the future interactions with a partner since they are fed back into the trust store for this
application and partner service. This profile also dynamically determines the frequency of
verification to allow a fine grained control over costs incurred by result verification.
5.8 Further Security Considerations
Until now, the problem of trust establishment and management among collaborating partic-
ipants is discussed:
• the most trusted participants are going to be considered thanks to user/application
trust requirements, direct and indirect experience and
• the collaboration among parties takes place as long as parties prove themselves as
trustworthy.
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The trust model presented in this chapter aims to gain a better view on the current behavior
of the participants in the environment, helping also in the construction of beliefs and predic-
tions regarding the future behavior of the collaboration partners. Some of the threats and
risks discussed in the third chapter were considered.
Grids are designed to provide access and control over enormous remote computational re-
sources, storage devices and scientific instruments. The information exchanged, saved or
processed can be quite valuable and thus, a Grid is an attractive target for attacks to extract
this information. Each Grid site is independently administered and has its own local security
solutions, which are mainly based on the application of X.509 certificates for distributing dig-
ital identities to human Grid participants and a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for securing
the communication between them. The primarily used techniques for assuring message level
security are:
• public/private key cryptography - participants use the public keys of their counterparts
(as defined in their certificates) for encrypting messages. In general, only the participant
in possession of the corresponding private key is able to decrypt the received messages.
• shared key cryptography - participants agree on a common key for encrypting the
communication between them. The key agreement protocol is based on using the target
partner’s certified public key.
These solutions are built on top of different operating systems. When all participants are
brought together to collaborate in this heterogeneous environment, many security problems
arise.
In general, Grid systems are vulnerable to all typical network and computer security threats
and attacks (Negm [208] and [207], Lindstrom [185] and Bloomberg et al. [90]). Furthermore,
the use of web service technology in the Grid (Foster et al. [143]) will bring a new wave
of threats, in particular those inherited from XML Web Services. Thus, the application of
the security solutions mentioned above offers no guarantees that the information exchanged
between Grid participants is not going to be compromised or abused by a malicious third
party that listens to the communication.
Furthermore, they all escape the idea why a participant in the Grid environment was chosen
among the others for completing a specified task and for how long a collaboration partner is
going to be considered. Thus, the behavior of the participants also needs to be considered in
order to limit the possibility of malicious participants to actively take part in a collaboration.
An alternative solution to the problem is the establishment of a secured communication
channel between collaborating participants (using a virtual private network - VPN). Thus,
the transport mechanism itself is secured. Although in this case an inherently secure com-
munication channel is opened between parties, the method itself is impractical to be used in
Grid environments (Tsugawa et al. [253]) due to:
• administration overhead - new tunnels need to be configured each time a new virtual
organization joins or leaves the environment.
• incompatibility between different formats used for private IP spaces in small and large
networks - 16-bit private IP space is preferred for small networks, while in large networks
the 24-bit private IP space is preferred. There exists the possibility that (multiple)
private networks use the same private IP subnet.
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There are several approaches for establishing secure communication between Grid par-
ticipants. For example, the Globus Toolkit [19] uses the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)
for enabling secure communication (and authentication) over an open network. GSI is based
on public key encryption, X.509 certificates and the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) communi-
cation protocol. Some extensions have been added for single sign-on and delegation. A Grid
participant is identified by a certificate, which contains information for authenticating the
participant. A third party, the Certificate Authority (CA), is used to certify the connection
between the public key and the person in the certificate. To trust the certificate and its con-
tents, the CA itself has to be trusted. Furthermore, the participants themselves can generate
certificates for temporary sessions (proxy certificates). By default, GSI does not establish
confidential (encrypted) communication between parties. It is up to the GSI administrator
to ensure that the access control entries do not violate any site security policies.
Other approaches try to improve the security of the communication between Grid partici-
pants by making use of different encryption methods. Lim and Robshaw [182] propose an
approach where Grid participants use identity-based cryptography (as proposed by Shamir
in [236]) for encrypting the information they exchange. However, in traditional identity-based
encryption systems, the party in charge of the private keys (private key generator - PKG)
knows all the private keys of its participants, which principally is a single point of attack
for malicious participants. Furthermore, the approach requires that a secure channel exists
between a participant and its PGK, which in turn is not very practical in Grid environments.
In a later publication Lim et al. [183], try to solve these problems by getting rid of a separate
PKG and by enabling the participants to play the role of the PKG for themselves. Addition-
ally, a third party is introduced with the purpose of giving assurances on the authenticity of
the collaborating parties. Collaborating participants, based on publicly available information
and using their PKG capabilities, generate session keys ”on the fly”, which are used between
collaborating participants to exchange the initial information (job request, credentials from
the third trusted party, etc.). During a collaboration, a symmetric key, on which parties have
previously agreed, is used for encrypting/decrypting the information flow. This could also
be a single point of attack (the attack is directed only towards a single participant) for a
malicious participant willing to obtain it.
Saxena and Soh [230] propose some applications of pairing-based cryptography, using meth-
ods for trust delegation and key agreement in large distributed groups. All Grid participants
that collaborate at a certain moment form a group. A subset of group members generates
the public key, and the rest of the group generates the private key. A distributed trusted
third party with a universal key escrow capability must always be present for the compu-
tation of the keys. These keys (public/private) are going to be used within the group for
encrypting/decrypting the communication between group members.
A similar approach is followed by Shen et al. [237] where some strategies for implementing
group key management in Grid environments are proposed. The main difference to the work
by Saxena and Soh [230] is the re-calculation of the group key every time a participant re-
joins the group.
The vulnerability of both approaches lies in the fact that all group members are aware of
the public/private key. A malicious participant, already part of the group, could decrypt all
messages that group members exchange between them. Even if a malicious participant is not
part of the group, a single point of attack (gaining access or stealing key information from
only a single group participant) could be sufficient to decrypt all the information the group
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participants exchange between them.
Crampton et al. [116] present a password-enabled and certificate-free Grid security infras-
tructure. Initially, a user authenticates itself to an authentication server through a username
and password. After a successful verification, the user obtains through a secure channel the
(proxy) credentials (public and private keys) that will be used during the next collaboration
with a resource. The resource in turn verifies if the user is authorized to take advantage of
its services and creates its proxy credentials and a job service in order to complete the tasks
assigned by the user. A single trusted authority accredits the authentication parameters for
the users, resources and authentication servers.
There are several problems with this approach. First, the complexity of the environment
is artificially increased. While the authentication of the resources is done directly by the
trusted authority, the authentication of the users is done by a third party, the authentication
server. Adding more components to the authentication chain increases the points of attack.
Second, the resource has to believe that the user is authenticated through a ”trusted” au-
thentication server and not by a malicious one. Third, the resource has to believe that the
user is not impersonating someone else in the environment. Finally, a single participant (the
trusted authority) is in charge of the authentication parameters of all other participants in
the environment. It must be trusted by the participants, and at the same time it has access
to private information of the participants. Thus, the participants’ private information is not
protected either in the scenario where this ”trusted” third party turns out to be malicious or
in the scenario where another malicious participant gains access to the private information
of different participants through attacking this ”trusted” third party (as a single point of
attack).
Additionally, some web services security standards (applied also to Grid services) are also
emerging. XML Signature [60] signs messages with X509 certificates. This standard as-
sures the integrity of messages, but it does not offer any support for threat prevention.
WS-SecureConversation [63] is a relatively new protocol for establishing and using secure
contexts with SOAP messages. Partners establish at the beginning a secure context between
them, but all the following messages are signed using the XML-Signature standard. XML
Encryption [59] is also a standard for keeping all or part of a SOAP message secret. A par-
ticipant in the communication is able to encrypt different sections of an XML document with
different keys making possible for its collaboration partners to access only certain parts of the
document, according to the assigned keys. However, in the case when many partners want
access to the same part of the document or to the entire document at the same time, they
come in the possession of the same key.
In the following such a hybrid approach, belonging to the message level security solutions,
is presented. It is based on combination of two asymmetric cryptographic techniques, a
variant of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with Certificateless Public Key Cryptography
(CL-PKC). The aim of the proposal is to make the malicious efforts to compromise the
communication and the information exchanged between parties as difficult and as expensive
as possible. It mainly concentrates on the confidentiality of the communication between Grid
participants, but issues related to authorization, integrity, management and nonrepudiation
will also be treated.
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5.8.1 Communication Threats
In general, there exists a flow of information from a participant to another target participant
as in Fig. 5.21.a.
Figure 5.21: Attack scenarios to the communication between Grid participants.
This information flow can be the target of different threats. The same threats, as de-
picted by Stallings in [247], can also be encountered in Grid environments: passive threats
and active threats.
The aim of passive threats is to simply intercept the communication and obtain the infor-
mation being transmitted, as shown in Fig 5.21.b. They affect the confidentiality of the
exchanged information, and are difficult to detect due to the lack of direct intervention pos-
sibilities on the information the parties are exchanging.
The situation changes completely when active threats are considered. Here, intervention on
the information flow is always possible. The information flow can be:
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• modified: the integrity of the exchanged information is placed at risk as a result of the
modification of the data being exchanged, through the intervention of an unauthorized
third party (Fig 5.21.c).
• forged: the authenticity of the exchanged information is placed at risk as a result of the
forged stream an unauthorized participant tries to exchange with the target participant,
impersonating another authorized participant in the environment (Fig 5.21.d). This is
also a non-repudiation problem.
• interrupted: the normal communication between partners is interrupted as a result
of any intervention from an unauthorized participant in the environment (Fig 5.21.e).
This is a threat to availability.
Prevention is the key to fighting passive threats. For active threats, fast detection and
recovery are crucial.
5.8.2 Basic Key Management Model
Grid systems typically make use of public key cryptography for securing a communication
session between collaborating participants (Sommerville et al. [187]). Two parties use a
randomly generated shared key for encrypting/decrypting the communication between them.
To ensure that the data is read only by the two parties (sender and receiver), the key has to
be distributed securely between them. Throughout each session, the key is transmitted along
with each message and is encrypted with the recipient’s public key.
A second possibility is to use asymmetric session keys. Each of the parties randomly generates
a pair of session keys (a public and a private one). Their application is similar to symmetric
session keys with the difference that in this case different keys are used for encrypting and
decrypting messages.
Here, each Grid participant is allowed to generate its own keys such that each participant
simultaneously possesses multiple public keys while all these keys correspond to a single
private key. This method was first proposed by Waters et al. [258] and was later further
developed by Zeng and Fujita [269].
According to their scheme, each time two participants A and B communicate with each other,
the sender (participant A) decides to use either a public key from its pool of existing public
keys or to generate a new one. This key is going to be sent to the receiver (participant B).
Whenever B sends a message to A, the message is encrypted using A’s previously sent public
key. Upon receipt, A decrypts it using its private key. The entire process is described in 5.22.
The generation of the public keys is done according to the algorithm in Fig. 5.23.
The terms group and subgroup were originally defined by Menezes et al. [198]:
• A group (G, ∗) consists of a set G with binary operation ∗ on G satisfying the following:
– the group operation is associative. Thus, a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G,
– there is an element 1 ∈ G, called identity element 0, such that a ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ a = 1
for all a ∈ G,
– for each a ∈ G there exist an element a−1 ∈ G, called the inverse of a, such that
a ∗ a−1 = a−1 ∗ a = 1.
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Figure 5.22: Encrypting/decrypting scheme (as used by Zeng and Fujita [269].
• A group G is finite if |G| is finite. The number of elements in a finite group is called
its order ;
• A non-empty subset H of a group G is a subgroup of G if H is itself a group with
respect to operation of G;
• A group G is cyclic if there is an element a ∈ G such that for each b ∈ G there is an
integer i with b = ai. Such an element a is the generator of G;
• If G is the group and a ∈ G then the order of a is defined to be the last positive integer
t such that at = 1, provided that such an integer exists. Otherwise the order of a is ∞.
To apply the above key management model to Grid environments, the following is pro-
posed:
• First, a collaboration in Grid environments has to take place between trusted partici-
pants. In terms of the trust-based communication model, the collaboration takes place
between the trustors (subjects that trust a target participant) and trustees (partici-
pants that are trusted). Two Grid participants involved in an interaction play both the
role of a trustor and a trustee to each other.
According to the model:
118CHAPTER 5. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH TO TRUST IN GRID ENVIRONMENTS
– a participant interacts with the target participant(s) and learns their behavior
over a number of interactions. In this case, the participant reasons about the
outcome of the direct interactions with others. When starting an interaction with
a new participant, i.e. no information about previous behavior exists, it can use
its beliefs about different characteristics of these interaction partners and reason
about these beliefs in order to decide how much trust should be put in each of
them.
– the participant could ask others in the environment about their experiences with
the target participant(s). If sufficient information is obtained and if this informa-
tion can be trusted, the participant can reliably choose its interaction partners.
• Second, the number of public keys has to equal the number of the trusted partners
(trustees) each Grid participant (trustor) selects. In general, a normal collaboration
between a trustor and its trustees, takes place as described in the following scenario.
The trustor specifies the trust requirements regarding its future partners. Then, the
participants which comply with the current application requirements (Grid-enabled
application) are selected. The decision which one of the chosen participants should
be considered further as a collaboration partner is made by comparing the trustor’s
trust requirements with the obtained trust information about these specific participants
(personal experience, third parties’ experience). Once the trustor has taken a decision
regarding the ”trustworthiness” of its counterparts, it generates a single private key and
exactly as many public keys corresponding to this single private key as the number of
its trusted partners. These keys will be used for securing the communication between
the trustor and its trustees during the collaboration that is going to take place.
• Third, directly after the generation of these public keys, the trustor has to assign a key
to each of its trustees. Thus, every trustee uses a separate public key for encrypting the
messages (information) it exchanges with the trustor. The trustor itself uses a single
private key for decrypting the communication flow.
• Fourth, the generated keys should be valid only during the lifetime of the upcoming
collaboration. Since the trust values that participants establish to each other change
according to the personal performance (and intentions), a trusted participant in the
current collaboration is not necessarily a trusted one in future collaborations.
1. Select a cyclic group G of order n;
2. Select a subgroup of G of order m, where m ≤ n;
3. Select and fix the private key x, where 1 < |x| < m;
4. Select a generator g of G;
5. Select indicator r, where 0 < |r| < m;
6. Compute y1 = gr and y2 = y1x;
7. Release public key (y1, y2).
Figure 5.23: Generating multiple public keys.
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The entire approach is summarized in the algorithm shown in 5.24.
1. According to its needs and to the trust information gathered from different sources, the trustor
establishes all the target participants (trustees) that are going to be considered in the very next
collaboration (the number of trusted partners is referred with n).
2. A private key (PB) is determined and the algorithm presented in 5.23 is repeated n times
(KB(n); n public keys are generated).
3. The generated public keys are sent to the trustees; every trustee receives only one key (KB(i)).
4. Each trustee, once it wants to send a message (information) to the trustor, encrypts the infor-
mation flow using the respective KB(i).
5. As soon as the trustor receives the encrypted message (information), it uses PB to decrypt it.
Figure 5.24: Multiple public keys management scheme.
The advantages of the proposed approach are:
• public keys are created by the trustor itself and are distributed directly and only to
trusted participants. Not every participant in the environment is aware of them. Thus,
the proposed approach mitigates also the non-repudiation problem,
• the lifetime of the private key (PB) and the incomparable public keys (KB(i)) does not
span over the lifetime of the collaboration itself.
However, since the public keys are going to be distributed through a public and non-secure
communication channel, the key distribution scheme is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle
attack. Thus, a third unauthorized participant could either obtain the key(s) by intercepting
the information flow as shown in Fig 5.21.b or by impersonating some other trusted partici-
pant in the environment (Lenstra et al. [181]).
For this reason, the presented approach is extended by applying a double encryption scheme.
A second pair of keys, generated via a certificateless key generation scheme, and information
tightly related to the participant itself, is used, as described in the following.
5.8.3 A Double Encryption Scheme
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography in Grid Computing.
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was first proposed by Al-Riyami and
Paterson in [72]. It combines elements of identity-based public key cryptography and tradi-
tional public key cryptography.
The generation of the keys is done in two stages. In the first stage, a participant in the
environment receives from a key generation center (KGC), over a confidential and authentic
channel, a partial private key. This partial key is computed using an identifier of the partic-
ipant.
In the second stage, the participant produces its private key by combining the partial pri-
vate key with some secret known only to the participant. Thus, no one else, other than the
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participant itself, knows the generated private key. A public key, which matches the private
key, is then published.
A distinct feature of the model is that it completely eliminates the need to obtain a certificate
from the trusted authority in order to establish the authenticity of a public key.
According to Foster et al. [141], the Grid is aimed at enabling virtual communities to share
geographically distributed resources as they pursue common goals, assuming the absence of
central location, central control, omniscience, and existing trust relationships. Thus, having
a central KGC is quite impossible. In order to overcome this problem, a hierarchical model
for KGCs can be used. The idea is presented in 5.25:
Figure 5.25: Establishing a hierarchical model for KGCs.
Every Grid participant, other than being a possible partner for the other Grid participants
in the environment, could also be a KGC for another participant or even for more than one
of them (i.e. in 5.25, participants G and F are KGC for participants 1 and 2 respectively,
participant 1 is KGC for participants 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 29 and 30; participant 3 is KGC
for participants 9, 16 and 18; participant 4 is KGC for participants 10, 14, 15, 20, 26 and 28;
participant 2 is KGC for participants 5, 11, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 27). Considering the
graph in 5.25, dedicated KGCs, like G, M and F (in charge only of partial key distribution;
e.g. international or national centers, universities, etc.), have a relationship of first order,
i.e. a supposed direct relationship between them exists and they have the same importance.
Within such a scheme, all participants are connected through chains to each other. Partici-
pants that do not have such a connection (i.e. do not possess a KGC or serve as a KGC for
themselves), have an infinite relationship with other participants (not present in 5.25).
The following information, already introduced in subsection 5.2.5, could be used from KGCs
for computing the partial private keys:
• What a participant is - refers to personal attributes of every single participant.
Examples of these traits include hardware and software peculiarities of the participant
(i.e. operating system, hardware in use, network physical address, IP address, etc).
Part of these attributes or a combination of them is difficult to duplicate and very
specific to a single participant.
• What a participant does - refers to unique patterns of behavior that this participant
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manifests during the collaboration with others in the environment. Trust values can
be gathered from different (ex) partners of the target participant, whose partial private
key a KGC is currently computing, and be used during the computation process.
Having received this partial private key, the Grid participant could generate the full pri-
vate key.
A Protocol for Encrypting/Decrypting the Information Flow between Grid Par-
ticipants. The proposed protocol is a combination of the approaches described above and
works in the following manner (assuming that each KGC has a master key MKGC and a
public key KKGC):
• Every participant i contacts its KGC (KGC(i)) for receiving the partial private key;
• The KGC(i) computes the partial private key PPK(i) using its master key MKGC(i),
its public key KKGC(i) and an identifier ID(i) (personal attributes or specific patterns
of behavior) of the participant;
• The participant, in an intermediary step, computes a secret value S(i) making use of
KKGC(i) and ID(i). This secret value S(i) is then combined with the partial private
key obtained PPK(i) and the KGC ′s public key KKGC(i) for generating the actual
private key PCL(i); Similarly, the public key KCL(i) is generated from the combination
of the user’s secret value S(i) with the public key KKGC(i) of its KGC. This public
key (KCL(i)) is made available to the others through placing it in a public directory;
• The participant, according to the application requirements and to the trust informa-
tion gathered from considered trust sources, establishes all the partners (trustees) that
are going to be considered during the very next collaboration (the number of trusted
partners is referred to with n); two partners that decide to collaborate with each other
are both trustor and trustee to each other; a participant in the environment with an
infinite relationship to the trustor is not considered at all as a trustee;
• The participant i (in this case the trustor), determines a private session key PB(i) and n
different public session keys KB(n) (a different public key for each of the n established
trustees);
• Before sending each public session key KB(j) to the target trustee j, the trustor encrypts
it with the corresponding KCL(j);
• The trustee j, once receiving the encrypted message, decrypts it using its PCL(j),
obtaining the KB(j) that is going to be used to encrypt the information flow with its
partner.
• Once a collaboration has to take place, the trustor first encrypts the information using
the public session key KB(i) assigned by its partner and then re-encrypts the already
encrypted information using the KCL(j) key made public by its partner;
• The double encrypted information is initially decrypted by the trustee using its PCL(j)
key. The obtained information is further decrypted using the personal private session
key PB(j).
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5.8.4 Discussion
In this subsection, a discussion on how the approach deals with the different threat scenarios
presented in subsection 5.8.1 of the thesis is done:
Intercepted Flow. Here, the following scenarios can be distinguished:
• An unauthorized participant does not have any clue about the existence of the encryp-
tion of the information flow or does not possess any of the decryption keys. This is an
ideal scenario, because the encryption itself brings the advantage that the unauthorized
participant cannot gather any information. A brute force attack will result in significant
costs and time to break the encryption.
• An unauthorized participant is aware of the encrypted flow and is able to forge or
obtain the PB and PCL keys. Forging both keys of a Grid participant is an extremely
difficult task, because PB is valid only during the ongoing session, and PCL is generated
using specific information of this participant and is in possession of only the participant
itself. Even the KGC has no complete knowledge of PCL. The only possibility for an
unauthorized participant is to take control of the authorized participant for obtaining
the original keys. However, in order to have a fully decrypted information flow, the
unauthorized participant needs to obtain all the private keys of all the authorized
participants involved in the current collaboration.
Modified Flow. Following the same reasoning as above, modifying multiple encrypted in-
formation flows is a very difficult task for an unauthorized participant. Enormous efforts,
monetary means and time are needed in order to succeed.
Forged Flow. In this approach, two participants establish a collaboration between them
only if they are considered as trusted partners for each other. The only possibility for an
unauthorized participant to forge an information flow is to impersonate another participant
in the environment. However,
• impersonating a participant C in the environment does not mean that it is a trusted
partner for participant A, although C might have been considered as trusted for par-
ticipant B (non-transitivity of trust). An additional attack to the trust information
of participant A is needed. Even though, since trust changes with time (increases,
decreases), a trusted partner for participant A during a current collaboration is not
necessarily a trusted one in future collaborations.
• impersonation is not enough. An unauthorized participant also needs the information
owned by the authorized participant it is impersonating (i.e. the public key(s) delivered
from its trusted partners).
Interrupted Flow. This attack prevents or inhibits the normal collaboration between
trusted participants; the approach presented here does not offer any direct possibility to
prevent such attacks. However, let us consider the scenario presented in 5.26.
In Grid environments, the trustor generally collaborates with more than one trustee. The
entire process is monitored and trust information is collected with respect to every single
trustee the trustor collaborated with. The components to be monitored could be derived
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Figure 5.26: Interrupted flow between trusted Grid partners (scenario no. 1).
from the parameters of QoS like: reliability (correct functioning of a service over a period of
time), availability (readiness for use), accessibility (capability of responding to a request), cost
(charges for services offered), security (security level offered), performance (high throughput
and lower latency), etc. In terms of 5.26, the attacked QoS element is the availability of one
of the trustees. The indirect solution offered by the approach presented here is that after
some unsuccessful efforts to contact the attacked partner, the flow is directed towards the
other available and trusted partners and the rest of the collaboration is going to take place
only with them.
However, for the attack scenario presented in 5.27, the considered approach does not offer
any prevention possibilities:
In this case, (distributed) denial-of-service prevention mechanisms need to be considered.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter, a flexible trust model for collecting and managing multidimensional trust
values in Grid environments has been presented. The trust model can be classified at the
individual level as learning based, reputation based, and till a certain point socio-cognitive
based. Both identity and behavior trust of the interaction partners were considered and dif-
ferent sources were used to determine the overall trust value of a collaboration partner.
The trust to the identity of the participants is established through an approach which con-
siders the distance (oracle of certification) between collaboration partners in a ”certification
graph”. To gain confidentiality on the identification of the collaboration partners, different
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Figure 5.27: Interrupted flow between trusted Grid partners (scenario no. 2).
”identification factors” for each of the partners, difficult to counterfeit, were considered.
To behavior is referred to as consisting of any of the quantitative QoS requirements, a combi-
nation, or the entirety of them. Behavior trust deals with the trustworthiness of interaction
partners, thus defines the confidence that a participant involved in an interaction will offer
the desired QoS, behaving as expected. This trust relationship is bidirectional, meaning that
both parties have to trust each other (not necessarily at the same level) in order for the
collaboration to take place.
The beliefs and expectations are built based on past direct collaborations with that partner
or on the experience of other participants in the environment. The relationship of a Grid
participant to its ”recommenders” is unidirectional, meaning that every participant is free
to ”share” its ”personal experience” with everyone else in the environment. It remains to
the participant who receives the recommendation(s) to decide whether to consider it at all
and at what degree. A recommender is weighted according to the resulting behavior of all
participants it recommended.
The trust system can be configured to the domain specific trust requirements by the use
of several separate trust profiles covering the entire lifecycle of trust establishment and man-
agement. An important role on the definition of these profiles is played also by the human
users. They choose between different first trust scenarios, experiences to be considered when
sorting out collaboration partners and monitoring strategies. For this purpose, in the system
architecture flexible and easy to use components that can be configured to the specific needs
of the users on per case basis are offered.
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Through the use of statistical methods for quality assurance, an alternative to monitor the
behavior (or only a part of the behavior trust elements) of the participants involved in an
interaction and differ among types of anomalies observed in their behavior, is offered.
This process is oriented on the discovery of differences between the ”real” behavior of a par-
ticipant and its ”observed” behavior either during the current collaboration or in time.
The chapter was closed with an approach which tends to increase the confidence on the col-
laboration process between trusted partners with offering an extensible encryption scheme.
The participants first generate a single private key and as many different public keys for this
private key as the number of its trusted partners. Each of the partners receives a public key
which is going to be used for encrypting the information they will exchange with the par-
ticipant in question. This first encryption is followed by a second one, using keys generated
through a technique based on certificateless public key cryptography.
The approach tends to prevent many of the threats and attacks to the communication be-
tween Grid participants through making it even more difficult and expensive to malicious
participants to trace and decrypt the information flow they exchange between them.
The performance of the trust model, together with the general effects of trust in the perfor-
mance of the Grid systems, will be analyzed and presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Implementation and Evaluation
”There is no such thing as a failed experiment,
only experiments with unexpected outcomes.”
Richard Buckminster Fuller
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the simulations and measurements performed for obtaining a quantitative
assertion of the effects of trust in the performance of Grid environments and the performance
of the verification strategies and sub-strategies presented in the previous chapter will be
presented.
6.1.1 Design
The experimental infrastructure is based on the GridSim Toolkit [27]. The basic functional-
ities and the architecture of this simulation toolkit, together with the undertaken modifica-
tions, are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 6.1 shows the flowchart of the simulation process as used in the experiments.
In the GridSim toolkit, a desired number of GridSim users (consumers) create a number
of Gridlets (which represent the GridSim jobs), each with average Million Instructions (MI)
(which represent the Gridlet length), allowed deviation percentage of the MI, granularity time
of the simulation, overhead processing time per Gridlet (Gridlet overhead processing time).
Additionally, any desired number of resources (providers) are created. Considering the fact
that each ”Grid entity” has the potential to play both roles (consumer and provider), for
the experiments each of the users configures also a resource to which other consumers in the
environment could send their Gridlets for processing.
Each of the consumers and providers specifies their initialization strategies together with the
verification strategies and sub-strategies. In a second step, the GridSim entities, and param-
eters are initialized.
Details on Grid resources are obtained from a file containing a list of resources with their
characteristics (total PEs - processing elements and MIPS - million instructions per second
for each PE).
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Figure 6.1: Flow of the Simulation Process.
Then, the GridSim simulation is started. Each of the experiments is specified within a class
object. Here, the Grid user and the Gridlets are created for the simulation. The user specific
trust requirements and the Gridlets are created based on user specified parameters (total
number of Gridlets, average MI of each Gridlet and the deviation percentage of the MI).
First, the characteristics of the available Grid resources created in the resource creation sec-
tion in the system are gathered. The Grid user, according to this information, sorts out
the most suitable resources that could be used to fulfill its needs. Based on the user trust
requirements, personal experience gathered during previous collaborations and experience of
the others in the environment, a second sorting of the resources takes place. Only the most
trusted of the suitable resources is going to be considered in the next collaboration. The
scheduler, with help from the ”partner evaluator” (Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.19), submits the
Gridlets to the chosen resources. The Grid resources, following the same logic as in the con-
sumers’ case, decide if the user (consumer), according to the trust value it built on previous
collaborations, could be served or not. If allowed, Grid resources process the received Gridlets
and send the results back to the Grid user (consumer). Again, according to the verification
strategy and sub-strategies, the collaboration is monitored from both partners. In the case
of an ”online” verification strategy, the monitoring takes place during the collaboration, and
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in the case of an ”offline” verification strategy, the monitoring takes place at the end of the
collaboration process. The second strategy concerns only a limited number of behavior trust
elements, e.g. on the consumers’ side, the accuracy of the results coming from a certain
provider and on the providers’ side, the behavior trust elements such as ”on-time payment”
or ”due payment”, as showed in the chapter 3.
The processed Gridlets are gathered from simulated network through the I/O port or queue.
Finally, the details (text and graphical) of the simulation, concerning the execution statistics
(Gridlets execution time, status, etc.) and trust evolution are displayed.
Figure 6.2 gives a detailed view of the integration of the trust model presented in this
Figure 6.2: Integration of the Trust Model into the GridSim Toolkit.
thesis into the environment offered by the GridSim toolkit. The user creates the jobs with
different characteristics and defines the trust requirements for the very next collaboration.
The Partner Evaluator according to the trust requirements and the experience of the previous
collaborations (either personal or that of third parties) sorts out the most trusted providers
from the list of available and suitable resources. The scheduler in turn prepares the schedul-
ing strategy and sends the jobs to the resources ”recommended” by the partner evaluator.
According to the verification strategies and sub-strategies, the collaboration is monitored and
the trust values of the respective resources used are updated. The user receives the results
back at the end.
6.1.2 Implementation
Figure 6.3 shows the Graphical User Interface (GUI) used for managing the experiments.
More details on the implementation are given in Appendix B
The main classes involved in the simulations are presented in Fig. 6.4 (more details can
be found in Appendix B).
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Figure 6.3: Graphical User Interface for the Simulation Scenarios.
Furthermore, the user can choose to perform the simulation with or without involving
trust in the system. This facilitates the comparison of the output between conventional
simulation scenarios and simulation scenarios where partners involved consider the notion of
trust1 while collaborating with each other. A coarse-grained view of the input and output of
the simulation system is given in Fig. 6.5.
6.1.3 Simulation Scenarios
As previously mentioned, this chapter will concentrate on:
• evaluating the performance of the trust model during establishment of trusted collabo-
rations between parties, monitoring of the collaboration and discovery of short-term or
long-term deviations on the behavior of the collaboration partners,
• evaluating the effects of trust in the performance of the Grid systems and
• helping the Grid participants to tune their trust requirements to their needs and capa-
bilities.
1Here, the personal definition for trust given at the chapter 3 is implied.
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Figure 6.4: Main Classes Involved During Simulations.
Considering the analysis done on the application/user requirements in subsection 5.5.1, the
main situations simulated deal with moderated and high trust requirements. The aim of the
experiments is to observe:
• trust establishment and development;
• detection of deviating behavior;
• behavior categorization;
• effects of trust processing time, cost and network load.
A set of resources and users using is modeled using GridSim where:
• each user creates/owns a resource. The idea is to show that in real Grid environments,
participants could play both roles; consumers and providers of services.
• each user sends his/her tasks to every resource in the environment (considered to be
suitable), except for its own resource.
• the behavior trust elements considered are the accuracy of the responses coming from
the different resources, their availability, accessibility, and speed of processing.
The simulation scenarios can be summarized as follows:
Trust Establishment and Development. Here, the normal course of trust establish-
ment and development among Grid participants will be observed. Participants (consumers
or providers) either new to the environment or with a certain personal experience are going
to sort their collaboration partners on the basis of identity and behavior trust considerations;
personal and/or third parties’ experience; moderated or high trust requirements. Further-
more, the influence of trust on the duration of the completion of users’ requests, on the budget
foreseen by the user and on the network load is going to be investigated.
Trust Development under the Presence of Cheating. In every Grid environment
(and any other collaborative environment), many participants, either intentionally or under
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Figure 6.5: Input and Output of the Simulation System.
the influence of outside factors, introduce deviations in their ”normal” behavior. These de-
viations affect single behavior trust elements, any combination or the entirety of them at
different frequencies or completely at random. Here, the performance of the trust model in
general and more specifically, the performance of the verification strategies and sub-strategies
in detecting the ”real” behavior of a participant within an active collaboration will be ob-
served.
”Malicious” Recommenders. In the presented model, either in the absence of infor-
mation gathered directly on a specific participant, or upon the user’s request, it is possible
to make use of the recommendations the other participants in the environment are willing to
share. According to the weight assigned to recommendations, every participant establishes
their influence on its personal decision on the collaboration with a certain participant. As
such, it is possible that ”malicious” recommenders intentionally offer low trust values for
”good” participants and high trust values for other ”malicious/mediocre” participants.
The negative effects of such ”malicious” recommendations, together with the efficiency of the
presented trust model in minimizing them will be observed.
From ”High” to ”Low”. As discussed in subsection 3.8.2, it has to be expected that
many selfish or malicious participants behave properly once introduced in the environment
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or at the beginning of the collaborations. Thus, they fulfill the expectations of their interac-
tion parties and offer services of high quality, the reason for which they were chosen among
the others in the environment. As soon as they have reached a ”high social position” in the
environment, they start displaying their real purposes, lowering the quality of the offered
services. Here, again, the performance of the trust model in general and more specifically
the performance of the verification strategies and sub-strategies in detecting short-term and
long-term deviations in the behavior of participants that keep a ”high social position” and
preventing such behavior for future collaborations will be observed.
From ”Low” to ”High”. A ”low social position” could be attributed to a participant
for different reasons:
• the participant entered the environment with limited capabilities,
• outside factors prevented the participant to behave properly,
• the collaboration party established a ”prejudiced” collaboration at the very beginning
(initial trust value 0 or very small) although the participant was able to fulfill its ”high”
trust requirements.
It is interesting to observe the development of trust of such participants to their collaboration
partners, if they improve the quality of the services they offer (upgrade personal capabilities
or minimize outside inference) or continue offering services of high quality (in the case when
their counterpart ”prejudiced” its capabilities).
Trust Effects. The presence of trust in Grid environments will definitively improve the
quality of the collaboration among participants. However, it is impossible to develop trust
for nothing. The disadvantages of trust involvement and of different verification strategies
and sub-strategies will be presented in terms of runtime, computational costs and overhead.
6.2 Establishing and Managing Trust Among Grid Partici-
pants
Trust establishment and development are two issues strongly related to each other. A Grid
participant will establish a collaboration with the most suitable partners which fulfill its trust
requirements. At the same time, trust information (developing trust through collaboration
monitoring) is going to be accumulated with respect to only active partners in the current/last
collaboration.
6.2.1 Trust Establishment
Trust establishment is influenced by the following factors:
Initial Trust Value. The initial trust value expresses:
• the disposition of a trustor to trust its trustee(s) in the environment in the absence of
the personal trust information regarding them,
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• the scale to which the trust value resulting from the combination of trust values com-
ing from different sources will be compared. If the combined trust value equals or is
greater than the initial trust expressed by the trustor, than the target participant can
be considered further to establish a collaboration. On the contrary, if the combined
trust value is smaller than the initial trust expressed by the trustor, it is going to be
discharged.
Personal Experience. It is based on the direct trust (as introduced in 5.2.8) that a trustor
has previously established with its trustees.
Third Parties’ Experience. It is based on the indirect trust (as introduced in 5.2.9)
that a trustor gathers from different trust sources other than its own personal experience.
Weights for Personal and Third Parties’ Experience. While deciding on its trustees,
each trustor, according to the formulas (5.9), (5.10) and (5.11), decides on the percentage
each of the trust sources (personal experience and third parties’ experience) will influence
this decision. The weights for the experiences during the experiments are:
• personal experience with 0.0 and third parties’ experience with 1.0. Thus, the entire
decision on establishing a collaboration with a target participant is based only on the
recommendations a Grid participant obtains. Here, the case when the user/consumer
does not have any personal experience at all, is also implied,
• personal experience with 0.2 and third parties’ experience with 0.8,
• personal experience with 0.5 and third parties’ experience with 0.5 (the presented graph-
ics in this sub-section are referred to this combination of weights),
• personal experience with 0.8 and third parties’ experience with 0.2,
• personal experience with 1.0 and third parties’ experience with 0.0. The participant
makes use only of its personal experience, discharging any offered recommendation.
Identity Trust of the Target Participant. Making use of the oracle of certification (as
introduced in 5.2.5), each trustor has the possibility to express a trust value for the identity
of the trustees it communicates with.
Simulation Scenarios and Environment. During the experiments, 30 users and 30
resources were created. A user obtains at the same time also a resource and considers as
possible partners, every resource in the simulation environment other than its own (practi-
cally 29 resources in total). Another feature of the experimental environment is the presence
of concurrent users. Thus, during a simulation all the users try to establish a collaboration
with one (or more) resources present in the environment that they consider as trusted ac-
cording their current trust requirements. The purpose of such configuration is to come near
to the real Grid environments, where the existence of concurrent consumers (multiple con-
sumers competing for resources) is the most common phenomenon to be found. However, the
graphics are built with the results gathered from a single GridSim user/consumer regarding
the most suitable participants, those that fulfill its trust requirements.
The bars represent:
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• the user’s personal experience, obtained either through past collaborations or through
the initial trust value,
• experience obtained from other active participants in the environment (third parties’
experience),
• combined and weighted experience according to the expressed preferences and
• the percentage each of the suitable (capable and trusted) resources was used during the
very last collaboration.
Combined and weighted experience bars show how personal and third parties’ experience
influence trust establishment between trustor and a trustee.
The bars on the percentage each of the trustees was used show the load distribution among
collaboration partners.
Three scenarios were considered:
In the first scenario, a Grid user/consumer tries to establish a communication with every-
body in the environment that fulfills its moderated trust requirements. The user does not
express any preference regarding the identity trust of its future communication partners and
assigns an initial trust value equal 1.0 to those participants with whom it has previously not
communicated with. The three sub-scenarios describe the situations where:
1. recommendations are accepted from everybody else in the environment that has previ-
ously had any experience with the target participant;
2. recommendations are accepted no more from everybody in the environment but only
from the direct partners of a participants’ partners, and
3. recommendations are accepted only from the direct partners.
The results are presented in Fig. 6.6. The different modelled resources are listed along the X
axis and the Y axis presents the level of trust the participant gathered through the direct and
indirect experiences, together with the percentage of tasks distribution among the different
resources.
The tendency of the trustor during the simulated sub-scenarios is to not make use of the most
trusted partner, but to collaborate with the most capable one(s). Thus, from all available
and accessible participants in the environment, the fastest of them was considered:
• in a. and c., no previous personal experience exists for the partners considered, and
• in b. other partners were most trusted.
The results reflect the open attitude of the trustor toward every possible collaboration part-
ner in the environment that fulfills its minimal trust requirements. As a result of the high
concurrency in the environment, only a minimal number of resources (1 to 5) were used in
total from a single trustor during the entire collaboration. However, most of the tasks were
completed only by a single resource.
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Figure 6.6: Trust establishment while considering everyone as a communication partner and
assigning an initial trust value 1.0.
In the second scenario, the user/consumer keeps quite the same moderated trust require-
ments. The difference to the first scenario is that it chooses to collaborate only with those
partners whose identity trust is at least 0.5, meaning that the trustor chooses to collaborate
with those partners in the environment which has obtained a certificate either directly from
the first order CAs or at least from a participant who has.
Once again, the initial trust assigned to unknown partners is 1.0 and the trustor accepts
recommendations from:
• everyone,
• known partners of its direct partners and its direct partners only and
• its direct partners only.
Just like during the simulation of the first scenario, the same open attitude of the trustor
toward every possible collaboration partner in the environment that fulfills its minimal trust
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Figure 6.7: Trust establishment while considering those participants who have an identity
trust at least 0.5 and an initial trust value 1.0 is assigned.
requirements is reflected.
The only distinct feature is the decrease of the number of possible partners to establish a
collaboration with as a result of applying an identity trust of at least 0.5 during the simula-
tions.
The behavior trust elements under observation were availability, accessibility and speed of
processing. In the simulation environment for the first three scenarios, none of the resources
injected errors on the responses they sent back. The resources were available during the entire
collaboration and their accessibility was conditioned from the concurrent requests each of the
users made during a simulation. The speed of processing was not artificially influenced. The
simulator itself created resources based on a singular principle, the later the resource was
created, the higher their speed of processing. Observing the graphics in Fig. 6.7, it can be
derived that more capable resources exist in the environment other that those chosen. Thus,
sorting the trustees based on the trust that the trustor places on its identity has some side
effects, more precisely the number of the available partners in the environment that can be
138 CHAPTER 6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
considered during the upcoming collaboration (wrongly) reduces. The same effect, but in a
more extended scale was observed during the simulation of the third scenario.
In the third scenario, the user/consumer tries to establish a collaboration only with those
participants who:
• have an identity trust 1.0, thus, the trustor chooses to collaborate only with those
partners in the environment which have obtained a certificate directly from the first
order CAs and
• total trust, weighted personal and recommendations, is at least 0.5 (initial trust value
is also 0.5).
In this scenario, recommendations are accepted from:
• known partners of its direct partners and its direct partners only and
• its direct partners only.
Figure 6.8: Trust establishment while considering those participants who have an identity
trust of 1.0 and a total trust of at least 0.5.
In these simulations, the common characteristic observed is the tendency of the trustor
to establish a collaboration not only with the most capable of the active participants in the
environment but they should also be the most trusted ones. However, the number of the
partners to collaborate with reduces drastically since the majority of the participants in the
environment do not comply with the trust requirements of the trustor in this scenario.
6.2.2 Trust Development in the Absence of Malicious/Mediocre Behavior
The development of trust between participants is strongly related to trust establishment.
Once a resource is considered as suitable and trusted for establishing a collaboration with,
the user sends the tasks there and monitors the entire collaboration process.
An example of the output of such a monitoring process is presented in Fig. 6.9.
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Figure 6.9: Measuring Behavior Trust Elements (no identity trust involved while calculating
the Absolute Behavior Trust (ABhvT)).
Absolute Behavior Trust is calculated as the production of single behavior trust elements un-
der observation. It is only a demonstration of the observed behavior trust elements. However,
for the target trustee can be said that:
• it was available during the entire collaboration,
• initially there were some problems for the trustor to access it (most probably as a result
of the concurrent requests from other users/consumers in the environment),
• some malicious behavior was observed during the collaboration (erroneous responses
were sent back to the trustor; does not reflect the ”real” behavior of the trustee), and
• speed of processing does not comply with the trustee’s ”promise” at the beginning of
the collaboration.
The scenario is pretty simple. A GridSim user with trust requirements as those presented in
Fig. 6.6 (moderated trust requirements, weights for personal and third parties’ experience
are 0.5) interacts between different experiments with many of the active resources in the en-
vironment. Thus, tasks are assigned to some of the participants considered as most trusted,
according to the expressed trust values, and responses are collected once the tasks are com-
pleted. All the resources are considered to give back correct responses (the assigned tasks
are completed correctly; there does not exist any malicious behavior in the environment) and
that the resources are always ”online” (available). Behavior trust is determined based on
only two behavior trust elements: speed and accessibility. In each experiment, the user sends
an average of 100 jobs. The measurement of speed and accessibility take place every time a
job is sent/processed to/from a resource. The same frequency is also applied for monitoring
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the availability, while accuracy, as it will be seen in the next subsections, will be observed
according to the verification strategies and sub-strategies specified by the user and presented
in 5.6.2 and 5.6.3.
Figure 6.10: Personal experience of User 4 regarding the behavior observed for Resource 2
over 12 experiments (no identity trust involved).
The results of the observations, presented in Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.11, regard the perceived
behavior trust for Resource 2 and Resource 30 from User 4 and User 1, respectively. The
identity trust of the two considered resources is not involved in the calculation of the total
trust. The X axes lists the different behavior trust elements under observation, through a
certain number of experiments. The trust values of these elements, together with the Abso-
lute Behavior Trust (ABhvT) are presented at the Y axis.
Both resources (Resource 2 and Resource 30) were available during the entire collabora-
tion and introduced no errors (at least this conclusion was derived from the observations of
respective trustors, User 1 and User 4). The oscillations on the ABhvT come from:
• the oscillations on the accessibility of the two considered resources. It can be explained
with the fact that no resource is strictly dedicated only to a single user. They can serve
other users as well, either simultaneously (unfortunately not possible in the GridSim
simulator) or in between (while the user continues to send its tasks).
• the oscillations in their speed of processing. Although not desired and not configured
to be part of the resources’ behavior, they are the best example of the indirect influence
that other factors could have in the behavior of a Grid participant (network problems,
malicious attempts from third parties to prevent the normal functioning of a target
participant, etc.).
The graphics in Fig. 6.12 and Fig. 6.13 represents the same observations as in Fig. 6.10
and Fig. 6.11 with the only difference that the Absolute Behavior Trust (ABhvT) is no more
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Figure 6.11: Personal experience of User 1 regarding the behavior observed for Resource 30
over 12 experiments (no identity trust involved).
shown in these graphics. Instead, the total trust calculated according to the formula (3.1) is
presented.
Resources show a similar behavior as in Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.11. The difference with that
scenario is the consideration by User 1 and User 4 of the respective identity trust for Resource
30 and Resource 2. Using a similar certification chain as the one presented in Fig. 5.1, the
identity trust that User 4 calculates for Resource 2 is T I4 (2) = 1.0 and the identity trust that
User 1 calculates for Resource 30 is T I1 (30) = 1.0. As a result, the total behavior observed
for Resource 30 is less appraised by User 1.
A better view for this collaboration scenario (User 1 - Resource 30; some malicious activity
(lack of 100% accuracy) was introduced in the behavior of the Resource 30) is presented in
Fig. 6.14 and Fig. 6.15.
Further simulations were conducted in order to observe:
• the development of the personal experience of a single user, regarding all its possible
collaboration partners over a number of experiments, and
• the development of the third parties’ experience that a single user obtains in regard to
all its collaboration partners over a number of experiments.
The obtained results for the development of the personal experience of a GridSim user are
presented in Fig. 6.16. As in the above simulation scenarios in this subsection, ABhvT of a
resource is primarily determined from their speed of processing and their accessibility.
The user starts with an initial trust value of 1.0 and tends to communicate with the most
capable of the resources. If for a certain user these resources result as available but not
accessible, the corresponding trust value is updated and the user tries to send the tasks to
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Figure 6.12: Personal experience of User 4 regarding the behavior observed for Resource 2
over 12 experiments (identity trust involved).
other resources in its list of capable and trusted resources.
During the simulations, the user makes a rich experience in the collaboration with the active
resources in the environment. In total, 29 resources were created and 15 simulations were
sequentially run. The axes in Fig. 6.16 show the trust (Z axis) that a single trustor built for
all the other participants in the environment (Y axis) throughout the simulations (X axis).
From the observations it can be concluded that:
• even with the very best intent of a participant to offer the maximum of its capabilities,
it is quite impossible that the trust value remains (if ”warm start” with initial trust
value 1.0) at, or reaches (if ”cold start” with initial trust value 0.0) its maximal value
1.0, and
• a higher constant trust value for a target participant does not always reflect the observed
behavior regarding that participant. The trustor could have simply not established a
collaboration with that partner at all or in a long time.
The development of the third parties’ experience that a single trustor obtains in regard
to all the other participants in the environment, over a number of sequential simulations is
presented in Fig. 6.17, Fig. 6.18 and Fig. 6.19. The development of the recommendations
follows the same logic as the development of the personal direct experience of a user. Once
again, X axis and Y axis show the resources/trustees in the environment and the sequential
simulations respectively. The trust regarding a target trustee that the trustor receives as a
recommendation from all the others in the environment (calculated according formulas 5.5,
5.6 or 5.7) is represented in Z axis.
The continuous decrease of the obtained values in the three simulated scenarios (Fig. 6.17,
Fig. 6.18 and Fig. 6.19) are principally because of the different experiences each of the partic-
ipants in the Grid environment makes, according also to the very personal trust requirements,
configurations, degree of concurrency (negative influence in the accessibility) and the influ-
ence that other outside factors could have in some of the behavior trust elements (i.e. speed
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Figure 6.13: Personal experience of User 1 regarding the behavior observed for Resource 30
over 12 experiments (identity trust involved).
of processing).
The smaller the number of recommenders, the higher the trust values received from the
trustor. However, no warranties can be offered on their objectivity. This problem will be
treated in subsection 6.3.4.
6.2.3 Partial Results on Trust Establishment and Development
Here, the most important conclusions derived from the simulations run for observing trust
establishment and development will be briefly summarized:
• Recommendations could many times offer a non-correct judgment on the real capabil-
ities of a participant. According to the personal trust values that everyone specifies
on a per case basis, the resulting personal experience with a target participant is built
differently between different Grid participants. In the case when recommendations are
accepted from everyone, the greater is the risk of obtaining non-decent information on
the collaboration partners. Recommendations could be considered as important only at
the beginning of a collaboration between partners. Later on, the only trust information
a user has to make reference to is its personal trust developed through monitoring the
collaboration process with the target participant.
• Involving the identity trust adds some prejudice in the capabilities of a target par-
ticipant, but will definitively help in placing some order in the Grid environments in
general.
• Logically, the more closed the attitude of a Grid participant while choosing its interac-
tion partners is:
– the less it has to make use of the third parties’ experience,
– the more will be the importance of the personal experience.
144 CHAPTER 6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Figure 6.14: Behavior Trust of a Collaboration Partner when Identity Trust is not Involved.
Figure 6.15: Behavior Trust of a Collaboration Partner when Identity Trust is Involved.
• Trust reaches and stays never at the exactly maximal possible value 1.0.
• A constant trust value, either low or high, does not necessarily imply that the target
participant continuously behaves ”bad” or ”good”. The gathered results showed that
the partner was most probably not used at all over a series of experiments.
• The claim done by Azzedin et al. in [82], [79], [81], and [80] and supported later on by
von Alunkal et al. [74] that as time passes, if no more collaborations have found place
among participants, trust decays, has not any ”real” background and must in no way be
converted into a rule. The experiments demonstrated that although a GridSim resource
was not used over a number of simulations by a certain GridSim user, its trust to the
other participants in the environment (behavior showed during the collaborations with
them) did not necessarily diminish; it developed normally either to higher or even lower
values as well.
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Figure 6.16: Development of the personal user experience regarding its collaboration partners
over different simulations.
6.3 Measuring the Performance of the Trust Model
The performance of the trust model is evaluated as below:
• First, the mean absolute error regarding the real behavior shown by a participant to
the observed behavior (either through applying the verification model only or making
a double check through applying the statistical model) will be measured. For this






where n is the number of sequential experiments.
• Second, the behavior of a participant through different sequential experiments will be
monitored in order to show possible fluctuations in the current behavior of a participant
compared to the behavior previously shown.
• Third, the effects of inaccurate third parties’ recommendations (intentionally high or
intentionally low) to the general decision of a trustor to collaborate with its trustees
will be assessed.
The simulation scenario is similar to the trust development: according to the trust require-
ments, a number of trusted participants is sorted out. Tasks are assigned to trusted part-
ners and responses are collected once the tasks were completed. The entire collaboration is
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Figure 6.17: Development of the third parties’ experience a participant obtains over different
simulations; Recommendations are accepted from anyone in the environment.
monitored using different verification strategies and sub-strategies. This time, errors were
introduced in the responses a trustee sends back to the trustor.
6.3.1 Mean Absolute Error
Measuring the Performance of the Verification Model. Here, the performance of both ”Offline”
and ”Online” verification strategies will be assessed.
• ”Offline” Verification Strategy: the verification frequency is calculated according
to formula 5.6, after the user establishes the minimal desired verification frequency.
As minimal verification frequency, the values Vmin = 5%, Vmin = 15%, Vmin = 30%
and Vmin = 60% are considered. A ”warm start” initialization strategy (initial trust
value 1.0) is applied. The trustor sends to its trustee between 50 and 200 tasks. The
trustee randomly introduces errors in the responses it sends back to the trustor. The
error frequencies vary between 5%, 10%, 30%, 60% and 100% of the completed tasks
sent back to the trustor. The verification takes place after the tasks are processed and
ready to be sent to the trustor. The performance of the verification process, for this
verification strategy and for the considered error rates (5%, 10%, 30%, 60% and 100%)
is shown in Figure 6.20 (a, b, c, d), where the mean absolute error (MAE) calculated
according to formula 6.1 is presented in Y axis for different number of tasks assigned to
the trustee (X axis). Initially, for all of the verification frequencies, the mean absolute
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Figure 6.18: Development of the third parties’ experience a participant obtains over different
simulations; Recommendations are accepted from known partners of its direct partners and
its direct partners only.
error increases until a certain point and then develops quite constantly. The increase
can be easily explained by fact that the trustor needs some time until it realises that
its trustee is sending back erroneous responses. The constant development of the MAE
has to do with the capability, or better say incapability, of the trustor to discover these
erroneous responses. From the graphics it can be seen that the greater the number
of tasks the trustor and the trustee exchange, the more possibility has the trustor to
observe errors in the behavior of a trustee and as a result the smaller the mean absolute
error is. Logically, the mean absolute error diminishes also as the minimal verification
frequency increases.
• ”Online” Verification Strategy: the verification frequency is calculated according
to formula 5.8, after the user establishes the minimal desired verification frequency.
Once again, as minimal verification frequency, the values Vmin = 5%, Vmin = 15%,
Vmin = 30% and Vmin = 60% are considered and a ”warm start” initialization strategy
(initial trust value 1.0) was applied. The number of tasks varies between 50 and 200
tasks. The trustee randomly introduces errors in the responses it sends back to the
trustor. The error frequencies vary between 5%, 10%, 30%, 60% and 100% of the tasks.
The trustor establishes also the ”clearance number” (number of tasks to be verified
sequentially). The simulations were run for clearance numbers 0, 25 and 75. The
verification takes place as the collaboration between parties continues. The performance
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Figure 6.19: Development of the third parties’ experience a participant obtains over different
simulations; Recommendations are accepted from known direct partners only.
of the verification process for this verification strategy is shown in the following:
– clearance number equal 0: In this case, the performance of the ”Online” veri-
fication strategy equals the performance of the ”Offline” verification strategy pre-
sented in Figure 6.20.
– clearance number equal 25: The performance of the verification process for
this verification strategy is shown in the Figure 6.21 (a, b, c, d). Introducing a
sequential verification of the responses coming from the trustee at the beginning of
the collaboration eases the identification of any ”malicious/erroneous” activity in
its behavior at the very first stages. The best example is the development of MAE
for a trustee that introduces 100% erroneous responses. The more tasks the trustor
exchanges with this trustee, the greater the experience the trustor gathers. Since
the verification frequency (5.8) is tightly coupled to the trust values a trustor
develops regarding its collaboration partners, the frequency of the verification
increases in this scenario, because the trust value diminishes. It is normal to
expect such fluctuations of the MAE values for high clearance numbers and high
percentages of errors in the incoming responses. From the graphics it can be seen
that as the clearance number increases, the mean absolute error reduces (once
again MAE is represented in the Y axis and number of tasks ”exchanged” between
parties in X axis).
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Figure 6.20: Mean Absolute Errors for the ”Offline” Verification Strategy.
– clearance number equal 75: The performance of the verification process for
this verification strategy is shown in Figure 6.22 (a, b, c, d). The number of tasks
exchanged varies between 100 and 200.
From the graphics can be seen that the performance of the verification model
is quite similar for all the minimal verification frequencies established from the
trustor. Thus, the behavior a trustee showed while sequentially verifying its re-
sponses (clearance number equal or greater than 75) corresponded to the behavior
it showed during the entire collaboration.
Measuring the Performance of the Statistical Model. Here, the performance of the
statistical verification model will be assessed. The average quality level (AOQ) is also tightly
coupled to the results that come out from the verification process. It is practicaly a double
verification of the received results. It was calculated according to formula 5.25, after the
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Figure 6.21: Mean Absolute Errors for ”Online” Verification Strategy; clearance number 25.
verification took place. Since the sampling interval k (formula 5.20) varied according to the
last updated trust value (formula 5.8), a mean value for the sampling interval is used. The
”errors” found with this method were added to the previously found ”errors” during the
verification process. The fraction of the ”total” number of erroneous tasks with respect to
the total number of tasks coming from the single trustees was calculated in order to determine
their behavior. In the graphics, fluctuations of the development of MAE, similar to those
observed during the evaluation of the performance of verification model, are to be expected
as well.
• clearance number equal 0: The performance of the verification process for this verifica-
tion strategy is shown in Figure 6.23 (a, b, c, d). The decrease of the mean absolute
error, as result of the double verification, is easily identifiable (comparing it also to the
mean absolute error presented in Fig. 6.20 a, b, c and d respectively).
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Figure 6.22: Mean Absolute Errors for ”Online” Verification Strategy; clearance number 75.
• clearance number equal 25: The performance of the verification process for this
verification strategy is shown in Figure 6.24 (a, b, c, d). The quality of the outgoing
tasks (tasks that come back to the trustor) improves even further especially for the
minimal verification frequencies and error rates under 100%.
• clearance number equal 75: The performance of the verification process for this
verification strategy is shown in Figure 6.25 (a, b, c, d). In the graphs it can be easily
identified that the higher the clearance number (as in this case 75 or higher), the more
similar is the performance showed from the statistical model with the performance of
the verification model only (Fig. 6.25.a, 6.25.b and 6.24.c similar with the respective
graphics presented in Fig. 6.22.a, 6.22.b and 6.22.c for 30%, 60% and 100% error rates;
Fig.6.25.d similar to Fig. 6.22.d with regard to all considered error rates).
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Figure 6.23: Mean Absolute Errors for the Statistical Verification Strategy; clearance number
0.
6.3.2 Partial Results
• The simulation results showed that although errors were found when applying the ver-
ification strategy, a gap between the observed behavior and the real behavior a trustee
exhibited still exists. Applying the statistical model helps a lot on having a better view
on the errors that could have skipped the verification process. The re-evaluated behav-
ior for a provider is definitively near to the real behavior that the provider exhibited.
• The higher the clearance number, the more similar the performance shown by the
statistical model with the performance of the verification model only will be.
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Figure 6.24: Mean Absolute Errors for the Statistical Verification Strategy; clearance number
25.
6.4 Keeping the Behavior of Collaboration Parties ”In Con-
trol”
Additional simulations were conducted in order to observe the behavior of the trustees be-
tween experiments. As previously mentioned at the beginning of the section 5.6, the aim is
to:
• verify the deviations on the trustworthiness of a participant between the simulations,
• establish till when the collaboration with a participant, despite its anomalous/malicious
behavior may continue.
The accuracy of the responses coming from a provider, together with its availability, accessi-
bility and speed of processing were considered. Behavior trust was calculated as the product
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Figure 6.25: Mean Absolute Errors for the Statistical Verification Strategy; clearance number
75.
of all these single Behavior Trust elements (5.2). The past behavior of the trustee(s) over a
number of simulations was recorded and the current behavior was compared to the recorded
values. For this purpose, making use of formulas 5.25 and 5.26, UCL and LCL were calcu-
lated.
In this type of graph are placed the results of the behavior observations during the current
collaboration. According to the positioning of the observed trust values (outside LCL, be-
tween LCL and UCL, or outside UCL) a trustor could derive conclusions on the behavior of
its trustees. Thus:
• if the observed behavior lies between UCL and LCL, a participant can still be considered
for future interactions but for the accomplishment of moderated expectations, since it
did not show an error-free behavior, and
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• if the observed behavior lies outside the UCL then the participant is banned and no more
considered for future interactions. In this case the collaboration with that target trustee
is interrupted and the remaining tasks can be assigned to other (trusted) partners
present in the environment.
During the simulations, the clearance numbers used were 0, 25 and 75. The trustor estab-
lished minimal verification frequencies with values 10%, 30% and 60% and a ”warm start”
initialization strategy with initial trust value 0.9. The trustee is supposed to initially start
the collaboration with an error-free behavior and later on doubles the error rate (after every
two collaborations; starting from 0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 80% and 100% error rates). In
each simulation, a total number of 200 tasks were exchanged between the trustor and the
trustee.
In order to fully observe the development of the behavior of a trustee through a sequence
of simulations, the stopping rule is configured higher than the number of tasks trustor and
trustee exchange. Thus, the collaboration will not be interrupted even in the case when the
tasks coming back to the trustor are 100% erroneous.
• Clearance number 0, Vmin = 10%: The results are shown in Figure 6.26 (a, b, c, d,
e, f, g and h).
At the beginning, from the first simulation until the error injection rate reaches 20%
(Fig. 6.26 a, b, c and d), it seems that the trustee is behaving perfectly. While the error
rate increases, the more the behavior graph approaches the upper control line (UCL)
(Fig. 6.26 e and f). However, due to the low verification frequency, this happens very
slowly. Only after the error rate reaches 100% (Fig. 6.26 g, h), the trustor, thanks also
to the experience gathered in the previous collaborations, once the observed behavior
exceeds the UCL, classifies the trustee as no more suitable for future collaborations and
blacklists it.
• Clearance number 0, Vmin = 30%: during these simulations, one could observe
that thanks to the higher verification frequency, the trustor is able to discover more
erroneous tasks coming from the trustee. However, the behavior graph approached the
upper control line (UCL) not particularly faster if compared to the scenario presented
in Fig. 6.26. The trustor blacklists the trustee only after the error rate reaches 100%.
• Clearance number 0, Vmin = 60%: While the minimal verification frequency in-
creases, the trustors discovers earlier the erroneous behavior of the trustee and the
number of errors is more elevate. In Figure 6.27 (a, b, c, d and e) can be seen that an
erroneous trustee is blacklisted at the frontier of 80% erroneous responses.
Similar simulations were run for a clearance number different from 0 (clearance number equal
25 and 75). The observed results are summarized in the following.
• Clearance number 25:
– Vmin = 10% - the collaboration was interrupted once the trustee started to send
back only erroneous responses to the trustor (100% error rate);
– Vmin = 30% - collaboration interrupted once the percentage of the erroneous
responses sent back to the trustor reached 80%;
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Figure 6.26: Clearance number equal 0; Vmin = 10%.
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Figure 6.27: Clearance number equal 0; Vmin = 60%.
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– Vmin = 60% - once again, the collaboration was interrupted once the percentage
of the erroneous responses sent back to the trustor reached 80%.
• Clearance number 75 - from this moment, independently from the minimal verification
frequency used (Vmin = 10%, Vmin = 30% and Vmin = 60%), the collaboration was
always interrupted once the percentage of the erroneous responses sent back to the
trustor reached 80%.
The above simulations are run considering a stopping rule greater than the number of tasks
exchanged between the trustor and a specific trustee. Once this stopping rule is exceeded,
the collaboration with this trustee is interrupted (either the UCL is exceeded or not) and the
rest of the tasks are distributed to other ”until then” trusted partners. An example of an
interrupted collaboration is shown in Figure 6.28.
Figure 6.28: Interrupting the Collaboration Once UCL and Stopping Rule are Exceeded.
Partial Results. The simulations showed that:
• as the clearance number and the verification frequency increases, the capability of a
trustor to detect any non-conformity (i.e. erroneous responses) in the behavior of any
specific trustee also increases.
• for a verification frequency under 100%, the common rate of the injected errors by a
trustee reached approximately in every simulation the value of 80%. After that they
were blacklisted and no more considered by this trustor even for more moderated trust
requirements.
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6.5 Handling Inaccurate Recommendations
A further feature of the trust model presented in this thess is the use of recommendations
obtained from third parties while choosing the most trusted partners to collaborate with. The
trustor has the possibility to establish whose recommendations it is going to accept and what
the importance (weight) of these recommendations in relation to the personal experience will
be.
The aim of the experiments in this section is to evaluate:
• how the trust of the recommender(s) develops between different experiments, in the
presence or absence of erroneous behavior of the trustees they recommend and
• what the effect of different presences of malicious recommendations in the decision
making process will be.
Recommenders’ Trust Development. According to formula 5.4, the trust each trustor
assigns to a recommender is calculated as the average behavior trust, manifested by the
trustees recommended by the recommender in question and used by the trustor during the
very last collaboration.
During the experiments, three environmental conditions were configured:
1. normal behavior of the trustees: no erroneous activity was injected at all (accuracy 1.0)
and the trustees were always available. The only behavior trust elements of importance
were accessibility (many participants compete with each other) and speed of processing.
2. trustees inject errors in the responses they send back to the trustor; the fault tolerance
of the trustor exceeds multiple times the number of errors contained in the received
responses.
3. trustees inject errors in the responses they send back to the trustor; the fault tolerance of
the trustor is very small; after four non-correct responses, another trustee is considered
for processing the remaining tasks.
The experimental results are represented in Fig. 6.29. Since the trust a trustor develops
regarding its recommenders is tightly coupled to the behavior trust of the trustees recom-
mended and used by the trustor, this value stays never to the maximum2 (value 1.0). It varies
according to the behavior of the recommended trustees during the current collaboration.
It is obvious that once the trustees inject errors in their responses, the trust value of recom-
mender diminishes. The differences observed in the trust value of the recommender between
the two scenarios, with high and low fault tolerance, are explained by the fact that in the
case with a higher fault tolerance the collaboration with an erroneous trustee continues for a
longer time than when a lower fault tolerance is specified. The longer a collaboration between
the trustor and a trustee lasts, the more the observed behavior is going to be near to the real
behavior shown.
Handling Malicious Recommenders. The second group of experiments serves to ex-
amine the efficiency of the model on handling with malicious recommenders.
2Refer to subsection 6.2.2.
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Figure 6.29: Recommenders’ trust development.
All recommenders which intentionally offer subjective (very high or very low) trust values as
recommendations, even in the case when they personally do not have had a direct collabora-
tion with the trustee in question, are defined as malicious.
During the experiments, 20 participants in total were considered, divided as follows:
• 1 trustor,
• 1 trustee,
• 18 others were configured all as recommenders.
The recommenders offer either their correct experience accumulated with the trustee in ques-
tion or a subjective value (1.0 was considered during the experiments). The trustee is config-
ured to send back 60% erroneous responses. The percentage of malicious recommenders varies
from 0% to 100%. The weights, the trustor assigns to the recommenders experience are 0.2,
0.5, 0.8, 1.0 (respective personal experience weighted with 0.8, 0.5, 0.2, 0.0). The evaluation
is done through computing the mean absolute error (MAE) according to the formulas 6.2
and 6.3:










where n is the total number of malicious recommenders.
The results are presented in Fig. 6.30 (a, b, c and d) and Fig. 6.31 (a, b, c and d). In
Fig. 6.30, the mean error is calculated according to the formula 6.2. The trust values of the
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recommenders are not involved in the calculations. The mean absolute error increases, first,
as the percentage of the malicious recommenders grows and second, as more importance is
assigned to recommendations.
Figure 6.30: Mean Absolute Error caused by malicious recommenders (without recom-
menders’ weight).
In Fig. 6.31, the mean error is calculated according to formula 6.3. The trustor does involve
the trust values of the recommenders. The decrease of the mean absolute error is visible in
all four graphs especially in Fig. 6.31 d for 100% malicious recommenders and weight 1.0.
In the model, there exists a strong correlation between the behavior the trustees exhibit
during the collaboration with a trustor and the trust values of the participants that recom-
mended them. A weak or good performance of a trustee will also directly affect the trust
value of its recommender(s), diminishing or increasing it.
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Figure 6.31: Mean Absolute Error caused by malicious recommenders (with recommenders’
weight).
Discussion. Compared to other proposals for handling inaccurate reputation sources like
Travos [251], Beta Reputation System [163] and BLADE [225], the presented approach has
the following advantages:
• Simplicity and speed on calculating recommenders’ trust. The trustor evaluates each
recommender according to the final trust value of the trustees it recommended. This
value is updated at the end of each collaboration process and stored for future use. On
the contrary, the three other approaches, before establishing trust on a trustee, initiate
a recommender estimation process gathering also information from other (known) par-
ticipants in the environment. This approach can turn up to be impractical as for the
additional time it consumes, the possible inaccuracy of the gathered results (although
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coming from the so called ”known” partners) and also for the ”artificial” trust assigned
to these ”known” partners.
• Continuous observation of the behavior of the recommended participants. Behavior of
the trustees is not considered as constant during the collaboration as in Travos [251].
Once the trust is established, it needs to be monitored. The better the trustor knows the
behavior of the trustee it collaborates with, the smaller the influence of the ”inaccurate”
recommenders.
• Consideration of the experience of all participants in the environment for as long as they
fulfill the trustor’s requirements. Trust is build upon personal experiences. It makes
no sense to discriminate opinions that differ from the average, as in Beta Reputation
System [163], for as long as the participants that offer them have proven themselves as
valuable recommenders.
• Possibility, through the first trust approach, to a trustor to express its personal attitude
toward a trustee, even when it completely lacks of previous collaborations with the
trustee.
• Realistic results. Although the experimented scenarios were run in a simulated envi-
ronment, the results leave little space for surprises, since they were obtained from a
very ”real life”-like trust establishment and management process.
6.6 Measuring the Effects of Trust
In the following, experiments for evaluating the effects of trust for the Grid participants and




For measuring processing time and costs, two types of experiments were run. In the first
type, a comparison between systems with and without trust was done. In the second type,
different verification strategies were compared.
6.6.1 Evaluation of Processing Costs and Time
During the experiments, 30 participants were created in total. One was assigned the role of
the trustor and the others were trustees. A fault tolerance of 4 erroneous tasks per trustee
was the condition for the trustor to interrupt the collaboration (fault tolerance) and check for
some other, more trusted, trustees. In other words, if the trustor finds 116 erroneous tasks,
after establishing a collaboration with all the present trustees, than no more tasks were sent
out. The environment is considered as unusable.
The trustor creates 250 tasks, where:
• by a 10% errors frequency there are approximately 25 erroneous tasks are injected,
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• by a 60% errors frequency there are approximately 150 erroneous tasks are injected,
• by a 100% errors frequency there are 250 erroneous tasks are injected,
The number of the discovered erroneous tasks and indirectly the processing costs and time
depend on the verification strategy applied.
The results of the measurements are represented in Fig. 6.32 and Fig. 6.33:
Processing Time (Trust vs. No Trust).
Figure 6.32: Measured processing time (trust vs. no trust).
Processing Cost (Trust vs. No Trust).
It can be seen that in the first sight, the experiments run when the trust is not involved are
faster and cheaper than the experiments run when trust is involved in the system. Further-
more, the higher the verification frequency (including also the clearance number), the longer
the experiments last and the more expensive they are. However, the results were obtained
through measuring directly the costs and time of processing the tasks a trustor sent to its
trustees. While during the scenario where trust was not involved, although a trustee (the
trustees) injected errors in their responses, the collaboration continued normally until all
tasks were processed, introducing trust considerations and behavior monitoring brought the
interruption of the collaboration when the trustor’s trust consideration were not fulfilled by
a certain trustee. The rest of the tasks was (re)distributed among other participants that
showed themselves as trusted ones (trustees). Thus, the real advantage of including trust in
the system relies in the total number of erroneous/malicious participants discovered. As the
number of erroneous/malicious participants in the environment increases (especially when
an unusable status for Grid environment is achieved), the greater is the advantage brought
by this trust model. The confirmation comes from the statistical reevaluation of the data
recorded during the simulation of the above scenarios (where the no trust scenario resulted
faster and cheaper than with trust scenario). Statistically speaking:
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Figure 6.33: Measured processing cost (trust vs. no trust).
• for 10% verification frequency
– 10% injected erroneous tasks, approximately 2.5 are discovered
∗ for clearance number 10, approx. 3.5 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 50, approx. 7.5 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 75, approx. 10 erroneous tasks are discovered,
– 60% injected erroneous tasks, approximately 15 are discovered
∗ for clearance number 10, approx. 21 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 50, approx. 45 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 75, approx. 60 erroneous tasks are discovered,
– 100% injected erroneous tasks, approximately 25 are discovered
∗ for clearance number 10, approx. 35 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 50, approx. 75 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 75, approx. 100 erroneous tasks are discovered,
• for 60% verification frequency
– 10% injected erroneous tasks, approximately 12.5 are discovered
∗ for clearance number 10, approx. 13.5 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 50, approx. 17.5 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 75, approx. 20 erroneous tasks are discovered,
– 60% injected erroneous tasks, approximately 75 are discovered
∗ for clearance number 10, approx. 81 erroneous tasks are discovered,
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∗ for clearance number 50, approx. 105 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 75, approx. 120 erroneous tasks are discovered,
– 100% injected erroneous tasks, approximately 125 are discovered
∗ for clearance number 10, approx. 135 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 50, approx. 175 erroneous tasks are discovered,
∗ for clearance number 75, approx. 200 erroneous tasks are discovered,
By a 10% verification frequency it comes only rarely to an interruption of all collaborations,
however, some erroneous tasks are discovered. By a 60% verification frequency, the interrup-
tion happens for the first time when the trustees inject 60% erroneous tasks and the clearance
number 75. When the trustees inject 100% erroneous tasks, than the interruption happens
every time. In other words, when an unusable status is detected by the trustor, the interrup-
tion of the collaboration with all erroneous trustees could bring 53.4% savings in time and
costs compared to the case when no verification took place at all.
Configuring a lower fault tolerance will bring even better results.
6.6.2 Network Load
The network load observed during the experiments is proportional to the number of active
participants present in the environment, their replicated tasks, erroneous tasks found and
resent for processing and to their replicas. This relationship can be described through the
following formula 6.4:
NetLoad = Nparticip(i) ∗Nreptasks(i)+
∑
(Nparticip(j) ∗Nresendtasks(j) + Nparticip(j) ∗Nreptasks(j))
(6.4)
where Nparticip(i) is the number of those participants whose tasks are remotely being pro-
cessed, Nreptasks(i) is the total number of replicated tasks, Nparticip(j) is the number of
participants that have already found errors on the tasks they receive back, Nresendtasks(j)
is the number of tasks found erroneous and resent to be processed and Nreptasks(j) is the
number of replicas for the resent tasks.
6.7 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to assess the performance of the trust model presented in this
thesis.
Initially, the basic functionalities of the simulation toolkit [http://www.gridbus.org/gridsim]
were extended. The changes were undertaken, in order to integrate the different elements of
the model, as introduced in the fifth chapter and to comply as much as possible with a real
Grid environment (e.g. the possibility given to a participant to play the role of a consumer
and a provider at the same time). The simulations were managed through a graphical inter-
face. Instructions to the underlying configurable experiment class(es) are given and at the
same time information on the very last simulation was accessed. For each of the trustors, the
behavior shown by its trustees between different simulations was separately saved. Another
implemented class, the GPaint class, made use of the saved results for delivering graphical
representations of the behavior shown for each of the trustees during the very last simulation
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and among different simulations (long time behavior observation).
The second part of the chapter concentrated on the presentation of the experimental work
done for:
• evaluating the performance of the trust model during establishment of trusted collabo-
rations between parties, monitoring of the collaboration and discovery of short-term or
long-term deviations on the behavior of the collaboration partners,
• evaluating the effects of trust on the performance of the Grid systems and
• helping in some way the Grid participants to tune their trust requirements to their
needs and capabilities.
During the simulations, a set of resources and users was modeled:
• each user created/owned a resource.
• each user sent his/her tasks to every resource in the environment (considered as suitable
in respect of its current personal trust requirements), except for its own resource.
• the behavior trust elements considered were: the accuracy of the responses coming from
the different resources, their availability, accessibility, and speed of processing.
To observe the trust establishment, different scenarios, with different trust requirements, were
considered. The opened or closed attitude of the trustor, expressed through its moderated
or high trust requirements respectively, was also reflected by the experimental results.
During the experiments, the way how trust develops in the simulated environment among Grid
participants was tracked down. The two main scenarios involve the collaboration between
trustors and trustees in the absence and presence of malicious behavior from the trustees.
While in the presence of malicious behavior it was somehow expected that the trust value for
the behavior trust was subject of oscillations (due to the discovered deviations), during the
experiments, where the malicious behavior lacked completely, it was observed that:
• even with the very best intent of a participant to offer its best, it is quite impossible
that the trust value remains (if ”warm start” with initial trust value 1.0) at, or reaches
(if ”cold start” with initial trust value 0.0) its maximal value 1.0, and
• a higher constant trust value for a target participant does not always reflect the observed
behavior regarding that participant. The trustor could have simply not established a
collaboration with that partner at all or in a long time.
Simulations were also conducted in order to measure the performance of the trust model on
detecting malicious behavior of the participants (trustees) during a single collaboration3 or
over a number of them.
Through measuring the differences between the real behavior shown by a trustee during the
3A single collaboration a trustor establishes with a trustee is considered the entire process from the moment
the first task is sent from the trustor to the trustee till the trustor receives the last processed task from the
trustee.
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collaboration and the behavior, a trustor was able to monitor, according to the verifica-
tion strategies and sub-strategies, or to statistically evaluate, the mean absolute error for
the entire monitoring process was determined. Different grades of malicious behavior of the
partners were simulated and different verification strategies and sub-strategies were applied.
The results showed that the model, based only on the verification frequency proposed in 5.8
was able to detect some deviations in the behavior of a trustee. This performance was fur-
ther improved through the use of the statistical methods of quality assurance. Experimental
results showed that the higher the number of sequential tasks verified at the beginning of
the collaboration (clearance number), the more similar the performance of the monitoring
process to the statistical re-evaluation process was.
Additional simulations were conducted in order to observe the behavior of the trustees be-
tween experiments. This time, not only the accuracy of the responses coming from a provider
but also its availability, accessibility and speed of processing were considered. The aim was
to observe the conformity of the behavior a trustee showed during a collaboration, with the
expectations a trustor built based on the results gathered from previous simulations.
The CL, UCL and LCL were measured, according to 5.24, 5.25, and 5.26, making use of the
information gathered during the past direct collaborations. For different grades of malicious
behavior injected and different verification strategies and sub-strategies applied, different
performances of the model were observed.
A further feature of the model that was tested is its capability of handling malicious rec-
ommenders.
The trustor has the possibility to establish whose recommendations it is going to accept
and what the importance (weight) of these recommendations in relation to the personal ex-
perience will be. Initially, the way how the trust of the recommender(s) develops between
different experiments in the presence or absence of erroneous behavior of the trustees they
recommend was observed. The results confirmed the expected decreases in the trust values of
the recommenders as the malicious behavior of the partners they recommended increased. As
a second step, the effects of different presences of malicious recommendations in the decision
making process were determined. As malicious were defined all those recommenders which
intentionally offer subjective (very high or very low) trust values as recommendations, even in
the case when they personally do not have had a direct collaboration with the trustee in ques-
tion. Once again, the parameter under observation was the mean absolute error calculated
as the difference between the resulting values for the gathered recommendations, including
the subjective ones(where no affinity to the real experience exits), with the values for the
gathered recommendations, when the recommenders reported their real experience (or even
the lack of experience as well) with the target trustee. The results showed that the mean
absolute error increases, first, while the percentage of the malicious recommenders grows and
second, while more importance is assigned to recommendations. The higher value is reached
for 100% malicious recommenders and weight 1.0.
The last part of the experiments deals with the investigation of the effects that the in-
volvement of trust brings in the environment in general and for the Grid participants. The
parameters measured are the processing cost, processing time and the network load.
For measuring processing time and costs, two types of experiments were run. In the first type,
a comparison between systems with and without trust was done. In the second type, differ-
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ent verification strategies applied were compared. The results showed that, the experiments
run when the trust is not involved were visibly faster and cheaper than the experiments run
when the trust is involved in the system. Furthermore, the higher the verification frequency
(including also the clearance number), the longer the experiments lasted and the more ex-
pensive they were. However, the real advantage of including trust in the system lies in the
total number of erroneous tasks discovered, especially in the case when an unusable status is
achieved in the environment. Thus, unacceptable deviations are contained in the behavior of
all trustees a trustor, according to its trust requirements, considers as suitable for establish-
ing a collaboration with. All this, translated in processing costs and time terms means that
considerable savings could be achieved when the trust is involved in the system. The lower
the fault tolerance will be (expressed by the trustor at the personal trust requirements) the
greater the advantages will be.
Regarding the network load, the experiments showed that it is proportional to the number of
tasks that each of the participants, according to the verification frequency applied, sends to
be executed twice (replicas) and to the number of tasks found as erroneous and thus re-sent
for execution.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
”A conclusion is the place where
you got tired thinking”
Dr. Martin Henry Fischer
7.1 Summary
This thesis presented an analysis of trust and a trust establishment and management model
for Grid environments.
Trust is a complex subject relating to belief in the honesty, truthfulness, competence, re-
liability, etc., of the considered participants. In a trust management system, there are par-
ticipants who assign some degree of trust to other participants based on a combination of
identity considerations, behavior observations, recommendations from other participants and
references to other trust sources. The degree of trust that the participants assign to each
other governs the decisions that they make when collaborating with each other. Definition of
a trust model is the basis for interoperability between Grid participants in a heterogeneous,
dynamic, uncertain and vulnerable environment.
The main contributions of the thesis are as follows:
• Consideration of Social Aspects of Trust in Grid Environments. A wide
variety of needs and requirements for trust by the users of applications running on
Grids, regarding possible collaboration partners, were considered. Trust is established
and managed based on experience (personal or that of the others), beliefs and prejudice.
Each of the participants is able to manage its own trust values regarding the others in
the environment and also offer this experience when it is requested.
• Trust Threats Analysis. Threats to trust in Grids were analyzed for getting a better
understanding of possible fraudulent behavior of the participants in the environment.
• A Flexible and Generic Trust Establishment and Management Model. The
offered approach considered both identity and behavior trust of the interaction partners
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together with different sources to calculate the overall or partial trust values for an
interaction partner.
• User/Application and Trust. Trust establishment and management were adapted
to user and application requirements in a service-oriented Grid environment. The trust
system was configured to the domain specific trust requirements by the use of several
separate trust profiles covering the entire lifecycle of trust establishment and manage-
ment.
• Relationship between Trust and Control. Each of the collaboration parties contin-
uously controlled the behavior of the other party based not only on the user/application
trust requirements but also on the observed behavior of the other party until that very
moment.
• Detection and Prevention of Anomalous Behavior. Statistical methods of qual-
ity assurance were used for monitoring the behavior of other participants during long
and short term collaborations as a tool for detecting possible deceitful behavior and
trust betrayal.
• Enhancing the Security of the Communication. Securing the communication
between Grid participants was identified as an important task. The proposed approach
made use of a double encryption scheme in which the transmitted information was
initially encrypted using incomparable public session keys (a technique where a par-
ticipant generates itself several public keys corresponding to a single private key; the
number of public keys equal the number of trusted partners a participant identifies).
In a second stage, this already encrypted information was encrypted again using keys
generated through a technique based on certificateless public key cryptography.
• Analysis of System Performance while Involving Trust. The effects that trust
can have on important features like mean processing time, and processing costs were
analyzed through different simulations.
• Effects of Control Levels on Trust. Many situations of normal and anomalous
behavior were simulated and analyzed. Different control levels (from strong control to
moderated control) exerted from participants and different types of interactions between
them were configured. This analysis is supposed to serve to users of the model as a
reference while expressing their trust preferences.
A comparative view of the characteristics of the offered approach to the related work in the
field of trust for Grid environments is presented in Table 7.1.
The considered features are summarized in the following:
• Trust sources - Trust is still a knowledge gaining process where individual participants
learn to trust others in the environment. In order to have a complete/better view on the
trust of a collaboration partner, many dimensions, like personal experience, personal
predisposition, third parties experience, etc., need to be considered. Different weights
can be assigned to each of the sources conform participant’s attitude in using/accepting
them.
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• Centralization level - Trust is inherently a personal opinion. Each of the participants,
according to the current (application-related) trust requirements, establishes trust only
with a certain number of partners from the entirety present in the environment. Trust
on a trustee increases or decreases with time. It ranges from complete distrust to
complete trust based only on:
– the intentions and the behavior showed from the collaboration partners, and
– the influence of other factors (e.g. concurrence in the environment).
• Generalization (Granularity) - different activities in which a participant is involved
have to be separated. This is the only possibility to increase the quality of the offered
services in the environment and assist participants to express which aspect of others’
behavior they are interested in and at which level.
• Trust level - considering both identity and behavior trust, makes Grid participants
more transparent to each other.
• Mutual verification - Trust could always be a measurable property in Grid environ-
ments. The trust level is a measure of participants’ honesty, competence, security and
dependability of this specific participant. In the environment, some participants may
be trusted more than others with respect to their behavior. To have an accurate view
on the level of trust regarding a specific participant, this has to be a continuous value.
• Security considerations - Trust is always accompanied by risk. During the collabora-
tion, the presence of some uncertainty on the outcome of the collaboration process with
a specific participant still exists, but at the same time some degree of trust in it is also
needed. Some ”malicious/deviating” behavior could be tolerated by the participants,
but when a certain threshold is reached, trust flips to distrust.
Trust alone is not enough. Further security considerations have to be involved in order
to increase the confidence and reliability on the collaboration process with a participant
and with the entire Grid environment.
7.2 Future Work
The work presented in this thesis is an attempt at modeling trust establishment and man-
agement for Grid computing environments, based on social properties of trust. There are
several open research areas that need further investigation.
Extension of the Trust Establishment and Management Model. In this work, all




In reality, Grid environments comprise a wider variety of participants. These are:
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Trust Trust Centr. General. Trust Mutual Sec.
Models Sourc. Level (Granul.) Level Verif. Consid.
Azzedin Direct, Decentr. Context Id. No No
et al. Indirect Behav.
[79]
NetShield Direct Centr. Global Id Id. at Yes
GridSec begin.
[161]
G-Pass Direct Centr. NA Id No Yes
[190]
GridEigen Direct Centr. Global Behav. No No
Trust Indirect
[74] Indirect
Lin Direct Decentr. Global Behav. No Partial
et al. Indirect
[184]
TRAVOS Direct Decentr. Global Behav. No No
[251] Indirect
Prejud.
Two-Level Direct Centr. Global NA Id. at No
Trust Decentr. begin.
[252]
Appr. Direct Decentr. Global Id., Id. at Yes
present. Indirect Context Behav. begin.,
in this Sociol. Behav.
work Prejud. all the
time
Table 7.1: Grid Trust Models Comparison Table.
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• Application Developers - construct Grid enabled applications and components. They
provide programming models appropriate for Grid environments and a range of services
that can be called during application development;
• Tool Developers - develop tools, compilers, libraries and so on that implement the
programming models and services used by application developers;
• Grid Developers - implement the basic services required to construct the Grid itself;
• Grid Nodes - either individual systems (computers, storage systems, sensors, etc.),
characterized by a relatively small scale and a high degree of homogeneity and integra-
tion, or clusters (network of workstations, any collection of computers) characterized
by an increased physical scale, reduced integration and a high level of homogeneity.
Such systems could be consumer nodes, provider nodes or both consumer and provider
nodes;
• Service Providers/Owners - a further classification implying those intermediary partic-
ipants between Grid nodes and application developers. This category is considered to
deal directly with the provider nodes offering Grid-enabled services and applications
developed by application developers.
As a result, the following trust relationships are supposed to exist in the environment:
• Grid Users - Consumer Nodes;
• Consumer Nodes - Provider Nodes;
• Provider Nodes - Service Providers/Owners;
• Consumer Nodes - Application Developers;
• Provider Nodes - Application Developers;
• Service Providers - Application Developers;
• Application Developers - Tool Developers;
• Tool Developers - Grid Developers.
These trust relationships could be either bidirectional or unidirectional. A general view on
the existing trust relationships is shown in Fig. 7.1.
Adapting the new trust relationships in the trust model will considerably enhance its
capabilities and will be a further step towards more trusted and secure Grid environments.
Thus, part of the future research should be focused on:
• ”shaping” the needs of every possible participant for trust;
• expressing the trust requirements;
• establishing the trust elements of interest for both identity trust and behavior trust.
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Figure 7.1: Trust Relationships in Grid Environments.
The presented trust model is generic enough to be applied for all possible trust relationships
among all categories of participants in Grid environments.
Extension of the Behavior Trust Elements Under Observation and Relationship
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Future research could be oriented towards the identification of further behavior trust ele-
ments. Their integration in the presented trust model should be a relatively easy task, since
the model itself is very flexible and configurable at every level.
Further research should be devoted to consider the relationship of this trust model to other
technologies that help make Grid environments more secure.
Several vulnerabilities and uncertainties in Grid environments were presented and analyzed.
Involving the notion of trust will help the participants in the environment to have fewer
uncertainties regarding their collaboration partners and at the same time diminishes some of
the vulnerabilities that exist. However, the behavior of a Grid participant is not limited only
to the fulfillment of its role as a consumer or provider to the expectations of the other party.
Every participant should fulfill its role as a ”Grid participant” towards everybody else in the
environment not only during the collaboration (here, the involvement of the participant in
different threats and attacks like DOS and DDOS attacks, attacks on XML parsing systems,
etc., are implied).
There are technologies and mechanisms that deal with responses to incidents, intrusion de-
tection, etc., which make the identification of different malicious activities in the environment
possible (i.e. Schridde et al. [234]).
Future research should concern the relationship of the presented trust model to such mecha-
nisms, in order to detect malicious participants before they could be chosen as collaboration
partners.
In Fig. 7.2, the relationship of the trust to other security mechanisms is shown.
Figure 7.2: Improving Grid Security: A Summary of Threats and Countermeasures.
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The entirety of these protective mechanisms (trust management included), will definitively
improve the security of Grid environments in general. Only in such a way, Grid technology
will be widely accepted outside of the academic domain (i.e. like in the application scenario
presented by Dörnemann et al. [131].
Appendix A
Grid Simulators vs. Real Grid
Platforms
There are many benefits of using a Grid computing infrastructure:
• harnessing of the collective capacity of the resources involved,
• simplified collaboration between geographically distributed and/or independent orga-
nizations (or singular participants),
• sharing of hardware and software resources and of scientific instruments.
There are a lot of initiatives regarding the construction of frameworks and toolkits for enabling
Grid environments. Single projects that have been started from big companies or universities
are a reality that gains even new understandings as the concept of Grid computing evolves
(Jennings et al. [121]).
These approaches offer a collection of protocols and services to ease the implementation of
Grid systems.
These initiatives for enabling Grid activities can be categorized into1:
• Real-life toolkits and frameworks - Real life toolkits and frameworks run real software
on realistic machines that are connected by real networks. Such platforms are DAS2
[51], NAREGI [36], TeraGrid [50] or Grid’5000 [25]. Running experiments in such
platforms has the advantage that it is possible to near the implementation in practice
and that the obtained experimental results are realistic. However, considering the
type of applications running in Grid environments (time-intensive; labour-intensive;
uncontrolled and unrepeatable) and the dynamic nature of Grid environments, real
life platforms are still challenging for Grid researchers. Changes in the configuration
of the environment could negatively influence the running experiments and introduce
failures. Furthermore, their scalability is limited and the possibility to build a real-life
Grid testbed each time one wants to test different scenarios with different scheduling
management strategies is time and effort consuming.
• Emulators - Emulators are another category of the platforms to conduct Grid experi-
ments. Such platforms are MicroGrid [35] and Grid eXplorer [23]. Emulators address
1A throughout presentation of experimental platforms for Grid computing can be also found at [222].
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the ”simulation” of complex behaviors and interactions of distributed Grid participants.
The software, in its whole complexity, is run on real machines and this feature limits
the scalability and the flexibility needed for the experiments. Emulators are pretty
complex, since many of the details in real Grid environment are provided. Due to their
complexity, they are also difficult to implement.
• Simulators - Simulators are the third class of experimental platforms for Grid comput-
ing. They belong to the high level observation tools for Grid computing. An interesting
feature of simulators is the abstraction they provide, focusing on specific behaviors or
mechanisms of a Grid system. Furthermore, they are independent of the execution
platform because only a model of the system runs in the simulator. Furthermore, sim-
ulators solve many problems that come up when using real life platforms or emulators.
There is no need to build a real system and there are no limitations to the scenarios
being experimented. It is pretty easy to control and to repeat experiments.
Some of the existing simulators are Bricks [4], SimGrid [48], GridSim [27], ChicSim [5]
and OptorSim [38].
A problem that could come up through working with experimental results obtained
through simulations is their validity and the comparability with results obtained from
experiments executed on real-life platforms.
However, the aim of the experiments is to observe the establishment and development of
trust, the performance of the trust model in general (performance of verification strategies
applied, number of deviations not discovered from the verification process) and the effects of
trust itself in the system (overhead introduced in the network, costs and time spent when
trust involved or not, etc). For these purposes, the following features are required:
• the ability to model an arbitrary number of participants,
• the ability to model a variable performance of the participants, either for sin-
gle/combination behavior trust elements or for the entirety of them.
These requirements can be currently met only by simulation packages. However, considering
the different features and the aims different simulators were conceived to fulfill, the most
suitable of them for running the experiments is going to be chosen.
The Bricks simulator focuses on client/server interaction in global high performance com-
puting systems. It allows for a single centralized scheduling strategy, which does not scale
well to large Grid systems. SimGrid is designed to simulate task scheduling (centralized or
distributed) on Grids. Independent of its functionalities that can be used for running exper-
iments, it can be considered as a low-level toolkit which interfaces to the C programming
language and thus bears some difficulties to splice with previous work done for the trust
model. The Chicago Simulator (ChicSim) is a simulation framework built on top of Par-
sec [41] for studying scheduling and replication strategies in Grids. A Grid is modeled as a
collection of interconnected Grid sites with network connectivity of each Grid site modeled
as a single parameter (describing the bandwidth of the gateway connecting this Grid site to
the other Grid sites). OptorSim is a Java-based Grid simulator oriented on the evaluation
of the performance of data access optimization algorithms. It offers limited capabilities and
as such can not be considered for experimental purposes in this work. Last, GridSim is a
181
discrete-event Grid simulator based on JavaSim (JSim) [30]. This simulator allows to simu-
late distributed schedulers, and although it is specifically aimed at simulating market-driven
economic resource models it fits well to the requirements presented above. Its computational
resource models are highly configurable and it is flexible enough to experiment in different sce-
narios. A detailed description of GridSim and of changes done to suit the model requirements
is presented in Appendix B.




The GridSim toolkit [27] supports modeling and simulation of a Grid environment through
a wide range of heterogeneous participants. It was proposed and designed by Rajkumar
Buyya [95] as part of his Ph.D. work at Monash University (Melbourne, Australia), for in-
vestigating interactions and interferences between scheduling decisions taken by distributed
brokers. It is mainly used to study cost-time optimization algorithms for scheduling task
farming applications on heterogeneous Grids considering economy-based resource manage-
ment and dealing with deadline and budget constraints. The scheduling involves notions like
providers (resource owners), consumers (end-users) and brokers discovering and allocating
resources to consumers.
GridSim, for its features and flexibility to introduce changes is considered to be the most
suitable tool for running the experimental evaluations of our work. In the following, a de-
tailed presentation of GridSim, together with the changes made to its structure for adapting
it to the experimental needs, will be presented1.
B.1 Grid Modeling and Simulation with GridSim
GridSim has the following features:
• It allows modeling of heterogeneous types of resources.
• Resources can be modeled operating under space- or time-shared mode.
• Resource capability can be defined (in the form of MIPS as per SPEC benchmark).
• Resources can be located in any time zone.
• Weekends and holidays can be mapped depending on resource’s local time to model
non-Grid (local) workload.
• Resources can be booked for advance reservation.
• Applications with different parallel application models can be simulated.
1Buyya’s work and other related publications on GridSim found at [27] were the major source for this
section.
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• Application tasks can be heterogeneous and they can be CPU or I/O intensive.
• There is no limit on the number of application jobs that can be submitted to a resource.
• Multiple user entities can submit tasks for execution simultaneously in the same re-
source, which may be time-shared or space-shared. This feature helps in building
schedulers that can use different market-driven economic models for selecting services
competitively.
• Network speed between resources can be specified.
• It supports simulation of both static and dynamic schedulers.
• Statistics of all or selected operations can be recorded and they can be analyzed using
GridSim statistics analysis methods.
B.1.1 GridSim Architecture
GridSim is based on a layered and modular architecture was employed for GridSim:
• The first layer is concerned with the Java interface and the runtime machinery (JVM).
• The second layer is concerned with a basic discrete-event infrastructure built using the
interfaces provided by the first layer. For the implementation of this discrete-event
infrastructure SimJava [49], [9] was used.
• The third layer models and simulates the GridSim components.
• The fourth layer simulates the different schedulers used in GridSim.
• The final layer focuses on application and resource modeling with different scenarios
using the services provided by the two lower-level layers for evaluating scheduling and
resource management policies, heuristics, and algorithms.
The GridSim architecture is shown in Fig. B.1.
B.1.2 GridSim Components
GridSim Users. A Grid user is an instance of the User entity . Each user may differ from
the rest of the users with respect to the following characteristics:
• Job characteristics e.g. job execution time, number of parametric replications, etc.;
• Scheduling optimization strategy: minimization of cost, minimization of time, or both;
• Activity rate e.g., how often it creates new job;
• Time zone where the user is supposed to be;
• Absolute deadline;
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Figure B.1: GridSim Architecture.
• Absolute budget;
• Relaxation parameters (D and B factors) for the deadline and budget. They express the
user’s tolerance to the deviations from the established deadline and budget according
to the processing requirements and available resources.
GridSim Resources. A Grid resource is an instance of the Resource entity . Each resource
may differ from the rest of resources with respect to the following characteristics:
• Number of processors;
• Cost of processing;
• Speed of processing;
• Internal process scheduling policy (time shared or space shared);
• Local load factor;
• Time zone.
The resource speed and the job execution time is defined in terms of the ratings of stan-
dard benchmarks such as MIPS and SPEC.
Brokers query resources directly for their static and dynamic properties once the resource
contact details are obtained.
GridSim Brokers. Each user is connected to an instance of the Broker entity . User’s jobs
are initially submitted to the broker who takes care about the scheduling of tasks according
also to the user’s scheduling policy. The broker dynamically gets a list of available resources
from the global directory entity.
GridSim GIS (Grid Information Service). It offers resource registration services and
keeps track of a list of resources available in the Grid. The information about resources is
then used by the broker.
GridSim Inputs and Outputs. Input and output entities simulate the flow of informa-
tion between GridSim entities. The use of separate entities for input and output enables a
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networked entity to model full duplex and multi-user parallel communications.
GridSim Tasks. Tasks in GridSim are represented through Gridlet objects. A Gridlet con-
tains all the information related to the job and its execution management details such as
job length expressed in MIPS, disk I/O operations, the size of input and output files, and
the job originator. These basic parameters are used for establishing the execution time, the
time required to transport input and output files between users and remote resources and
returning the processed Gridlets back to the originator along with the results.
The environment architecture is shown in Fig. B.2:
Figure B.2: Environmental Architecture.
B.1.3 GridSim Java Package Design
The GridSim package implements the following classes:
• GridSim - This is the main class of Gridsim package that must be extended by GridSim
entities. The GridSim class adds networking and event delivery features, which allows
synchronous or asynchronous communication for service access or delivery. The Grid-
Sim class supports methods for simulation initialization, management, and flow control.
Its environment must be initialized to setup the simulation environment before creat-
ing any other GridSim entities at the user level. This method also prepares the system
for simulation by creating GridInformationService, GridSimShutdown, and GridStatis-
tics. The GridSim class supports static methods for sending and receiving messages
between entities directly or via network entities, managing and accessing handle to
various GridSim core entities, and recording statistics.
• Input - This class defines a port through which a simulation entity receives data from the
simulated network. It maintains an event queue to serialize the data-in-flow and delivers
to its parent entity. Simultaneous inputs can be modeled using multiple instances of
this class.
• Output - This class defines a port through which a simulation entity sends data to the
simulated network. It maintains an event queue to serialize the data-out-flow and de-
livers to the destination entity. Simultaneous outputs can be modeled by using multiple
instances of this class.
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• PE (Processing Element) - It is used to simulate CPU. Its capability is defined in terms
of MIPS rating.
• PEList - It maintains a list of PEs of each machine.
• Machine - It represents a uniprocessor or shared memory multiprocessor machine.
• MachineList - It simulates a collection of machines. GridSim users define the connec-
tivity among the machines in a collection.
• ResourceCharacteristics - It represents static properties of a resource such as resource
architecture, OS, management policy (time or space shared), cost and time zone at
which the resource is located along resource configuration.
• GridResource - It extends the GridSim class and gains communication and concurrent
entity capability. The process of creating a Grid resource is as follows:
– PE objects with a suitable MIPS/SPEC rating are created,
– they are assembled together in order to create a machine.
– one or more objects of the Machine are grouped to form a resource. A resource
having a single machine with one or more PEs is managed as a time-shared system
using round robin scheduling algorithm. A resource with multiple machines is
treated as a distributed memory cluster and is managed as a space-shared system
using first-come first served scheduling policy or its variants.
• GridSimStantardPE - It defines MIPS rating for a standard PE or enables the users
to define their own MIPS/SPEC rating for a standard PE. This value can be used
for creating PEs with relative MIPS/SPEC rating for GridSim resources and creating
Gridlets with relative processing requirements.
• ResourceCalendar - This class implements a mechanism to support modeling local load
on Grid resources that may vary according to the time zone, time, weekends, and
holidays.
• GridInformationService - It provides Grid resource registration, indexing and discovery
services.
• Gridlet - This class acts as job package that contains job length in MI, the length of
input and out data in bytes, execution start and end time and the originator of job.
• GridletList - It maintains a list of Gridlets and supports methods for organizing them.
• GridSimTags - It contains various static command tags that indicate a type of action
that needs to be undertaken by GridSim entities when they receive events.
• ResGridlet - It represents a Gridlet submitted to the resource for processing. It contains
Gridlet object along with its arrival time and the ID of machine and PE allocated to
it.
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• GridStatistics - It records statistical data reported by other entities. It stores data
objects with their label and timestamp. At the end of simulation, a report-writer
entity queries recorded statistics of interest for report generation.
• Accumulator - It provides a placeholder for maintaining statistical values of a series of
data added to it. It can be queried for mean, sum, standard deviation, and the largest
and smallest values in the data series.
• GridSimShutdown - It waits for termination of all user entities to determine the end of
simulation and signals the report-writer to generate the report. It signals also to other
entities the end of the simulation.
• GridSimRandom - It provides static methods for incorporating randomness in data
used for any simulation. The idea is to reflect the uncertainty and the randomness that
could be present in the nature itself (e.g. the execution time of a Gridlet on a particular
resource, can vary depending on the local load)
The relationship between GridSim packages is shown in Fig. B.3.
Figure B.3: Relationship Between GridSim Packages.
B.1.4 GridBroker Java Package Design
The key components of the broker are:
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• Experiment - It is a placeholder for representing the configuration of simulation ex-
periments. It provides methods for updating and querying the experiment parameters
and status. The user entity invokes the broker entity and passes its requirements via
the experiment object. On receiving an experiment from its user, the broker schedules
Gridlets according to the optimization policy set for the experiment.
• UserEntity - It simulates the user and manages the forwarding of the user’s requirements
to the broker, recording of parameters of interest once results are received and ends the
simulation.
• Broker - It simulates the Grid resource broker. Once an experiment is received from
the user entity, it carries out resource discovery, determines deadline and budget val-
ues based on D and B factors, schedules the tasks, receives the results of application
processing and records parameters of interest. On user’s behalf it ends the simulation.
• BrokerResource - It is a placeholder for the broker to maintain a detailed record on the
resources it uses for processing user applications. It is used for maintaining resource
characteristics, a list of Gridlets assigned to the resource, the actual amount of MIPS
available to the user and a report on the Gridlets processed. These measurements help
in scheduling jobs dynamically at runtime.
• ReportWriter - It is used for creating a report at the end of each simulation.
The relationship between GridBroker packages is shown in Fig. B.4.
Figure B.4: Relationship Between GridBroker Packages.
B.1.5 Modeling Simulations with GridSim
Simulations with GridSim are in general modeled according to the following procedure:
1. Grid resources of different capability and configuration together with users with different
requirements are created.
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2. The user creates an experiment that contains an application description and sends
the requirements to the broker via the experiment interface (a number of Gridlets are
created and all parameters associated with jobs are defined).
3. The resource broker accesses the GIS and enquires the resource for its capability in-
cluding cost and then develops a scheduling policy for assigning Gridlets to resources
and coordinates the execution.
4. Gridlets that are mapped to specific resource are added to the Gridlets list in the broker
resource.
5. For each of the resources, a number of Gridlets, according to the usage policy in order
to avoid overloading resources with single user jobs, is selected.
6. The dispatcher then submits Gridlets to resources.
7. When the Gridlet processing completes, the resource returns it to the broker’s Gri-
dlet receptor module, which then measures and updates the runtime parameter. The
prediction of the job consumption rate for making scheduling decisions.
8. Steps 4-7 continue until all the Gridlets are processed or the broker exceeds deadline or
budget limits. The broker then returns updated experimental data along with processed
Gridlets back to the user.
For facilitating the construction of different scenarios, GridSim adopts a graphical user in-
terface (Visual Modeler - VM) with the following features:
• it enables the creation of many Grid users and resources with different requirements
and characteristics,
• it generates into Java code the simulation scenario which can be compiled and run with
GridSim,
• it saves project files and retrieves scenarios in/from XML language.
B.2 Introduced Changes to GridSim Components
In the following, the infrastructural and other changes done to the GridSim toolkit and
GridSim components are going to be presented.
B.2.1 Infrastructural Changes
Changes to the infrastructure of the GridSim toolkit include improvements to the usabil-
ity of the toolkit, the way how resource entities are created, simulation management and
management of personal trust experience for every participant.
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Figure B.5: Relationship of Class GUI to Other Classes.
Graphical User Interface (GUI)
Through the Graphical User Interface (GUI), a better management of the simulation scenarios
is achieved. It is implemented in a separate class (class GUI). The relationship of this class
to the others in the system is shown in Figure B.5.
The components used in the GUI class are from the Java Swing package. The types of
components used are JMenu, JTextField, JButton, JTextArea, JFrame and JApplet. The
user may load a preconfigured simulation scenario (class Experiment) from the menu ”Simu-
lation” and start the simulation through the button ”Start Simulation”. The overall output
is displayed in the JTextArea on the right side. In the JTextArea on the left, information
related to a specific Grid node could be achieved. The node number can be specified under
”Node Info”.
Specifying the provider’s number, a consumer collaborated with, it is possible to obtain a
graphical representation of the behavior (single behavior trust elements, according to the
user’s trust requirements and also a view of the absolute behavior trust (ABhvT)) of the
participant during the last collaboration.
Upon the request, the output of the simulation could also be saved as a text file.
Events are handled through an action listener. The action listener listens only to the clicking
of the JButtons.
The main method, is separated from class GridSim and integrated in part into the ”action
performed” method of the class GUI. In turn, the ”chosen” Experiment class will be executed.
Grid Resource Creation
Resources are created in the same way as in the GridSim toolkit. The introduced change,
as shown in Figure B.6, allows each user to ”own” a resource. The idea behind this is that
every Grid participant is potentially able to play both roles, consumer and provider, either
separately or at the same time. In our simulation environment, each user ”owns” a resource
where other participants in the environment (other than himself) could send their jobs to be
processed. Every other resource in the environment, depending on their capabilities and user’s
specific requirements (trust requirements included), is a potential partner for the upcoming
collaborations.
Resources have the same characteristics as in GridSim. These characteristics are specified in
the file, namely, resource name, architecture, operating system, number of machines, number
of PEs, MIPS (millions instructions per second) of each PE, time zone, processing cost
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Figure B.6: Creating Grid Resources.
(expressed in Grid dollars), communication speed, random seed and resource load during
peak hour, off-peak hour and holiday.
Class Experiment
The main method is separated from class GridSim. For each of the experiments, a separated
class is constructed. Each Experiment class is in charge of simulating a single simulation
scenario.
According to the characteristics of the scenarios that will be simulated, the needed changes
are going to be introduced in the respective Experiment classes:
• number of users/resources,
• users/resources basic characteristics/requests,
• users/resources trust requirements (initialization strategies, experiences considered, er-
ror tolerance, identity and/or behavior trust considerations, behavior trust elements of
interest, etc.),
• verification strategies and sub-strategies,
• deviations in the behavior of certain participant(s), introduced with different frequencies
(affecting any, a collection or the entirety of the behavior trust elements)
The main purpose for the Experiment class is simulation and organization of the output
Trust Container
Each of the consumers in the environment creates a storage component where the trust val-
ues regarding all the collaboration partners are saved for personal use during future direct
collaborations or to be offered to the others in the form of recommendations.
Before starting a collaboration, each user, after sorting out the most suitable resources ac-
cording to his ”computational requests”, consults the personal trust container. To assess the
trustworthiness of every single resource, the respective trust values (values) stored are going
to be used. If personal experience with the single resources exists, then this experience is
going to be used, otherwise, the initialization values expressed by the user according to the
initialization strategy (”coldstart” or ”warmstart”) will be used.
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After every verification (either ”online” or ”offline”), these trust values will be updated ac-
cordingly.
The purpose of such a container is to create a ”history of personal direct collaborations”,
thus personal experience for each user.
B.2.2 Other Changes
The other changes affect part of the existing classes in GridSim for adapting it to the trust
model implementation and simulation needs.
Certification Chanins - Assigning Certificates to Participants
A certificate in this model is represented by a ”virtual document” possessed by participants.
Here, only the names of the ”issuer” and of the ”receiver” are specified. Every participant
could be an issuer of a certificate. At the top there are some certification authorities named
after some German cities like: Marburg, Giessen and Frankfurt. The ”certificates” are not
really issued by the certification authorities; they are generated at the participants’ site once
they are created. GridSim already offers a way of assigning identities to users and resources.
The respective certification authorities are generated according to the Figure B.7.
Figure B.7: Generating Certification Authorities.
It means that from the entirety of the participants present in the environment:
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• part of them is randomly ”certified” directly by the ”first order” certification authorities
(Marburg, Giessen or Frankfurt),
• part of them is randomly ”certified” by the ”second order” certification authorities
(participants which were directly certified from the ”first order” CAs and
• the rest is randomly ”certified” by the ”third order” certification authorities (partici-
pants ”certified” from the ”second order” CAs).
A typical certification chain resulting from the simulations is represented by the certification
graph in Fig. B.8.
Figure B.8: Example of an Established Certification Chain Among Participants in the Envi-
ronment.
Integration of Participants’ Trust Requirements
The participants’ (users or resources) normal requirements and characteristics are extended
with the trust requirements. Normal requirements and characteristics under GridSim are:
For every user:
• user name;
• baud rate; max. simulation time; scheduling strategy; successive experiment delay;
• gridlet size; gridlet min. deviation; gridlet max. deviation;
• length size; length min. deviation; length max. deviation;
• file size; file min. deviation; file max. deviation ;
• output size; output min. deviation; output max. deviation;
• budget and deadline.
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For every resource:
• resource name;
• baud rate; peak load; off-peak load; holiday load;
• architecture; operating system; time zone; Grid$ per application operation (price in
”Grid dollars”); allocation policy; list of machines (together with their PEs and MIPS).
Figure B.9 is an example of the integration of the participant’s trust requirements to the
other requirements mentioned above.
Figure B.9: Integration of the Trust Requirements for a GridSim User Entity.
In Fig. B.9:
• errorRate - percentage of erroneous tasks a resource should send back to the consumer;
• weightPersonal - importance of the previous personal experience (if any) or personal
disposition expressed through the initial trust in the decision making process. Its value
vary in [0.0, 1.0];
• weightThird - importance of third parties’ experience (recommendations) in the decision
making process. Its values vary also in [0.0, 1.0] and the sum with weightPersonal should
be 1.0;
• acceptRecs - participants in the environment to get recommendations from.Its values
are 1.0 (known partners only), 0.5 (known partners only and their known partners), 0.0
(everyone);
• verifFreq - minimal verification frequency;
• verifStrat - the verification strategy. It has the values ”ONLINE” and ”OFFLINE”;
• errorTolerance - tolerance of the consumer toward the possible errors that a provider
introduces during the collaboration. Its minimal value is 0;
• collabID - identity trust value for the considered partner(s). The considered values
during the experiments were 1.0 (participants certified directly from first order CAs
only), 0.5 (participants certified directly from first order CAs and everyone that was
certified through these participants), 0.0 (everyone in the environment).
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Verification Strategies
The implementation of the ”online” and ”offline” verification strategies is shown in Fig. B.10
and B.11.
Figure B.10: ”Online” Verification Strategy.
Class GridResource
In order to have some ”natural” resource behaviors during the simulations, some status flags
are implemented:
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Figure B.11: ”Offline” Verification Strategy.
• free - the resource is online and accepts the user requests,
• busy - the resource is online but accepts no requests,
• off - resource is ”offline”.
The idea behind this categorization is to simulate the following behavior trust elements:
• availability - if free is ”true” than the specific resource available,
• accessibility - if busy is ”true” than resource is available but not accessible,
• if off is ”true”, than the specific resource is neither accessible nor available.
Introducing Processing Errors
Errors in the responses a resource sends back to a user are also implemented through an
”error flag”. Errors are introduced either randomly or at a certain frequency.
An example of the error ”integration” in the response a resource send back to a user is given
in Figure B.12.
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Figure B.12: Introducing Errors.
Class ResourceCharacteristics
An additional change to the RessourceCharacteristics class is the ”error” variable (Fig. B.13).
Figure B.13: ”Error” Variable to the Resource Characteristics.
It is used for declaring the frequency of error introduction from a specific resource to its
response. Allowed values, which specify the percentage of responses containing an error, are
in the segment [0, 1].
Class Gridlet
Two new variables added to class Gridlet, checked and error (Fig. B.14 and Fig. B.15).
Figure B.14: Variable for showing if a Gridlet was verified.
The checked variable has two statuses:
• ”false” - it means that the Gridlet was not checked for errors and
• ”true” - the Gridlet was verified for any possible errors.
The error variable has also two statuses:
• ”false” - it means that the Gridlet was not containing any error and
• ”true” - the Gridlet was erroneous.
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Figure B.15: Variable for showing if a Gridlet is erroneous.
Simulation Time
The total simulation time is calculated in seconds based on:
• time needed for sorting out the present resources based on their trust value and
user/application trust requirements. The time is a function that depends on the time
needed for calculating identity trust and behavior trust (personal experience or third
parties’ experience; ABhvT or RBhvT);
• time to gather trust information;
• time to evaluate partners;
• time to send Gridlets to resources;
• time for processing the Gridlet at the Grid resources;
• time to receive the Gridlets back;
• time for verification.
This is shown also in Fig. B.16.
Simulation Output
The output of the simulation is text and graphical. In the text, output information on the
simulation process is given. This information has to do with the participants involved in the
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Figure B.16: Total Simulation Time.
simulation, participants’ characteristics, behavior of the participants during the simulation,
simulation statistics (total simulation time, time for processing Gridlets, results verified),
etc.
In the graphical output, upon user request, it is possible to have for every participant a
graphical representation of the behavior that its counterparts showed during the very last
collaboration. Here, absolute behavior trust (ABhvT) and all the behavior trust elements
under verification (RBhvT) are presented. An example is presented in Fig. B.17 and B.18.
Furthermore, each of the participants has the possibility to compare the behavior of each
of their partners during the last collaboration with the bahavior shown by them previously
(Fig. B.19).
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Figure B.17: Simulation Output in the Graphical User Interface.
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Figure B.18: Graphical Representation of the Behavior of a Participant in the Last Collab-
oration (for the participant under observation, except for availability all the other behavior
trust elements contained errors).
Figure B.19: Comparing Current Behavior to the One shown Previously (the shown results
were obtained for an injected error rate of 5%, clearance number 0, minimal verification
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